The focus and context of the great powers' interest in the Persian Gulf has altered —often subtly, sometimes dramatically —since Britain established its hegemony in the region in the 19th century. Britain engaged in a lucrative trade, but primarily sought to protect imperial communications and the approaches to India. Today, it is oil that gives the region its strategic importance. For a number of years after World War II, Britain remained the paramount power in the area, maintaining maritime peace, handling the external affairs of the Gulf sheikhdoms, mediating local disputes, dominating trade. Since Britain's withdrawal from the Gulf in 1971, the situation has become somewhat more messy.

The flood of attention that underdeveloped economies have received in recent years has revived interest in the normative questions of political economy. For the society that stands on the threshold of development apparently can choose among economic systems with different normative properties, each one of which claims enthusiastic followers. One such question concerns the impact of economic organization on freedom. Does a centrally administered economy restrict freedom by achieving its objectives through coercive means? Is the market economy fundamental to free institutions?.

The comparative ease with which authoritarian groups have come to power in nations where large parties stood pledged to defend the democratic order to the bitter end has become one of the most disturbing elements in modern world politics. Such developments have brought into question the validity of accepted liberal-democratic norms governing the behavior of responsible leaders, both in the domestic opposition to the authoritarian regime and in foreign governments whose security arrangements are adversely affected by the suppression of free institutions. Basically, these traditional norms have implied non-interference with constitutional political processes and acceptance of their consequences. On June 23, 1933, Hitler outlawed the German Social Democratic Party (SPD), which for over four decades, until 1932, had been the largest German party and, since the founding of the Weimar Republic iri 1918, the principal advocate and defender of the democratic system and a peaceful foreign policy. In considering the actions of its leadership from the accession of Hitler to the outlawing of the party, this article seeks to contribute to a re-examination of these accepted norms, particularly insofar as they concern the behavior of a liberal-democratic mass party faced with a government seeking total power.

On November 17, 1969, after a three-year delay, the United States and the Soviet Union initiated Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). Involving strategic systems and policies vital to the security of both superpowers, their allies, and the world, these talks have the potential of becoming the most important series of United States-Soviet negotiations since World War II. They can affect not only the military-technical aspects of the strategic balance but United States-Soviet political relations and the future role of nuclear weapons. Given the complexity and sensitivity of the subject, it is not surprising that negotiations are still continuing. Even if an early, limited agreement is reached, SALT meetings can be expected to span a period of many years.

The first general strike in the history of England, with its mass labor action, was bound to attract strong interest from the workers' state which proclaimed as its rallying cry: “Workers of All Countries, Unite!” Soviet concern for the British working class followed logically from the active participation of Marx and Engels in the movement, and the continued attention shown by Lenin to this important “section” of the “world proletariat.”

Social science writings have one thing in common with products of the artistic spirit—they readily lend themselves to dating by their “stylistic” traits. This is not a preferred manner for dating scientific products. Science, like technology, is generally regarded as cumulative in its development. To the extent that this is so, it is possible to place a scientific work in its historical position by examining the stage of knowledge that it reveals. However, the store of social science knowledge grows very slowly indeed. The result is that much of social science impresses one as being modern more by virtue of various stylistic traits than by demonstrable additions to, or modifications of, our stock of substantive (or methodological) knowledge.

Western observers remain fundamentally divided on the motives behind Soviet policy toward the West. An examination of these motives must be based on understanding elite opinion in the U.S.S.R. on East-West issues, as well as the scope of political conflict and consensus. The writings and public comments of prominent Soviet foreign policy officials over the last decade reveal a broad spectrum of views and persisting signs of political tension on issues of arms control policy, foreign trade and economic ties, and competition with the West in the Third World. Reform-minded officials have pressed for expansion of cooperation with the West as a matter of practical self-interest in the age of nuclear weapons and advanced technology. More conservative officials have resisted efforts to mute competition and have sought to preserve more insular policies. Proponents of expanded ties to the West openly pressed their case when détente flourished in the early 1970s, and many of their arguments found reflection in statements by the Soviet leadership. The arguments of conservative spokesmen have resonated anew, however, as East-West tensions have mounted since the late 1970s.

