The constitutional text in a constitutional democracy does not necessarily constrain constitutional change. Quite the contrary, constitutional change in a constitutional democracy often occurs in ways that depart from the rigid procedures governing constitutional amendment enshrined in the text of the constitutional.

In this article, I illuminate this peculiar phenomenon in comparative perspective, drawing from the constitutional traditions of Canada, Germany, India, South Africa and the United States. In addition to illuminating distinctions in the amendment practices of liberal democratic constitutional states, I deploy those contrasts as a springboard to substantive insights about fundamental principles of statehood, namely sovereignty and legitimacy.

Restitution for civil wrongs, also known as restitutionary damages, is a legal response through which the defendant’s wrongful gain is awarded to the claimant. James Edelman has recently advocated two different restitutionary responses for wrongs. One response, termed ‘restitutionary damages’, would aim to compel the wrongdoer to give back to the victim a wrongful gain, whereas the other response, ‘disgorgement damages’, would oblige the wrongdoer to give up a wrongful gain for the benefit of the claimant.

In the first case, the claimant would obtain what should have never left his assets. In the second case, the claimant would be the beneficiary of a judicial decision according to which a wrongful gain should not be kept by the wrongdoer. In this essay, I seek to demonstrate that this taxonomy cannot be accepted. I argue that Edelman’s ‘disgorgement damages’ are the only true example of restitution for wrongs, whereas his ’restitutionary damages’ are simply compensatory damages which are quantified in a particular fashion. Edelman’s ‘restitutionary damages’ might appear to deprive the defendant of his gain, and thus to achieve a restitutionary goal. Yet they nullify the victim’s loss and therefore have a compensatory nature. They are ‘pseudo-restitutionary damages’. In opposition to the dual theory, I submit a model of restitutionary damages based upon a single response which is coherent with the tenets of corrective justice. Given that it deals mainly with Edelman’s ‘restitutionary damages’, this article is not so much about restitution for wrongs but rather about compensation, which is what Edelman’s ‘restitutionary damages’ really concerns. The theory which I propose, based upon a single restitutionary response for wrongs, solves the taxonomic incoherence of Edelman’s dual theory. It also reflects the law as we find it, being supportable by reference to the available judicial authorities.

Does the fact that my actions cause someone to lack access to the objects of her human rights make me a human rights violator? Is behaving in such a way that we deprive someone of access to the objects of her human rights even when we could have avoided behaving in such a way, sufficient to maintain that we have violated her human rights? When an affluent country pursues domestic policies that will foreseeably cause massive deprivation abroad in order to improve its already prosperous economy, has this country violated the human rights of the very poor just by doing so? If international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization pursue policies that lead to an increase in the global poverty rate, are such organizations human rights violators? Can an individual undertaking certain actions in the market place that render insecure the access of the worst-off to the objects of their human rights be blamed for violating their rights?In this article I discuss the thesis that claims that whenever we cause, or contribute to the cause of, someone else’s lack of access to the objects of her human rights, we are human rights violators. I contend that this thesis, which seems to underpin the arguments of many cosmopolitan authors taking part of the global justice debate, is mistaken. In order to achieve this end, I analyze several alternative formulations of the causal thesis. My conclusion is that before it can be said that an agent has violated someone else's human rights, it has to be proven that this agent has caused, or contributed to the cause of, a state of affairs where someone lacks access to the object of some of her human rights, by infringing a duty not to do so. Furthermore, I maintain that this must be a perfect, as opposed to an imperfect, duty.

Imagine the following. You have been asked to critically evaluate the criminal process in your home jurisdiction. In particular, you have been asked to determine whether the criminal process currently in place appropriately balances the need to maximize the chances of getting things right—of acquitting the innocent and convicting the guilty—with the need to minimize the chances of getting things wrong—of acquitting the guilty and convicting the innocent. How would you proceed? What rules of evidence and procedure would you put in place? Would you exclude germane inculpatory evidence that has been obtained in violation of the accused’s constitutional rights? Would you permit spouses to testify against each other, or allow the jury to draw adverse inferences from an accused’s failure to testify on his or her behalf? These, in broad outlines, are the sorts of issues addressed by Larry Laudan in his superb Truth, Error, and Criminal Law.

