Legitimate reasons for the imposition of non-tariff measures (NTMs) within regulations have triggered their extensive use. Among these measures, technical barriers to trade (TBTs) and sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures allow countries to impose restrictions on the import of low-quality products suspected of harming domestic consumers’ health, plant life, or the environment. This paper analyses two regulative and standard-like NTMs – TBTs and SPS measures – and the quality of traded products that is driven by their imposition, which is a general underlying motive for the adoption of such regulations. A dummy variable measuring the existence of these NTMs and a count variable indicating their stringency are used in the analysis. Moreover, two other variables indicate flows of NTMs imposed in each year and stocks of these NTMs accumulated over years. The results indicate that TBTs and SPS measures do indeed imply a higher quality of traded products. Stringent TBTs with more regulations imposed in each year (i.e. flows of count TBTs) have the largest impact on the quality of traded products. However, for SPS measures, only the existence of a regulation (i.e. the dummy variable on flows of SPS measures) on a traded product has the strongest impact on its quality.

Unhappy with the rulings of the WTO dispute settlement system, which disproportionately targeted US use of trade remedies, the United States ended the entire system in 2019. There are multiple hurdles to agreeing to new terms of trade remedy use and thus potentially restoring some form of binding dispute settlement. First, a change would affect access to policy flexibility by the now large number of users of trade remedies. Second, although China's exports are the overwhelming target of trade remedies, exporters in other countries increasingly find themselves caught up in trade remedy actions linked to China. Third, critical differences posed by China's economic model may call for new rules for trade remedies, but no consensus on those rules has emerged. Even some of the most promising reforms have practical limitations, create additional challenges, or may be politically unviable.

With its narrow focus on price-based policies and ‘explicit’ carbon prices, the EU carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) aims to prevent carbon leakage by ensuring that imported products ‘bear’ the same exact economic costs ‘borne’ by EU products. The proposed US border carbon adjustment (BCA) and the recent proposal for a global steel and aluminium arrangement (GSAA), by contrast, reflect a broader focus on environmental equivalence and recourse to punitive or quasi-punitive remedies. All recently proposed carbon border measures suffer from specific limitations. Further, albeit to a different extent, they are all associated with problematic aspects in terms of WTO law compatibility. This research note enquires whether the GSAA could be fine-tuned at the regulatory design stage in such a way as to provide an environmentally effective and WTO law compatible way forward. The analysis illustrates that recourse to an installation-based approach, emission limit values and product standards would achieve these goals. Nonetheless, the implementation of this ambitious strategy would be fraught with political obstacles.

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) may potentially reduce trade barriers between China and countries along the Belt and Road (BR) route, affecting the positions in Global Value Chains (GVCs) of agricultural products of these countries. This study explores the BRI influence on the GVC positions using a global computable general equilibrium (CGE) model and focusing on China and the BR countries. The study finds that the reduction of tariff barriers and non-tariff barriers between countries along ‘the Belt and Road’ results in increased producer prices and volumes of almost all agricultural products exported from China, which improves the position of China in the GVCs of these agricultural products in our best estimate scenario. Countries along the BR route also benefit from the reduction in trade barriers, with improved positions in the GVCs of agricultural products in the best estimate scenario, especially those products that have comparative advantages in GVCs.

This study examines how US discretionary practices developed in the past decade have affected antidumping duty rates against exporters. Using the most recent data on dumping margin calculations, we find that the US Department of Commerce (DOC) has developed discretionary practices in a more nuanced manner to inflate dumping margins, which have primarily targeted market economy exporters. Our case studies document that practices known as targeted dumping and particular market situations appear to serve as trade protectionism for market economy exporters, especially those who could otherwise have received a negative determination without such practices. Furthermore, the DOC has brought an apparent change in its application of discretionary practices after the Trade Extension Preferences Act of 2015, leading to much higher dumping margins for the market economy. Along with empirical and case analyses, we further examine the World Trade Organization (WTO) jurisprudence concerning the extent to which the discretion of an investigating authority in anti-dumping proceedings can be condoned in the WTO.

Decades of negotiation to extend the GATT/WTO system to address subsidies have never produced the sort of uniform, scheduled rules that apply to tariffs or even services. Instead, WTO members have developed rules to demarcate permissible and impermissible subsidies. In this paper, I argue that the WTO approach is now hampered by shifts in the share of global trade away from geopolitically aligned, wealthy states and the growth of global supply chains. These pressures were magnified by the accession of China, with its centrality to global trade and recurrent geopolitical tensions with the United States. The challenges in facing cooperation over subsidies suggest limits to the ability for a ‘rules based’ approach to handle substantial changes in the global trading system.