AS the revived study of the politics of tropical Africa by Americans enters its second decade,1 scholars have on the whole tempered youthful enthusiasm with an adolescent awareness of the complexity of their subject.

Authoritarian regimes repress to prevent mass resistance to their rule. In doing so, regimes’ security forces require information about the dissidents who mobilize such resistance. Political competition, which fuels partisan rivalries, offers one solution to this problem by motivating civilians to provide needed information to security forces. Yet civilians share information about any political opponents, not just dissidents, which creates a challenge for regimes that want to target dissidents. Drawing on novel archival data from the immediate aftermath of the 1973 coup that brought Augusto Pinochet to power in Chile, a period that included civilian collaboration with repression, this article presents evidence that close pre-coup political competition is associated with more frequent repression and more targeting of non-dissidents. The author uses pre-coup democratic elections to measure political competition and addresses the challenge of estimating political preferences unaffected by repression. Qualitative evidence and further quantitative tests probe implications of the partisan rivalry mechanism and account for alternative explanations.

The United States is at present creditor to the world. Since the war more than $25 billion has been put into various foreign aid programs. Government loans, military assistance, ECA assistance have combined in a great assault on world problems. Yet, great as has been the government-to-government assistance extended by the United States, and substantial as has been aid given by such organs of American policy as the Export-Import Bank not only to foreign governments but to private business, it is not only conceded but argued by government officials as well as private business that a job remains to be done which cannot be done in this way. For the doing of that job, private enterprise and private capital investment are needed. In testimony on various aspects of the Point IV program over the course of the last year, this necessity has been stressed no less by government than by business witnesses.

The Russian Research Center was established February 1, 1948. It is supported by the Carnegie Corporation on a grant covering the period until July 1, 1953. The Research Center is an integral part of Harvard University and the senior members of its staff are all members of the Harvard faculty. Although the Center is not directly concerned with instruction, there is close cooperation with the Soviet Program of the Committee on International and Regional Studies, and a number of members of the Center staff teach in this program.

The basis of NATO deterrence strategy is the manipulation of the nuclear "threshold." When NATO's conventional component is strong and the exact nature of its nuclear threshold is uncertain to Warsaw Pact countries, NATO's deterrent will be strong. Attempts to improve the “quality” of the nuclear arsenal by making the outcome of nuclear conflict more predictable weaken NATO's deterrent power. It is the possibility that NATO may use nuclear weapons, as well as the uncertainty of the consequences of such use, that strengthens the deterrent. The number of nuclear weapons in the NATO arsenal could be reduced with no appreciable damage to the deterrent posture. Qualitative improvements in the conventional component, while increasing deterrent strength, also serve as safeguards in case of deterrence failures. To the extent that political unity within NATO increases the predictability of a NATO response to Warsaw Pact aggression, it is possible that political disunity actually adds to deterrent strength.

During the past several years, the Western world has been treated to the arresting spectacle of a long-isolated Soviet power bloc emerging, slowly at first and then with increasing momentum, from its autarkic hibernation into the dazzling limelight of international economic competition. The most dramatic aspect of this emergence, no doubt, has been the Soviet adoption of foreign aid to less-developed countries as a useful and appropriate instrument of national policy.

Foreign policy decision making is the result of a complex political process in which the political values and style of the chief executive play a large part. The case of Canada's decision, in 1963, to acquire nuclear weapons illustrates that external events and pressures generated by Canada's international obligations were processed through complex political interactions. The Government of Prime Minister Diefenbaker was unable to take the nuclear weapons decision because of two splits in the Cabinet, only one of which was pertinent to nuclear weapons policy. The decision was taken by Leader of the Opposition Pearson alone and in conformity with his personal values, because of his political style which commanded deference. The approach used combines historical detail with political analysis.