Constitutional Goods, a work of political theory presented as constitutional theory, foregrounds law. Law is central to its method. The dialogic (or inclusive) theory developed in the book is based, we are told, on ‘a unity of elements found in actual case law.’ Law provides, then, much of the raw material on the basis of which the three conceptions of liberalism (libertarian, egalitarian and communitarian) are identified. And court cases are vital to the process of ‘sifting’ through which aspects of each conception that are of enduring value are identified and synthesized within a final ‘inclusive conception’ of the liberal constitution. Law is also central substantively. It plays a role in the high moment of the theory—the mutual recognition of citizen and ethos—and permeates (and justifies) every mode of social and political interaction within the ideal political community that Constitutional Goods presents. State, community, and individual are wrapped up and enfolded within law (or, as Brudner prefers to style it, ‘the Law’) within the inclusive theory.

In this paper I focus on chapter 9 of Constitutional Goods, with its analysis of sex and family. In that chapter Alan Brudner uses the constitutional theory that he has developed throughout the book and applies it to two key issues of state regulation: sexual relationships and abortion. The arguments he uses with respect to both issues are novel, and the conclusion concerning abortion is particularly controversial. So there is much to say about those arguments, and discussion of them is the focus of the second half of the paper. But I start with some general remarks on Brudner’s project as a whole: the project of inclusivity. It is necessary to discuss the concept of inclusivity not only because it underpins the arguments of chapter 9. The idea of inclusivity is fundamental to Constitutional Goods as a whole, and in the first part of the paper I argue that this idea is problematic both conceptually and normatively.

This paper is concerned with certain connections and oppositions that Brudner perceives between liberty, equality and community. As I understand his project, he begins with a strong atomist conception of the worth of individuals, which he calls libertarian, and claims to show how egalitarian and communitarian ideas of individual worth are unavoidably contained in the original idea and must be developed out of it in order to arrive at a coherent and conceptually stable view. This is the inclusive conception, which retains the libertarian and egalitarian moments as subordinate but essential aspects of a liberal ethical community. This paper is sceptical of the validity of the proposed deduction. It concentrates on a few passages, which purport to show how an initial position has implications that nevertheless are in contradiction with the premises from which they are derived. As a result of this concentration, the paper, unavoidably, ignores a great wealth of illuminating material that, together with the impressive sweep of the project as a whole, fully justifies the attention the book is receiving, even if, as I believe, the overall argument does not succeed.

In Constitutional Goods, Alan Brudner seeks to articulate a novel conception of justice that will inform the content of the ideal liberal constitution. The content and justification of this conception ofjustice are the topics of this paper. The content of this novel conception ofjustice is constituted by what Brudner describes as an inclusive conception of liberalism, and its justification is grounded on an account of public reason that is presented in opposition to that of John Rawls. I argue that we should reject both the content and justification of Brudner’s conception ofjustice. Brudner is unable to construct an inclusive conception of liberalism from elements of libertarianism, egalitarianism, and communitarianism, and his account of public reason lacks the properties of fairness and reciprocity that differentiate a reasonable agreement from a modus vivendi. This paper therefore defends a Rawlsian political conception ofjustice and justification from Brudner’s criticisms and proposed alternatives.

Alan Brudner’s closely-argued, richly-textured and wide-ranging work, Constitutional Goods, provides a striking and original account of the rule of law and its implications for legitimate government. Since the rule of law includes the enforcement of substantive principles ofjustice, it requires a clear separation of powers between court and legislature. The role of the court is chiefly confined to pure practical reason, determining what the public reason of the liberal consti-tution requires. It is the role of the legislative assembly to give its assent to governmental measures that apply the principles ofjustice to empirical circumstances, where the scope for reasonable disagreement provokes a transition from natural law to political judgment. Judicial review carries no anti-democratic implications because it defends the conceptual boundaries of popular decision-making: ‘Democracy is not defeated but protected if the court invalidates a law no free person could impose on himself, for the majority has no more authority to pass such a law than an autocrat nor any jurisdiction to decide by fiat a question to which there is a correct legal answer.’

This paper is about the place of religion in Alan Brudner’s Constitutional Goods. More generally, it offers some thoughts on the place of religion in constitutional theory and political philosophy today. This theologico-political question was central for many centuries, but gradually faded as our secular age affirmed itself. Recent political and social events at the European and at the global level have firmly turned the tide.