Why are highly educated people more supportive of international trade? Two competing explanations exist for this empirical finding. On the one hand, the economic interest approach suggests that the highly educated realize that trade can benefit them economically. On the other hand, the ideational perspective argues that this relationship arises because highly educated people are more cosmopolitan, and cosmopolitanism is positively related to support for trade. To contribute to this debate on the education–trade attitude nexus, we present and empirically test four hypotheses. Using data from the PEW Global Attitudes survey (2014) for 36 countries at various levels of development, we find that as expected by the economic interest approach, the effect of education on people's perceptions of the consequences of trade is conditional on respondents’ individual and subnational economic context. The results thus show that economic interest at least partly explains education's effects on public opinion towards trade. Beyond adding to this specific debate, the research note makes several broader contributions to research on trade and public opinion.

The ‘public morals’ exception remains a key aspect of the international trade system; however, its outer bounds have never been precisely defined. This question became pertinent in the US–Tariff Measures panel report, which expansively read the exception to justify a wide range of economic interests, including prohibitions on economic espionage, anti-competitive behaviour, and the regulation of government takings. This note challenges the panel's interpretation, arguing that it is flawed and essentially amounts to a factual standard of review. It proposes an alternative approach to public morals review, which involves an objective standard of review of facts and law, while providing adequate deference to Members’ own factual determinations. It further engages with the issue of extraterritoriality, defending an approach based on Members’ legislative jurisdiction as this strikes a balance between Members’ right to regulate trade for moral purposes and the interests of the international community.

The tariff preferences in FTAs do not apply automatically to all imports. Instead, importers can request to use the tariff preferences, but must then show that the imported goods fulfil the formal requirements (e.g. rules of origin) of the FTA. This is costly, which is a likely reason why tariff preferences are not always used. This research note examines preference utilization under the FTA between the EU and South Korea, which was formally ratified in 2015 (but had been provisionally applied from 2011). We use firm and transaction level data for Swedish imports from South Korea during November 2016 to answer the question ‘Who uses the EU's FTAs?’ With information on firm size, product category, import mode (direct imports or customs warehousing), preference margin, potential duty savings, and transaction size, we provide a detailed picture of when firms choose to utilize the tariff preferences. The results suggest that the differences across importers are not primarily related to firm size, as is sometimes suggested in extant literature. We also find that it is the size of the import transaction rather than the size of the preference margin that determines preference utilization.

This article critically examines the proposed waiver of intellectual property (IP) rights for COVID-19 vaccines under the World Trade Organization Agreement's Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), which was initiated in October 2020 when the pandemic raged and vaccines were unavailable. However, the landscape has now changed and the waiver may no longer be necessary. The Outcome Document, introduced in the TRIPS Council in May 2022, along with Ministerial Decision of June 2022 recognizes this by focusing on easing the requirements to use TRIPS-flexibilities to accomplish wider and cheaper access. In so doing, the Ministerial Decision reinforces the notion that TRIPS flexibilities can be a useful part of the policy toolkit, even in times of crisis. After providing an overview of the context and outlining justifications for the waiver proposal, the article analyses and identifies key implications and possible effects of the Ministerial Decision. The article concludes that while the Document may not be a perfect solution to the issue of access to vaccines, flexible application of TRIPS-flexibilities is a better resolution in the current environment, especially given the need for further innovation to combat COVID-19 and future pandemics.

Since its accession to the WTO twenty years ago, China's image has shifted from a good student aspiring to assimilate itself into the multilateral trading system to one that is increasingly alienated from key WTO principles. How has China's perspective on WTO been evolving? What are the reasons behind China's changing perspective? This paper answers these questions from the Chinese perspective with a comprehensive analysis of the key moments in China's first two decades in the WTO, followed by practical suggestions on how to engage China more constructively in the WTO and beyond.

This article offers the justification for a type of carbon customs union in which countries with a diverse range of high-ambition domestic climate measures would adopt a common external tariff on carbon intensive imports from countries outside the union. We explain why any pragmatic approach to carbon border measures (CBMs) is likely to create problems under prevailing interpretations of the World Trade Organization's (WTO) primary rules. Given the urgency of the climate crisis and the fact that the legality of a CBM – no matter how designed – will be a question of first impression for any WTO dispute panel, WTO consistency should take a backseat to considerations of domestic legal and political feasibility in designing a CBM. Instead of trying to fit a CBM into current understandings of WTO rules, WTO members should renegotiate WTO rules to permit a range of aggressive, but likely trade-restrictive, decarbonization measures. Having said that, we also recognize that WTO negotiations may take longer than optimal from a decarbonization standpoint. We therefore suggest an approach that would allow WTO members to take advantage of flexibilities that existing WTO rules afford.

The commonplace narrative regarding China's participation in the WTO is that the original expectations have not been matched in subsequent experience. China has not behaved in accordance with the spirit (and sometimes the letter) of its commitments. Reactions by trading partners have been from critical to hostile, and some have even called for a WTO without China, ignoring the boost to international trade that China's accession has provoked. Yet, China's participation in the WTO cannot remain un-addressed. The US almost brought the WTO to its knees largely because of China, and the EU has enacted laws to counteract China's trade expansion. In this short paper, we argue that the solution to the China-issue passes through an addition and re-invigoration of the multilateral trade rules.