Recent work on political development fails because it does not address the fundamental questions of “developmental theory.” The questions, answered in the essay, are: What “grows” in the passage from rudimentary to “modern” polities? What is the polity in its rudimentary form? Why is advancement from the primal to the advanced form ineludible? Through what stages does it pass? What forces move it through its passage? Political development is conceived as the necessarily increasing politicalization of society through six stages; and, along with this, as the gradual transformation of ceremonial, theatrical polities into “efficient,” managerial ones.

The relationship between Soviet Islam and the Islamic revival outside the U.S.S.R. is neither unidimensional nor definitionally antagonistic. Although bogged down in a costly civil war in Afghanistan, the Soviet leaders have tried to maintain a public stance of tolerance toward Islam. Recent Soviet writings reflect a new sophistication, which demonstrates unblinkered consideration of Islam as both a social and a political force. The quiescent state of Islam in the Muslim regions of the U.S.S.R., where indigenous populations practice a nondoctrinal, heavily ritualistic religion, further makes it unlikely that the Soviets are following aggressive policies in Southwest Asia because they fear Islamic fundamentalism at home.

This essay is an analysis of the implications of misperception—the inaccurate assessment by one actor of the other actor's preferences—in international relations. The author finds that misperception cannot affect the choice of an actor with a dominant strategy, although it can affect that actor's expectations as long as both actors are self-interested and seek to maximize their own payoffs. Misperception creates conflict only in a narrowly circumscribed range of situations, and even then the misperceived actor has no incentive to mask its true preferences. An actor who deceives does so in order to facilitate coordination through the other's misperception of its preferences, and thus to avoid conflict—not to create it. Three possible outcomes can occur when both actors misperceive, and in only one of the three does misperception cause conflict that would otherwise be avoidable. In a formal analysis of the limited set of situations that characterize international crises, misperception is found neither to create conflict nor to lead to the escalation of crisis into war.

An examination of the major motifs of dissident political literature from Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Hungary in the 1970s reveals a certain commonality of understanding and suggests that dissent is itself a complex, multicausal phenomenon likely to pervade the region for some time to come. Criticisms of the existing system are based on a rejection of dictatorship and its concomitant intellectual rigidity, economic inefficiency, and social alienation. The dissidents' vision of a better socialist society, in contrast, is one of decentralized decision making and of plural centers of power operating within the context of respect for human rights. The tactics put forward by the dissidents derive from these ideas: open discussion, mass mobilization within a legal framework that respects the rights of minorities, and pressure on established elites to make the necessary changes.

During the last decade, the concept of patrimonialism has become firmly embedded in political science and the sociological literature, being used primarily to explain the operation of bureaucracies in the underdeveloped world. This research note examines some of the usages of the term and attempts to assess its explanatory value. It is suggested that, as employed in much recent literature, “patrimonialism” has not contributed a great deal to the understanding of underdeveloped polities. The author argues that this is primarily because the literature has generally ignored the broader structural factors of which the phenomenon of patrimonialism is a manifestation. Taking account of these structural factors and locating patrimonialism within the broader context of underdevelopment will better equip us to understand the character and operation of Third World bureaucracies.

The contradiction between Israeli and Palestinian goals and Israel's refusal to negotiate with the Palestine Liberation Organization have caused a profound diplomatic impasse. Moreover, the PLO's dependence on Arab hosts has embroiled it in secondary-level conflicts with Arab states. Although the PLO has gained their moral, diplomatic, and financial support, it has posed a threefold challenge: rulers resent the military cost of confronting Israel; Palestinian raids precipitate Israeli retaliatory actions against host territories; and the presence of autonomous Palestinian political and military forces undermines the host regimes' sovereignty and legitimacy. The review essay explores the ramifications of these Palestinian-Israeli and Palestinian-Arab dilemmas, and assesses the likelihood of a compromise settlement by creating a Palestinian state on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

Five recent books reveal the beginnings of important new work in conceptualizing the place of human rights concerns in national foreign policies. The moral force of claims of human rights requires that they be given serious consideration in foreign policy. Philosophical analysis also shows that categorical moral distinctions between personal (or civil and political) and economic and social rights must be abandoned. Any justifiable priority for one class of rights must rest on strategic or political, not conceptual or moral, grounds. Since human rights are only one of many foreign policy concerns, tradeoffs with other goals, interests, and values will be necessary. However, human rights and the national interest are often complementary. The “tradeoffs” actually made should be principled, instrumental decisions, rather than apparently ad hoc or cynical sacrifices of human rights.