Many recent studies argue that labor organization and government partisanship were important determinants of the economic performance of the advanced industrial democracies during stagflation. They do not, however, take into account the potential impact on performance of position in the international economy; the relationships reported may therefore be largely spurious. Even when the strong effects of international position, most notably the extent of dependence on imported sources of oil, were controlled for, domestic political structures remained powerful determinants of economic performance during stagflation. “Corporatist” political economies dominated by leftist governments in which labor movements were densely and centrally organized, and “market” political economies in which labor was much weaker and rightist governments were predominant, performed significantly better than the less coherent cases in which the power of labor was distributed asymmetrically between politics and the market.

The theory of games is used to investigate several controversial issues in the literature on the balance of power. A simple model of an international system is presented as an n-person noncooperative game in extensive form, and the stability of both constant-sum and nonconstant-sum systems is examined. It is shown not only that constant-sum systems with any number of actors from two through five can be stable, but also that stability is actually promoted by conflict of interest. Contrary to much of the literature, however, there is a well-defined sense in which the most stable system is one with three actors. In each type of system, there is at least one distribution of power that leads not only to system stability but also to peace. Some of these peaceful distributions are more stable than others, and these more stable distributions are shown to be characterized by inequality rather than by equality of power. It is possible to distinguish between a bipolar and a multipolar type of stable distribution, the properties of each of which resemble, to some degree, assertions made about them in the literature. Finally, contrary to much of the recent literature on international cooperation, an increase in the ability of states to make binding agreements may actually diminish the stability of international systems.

The weapons succession process is an analysis of military-technological change that draws upon classical economics and recent theories of bureaucratic politics. The analysis focuses on the institutional mechanisms for reconciling the demand for weapons with the supply of weapons. In wartime, the demand for weapons, determined in battle, shapes military-technological change. In peacetime, different styles of military-technological change depend on different types of supplier institutions; military-technological change is described as “baroque” in the West and “conservative” in the Soviet Union. The essay speculates about the implications of different styles of military-technological change for economic development and for arms limitation.

The deceleration of industrial growth in India since the mid-sixties has opened up a debate over industrial policy as the new government of Rajiv Gandhi has attempted to replace many bureaucratic controls by market processes. A central issue is whether the deceleration is due primarily to inadequate investment in key sectors of the economy (a point on which there is considerable agreement) or whether resources have also been inefficiently employed. State controls put in place by antibureaucratic and anticapitalist socialists created interests within the bureaucracy, the governing Congress Party, and the business community, which sustain an industrial structure that the present government, its new orientation notwithstanding, will find difficult to dismantle.

For many scholars and observers of the Middle East, the uniqueness of the Arabs has proved to be far more interesting than those areas of Arab political life that exhibit similarities with politics elsewhere. Some of the studies reviewed here provide a partial corrective to this gap. They suggest that Arab politics, much like politics in other settings, is concerned with issues of socioeconomic change and conflict, problems of legitimacy, the role of competing ideologies, and elite factionalism. Those of the studies that highlight the weaknesses of pan-Arabism are more persuasive than those that emphasize its vitality. What is needed now is the ability to determine where we can usefully generalize about Arab politics and where politics in the Arab world are in fact unique. The social-scientific approach is deemed more likely to accomplish this analytical goal than the traditional area-studies and policy approaches.

Aside from language, students of international relations in the United States and Great Britain have several things in common: parallel developments in the emergence of international relations as a field of study after World War I, and more recent efforts to broaden the field by drawing security issues and changes in the international political economy under the broad umbrella of “international studies.” But a review of four recent books edited by British scholars demonstrates that there is also a “distance” between British and American scholarship. Compared with dominant trends in the United States, the former, though hardly monolithic and producing a rich and varied literature, is still very much attached to historical analysis and the concept of an “international society” that derives from the period in modern history in which Britain played a more prominent role in international politics. Because trends in scholarship do, in fact, reflect national political experience, the need continues for transnational cooperation among scholars in the quest for strong theories in international relations.