¹ Ardagh, John, The New French Revolution (London 1968), 347Google Scholar. Nevertheless, Ardagh provides an excellent introduction to French life in 1968.

² This is not to say that political socialization research is relevant only to studying intergenerational consistencies. An obvious further point for inquiry is those circumstances under which different generations have undergone significantly different life experiences. A further cautionary note: although political socialization data, and psychological data in general, are often necessary in order to explain individual or group behavior, they rarely are sufficient. Consider, for example, the French national survey finding that President de Gaulle's popularity was rising during the months leading up to les événements. “La Crise de Mai 1968,” Sondages: Revue Française de l'Opinion Publique, ii (1968) 9Google Scholar. But clearly De Gaulle's aggregate national popularity was less important than his popularity in specific, politically relevant population groups. And even more important, psychological data should not be considered alone—in the absence of data on situational stimuli—in explanations of behavior. On the latter point, see the elegant formulation of Smith, M. Brewster: “A Map for the Analysis of Personality and Politics,” Journal of Social Issues, xxiv (July 1968), 15–28CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³ This has been argued most forcefully by Stanley Hoffmann. See, in particular, his “Paradoxes of the French Political Community” in Hoffmann, Stanley and others, eds., In Search of France (Cambridge, Mass. 1963)Google Scholar and “Heroic Leadership: The Case of Modern France,” in Edinger, Lewis J., ed., Political Leadership in Industrialized Societies: Studies in Comparative Analysis (New York 1967), 108–54Google Scholar.

⁴ Thomson, David, Democracy in France since 1870 (New York and London 1964)Google Scholar, ii. Our choice of texts is not intended to be representative but merely illustrative of some of the best writing in France.

⁵ Hoffmann, “Paradoxes,” 108.

⁶ Alain (Chartier, Emile) Eléments d'une Doctrine Radicals (Paris 1933), 25Google Scholar.

⁷ Hoffmann, “Heroic Leadership,” 113.

⁸ Williams, Philip, Crisis and Compromise: Politics in the Fourth Republic (Garden City, N.Y. 1966), 201Google Scholar.

⁹ “Neither-nor” is Hoffmann's phrase; he uses it in a classic instance of polar type analysis: “Paradoxes,” 8.

¹⁰ Francois Goguel, “Six Authors in Search of a National Character,” in In Search of France, 393.

¹¹ There seems to us to be too much of this tendency in Michel Crozier's enormously imaginative The Bureaucratic Phenomenon (Chicago 1964)Google Scholar.

¹² See, for example, Luethy, Herbert, France Against Herself (Cleveland and New York 1968), 3Google Scholar. Luethy writes: “Abstractions can be exhaustively defined, but a personality never. … In this respect, France evades all definitions. However sharply and clearly defined her outlines may seem from a distance, she evades the hands that seek to grasp her.” Needless to say, works conceived in this spirit are not likely to yield testable—much less tested—hypotheses.

¹³ Almond, Gabriel A., “Comparative Political Systems,” Journal of Politics, xviii (August 1956), 391–409CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and , Almond and Powell, , Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston 1966), 263–265Google Scholar.

¹⁴ For example, the earliest and perhaps the greatest of these writers, Andre Siegfried, wrote; “I have observed that the voter knows very well what he wants and even better what he doesn't want … he almost always has a tendance that marks his behavior.” Tableau Politique de la France de l'Ouest (Paris 1964 ed.), ixGoogle Scholar.

¹⁵ A recent study based upon survey data builds its analysis entirely upon a fixed-choice item on tendance, without ever ascertaining whether “Extreme Left,” “Left,” etc., were salient and meaningful to the respondents. Emeric Deutsch and others, Les Familles Politiques Aujourd'hui en France (Paris 1966), 11–15Google Scholar.

¹⁶ Hoffmann, “Paradoxes,” 18. Italics added.

¹⁷ Almond, Gabriel and Verba, Sidney, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton 1963) 133–34CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁸ The basic work here is, of course Crozier, The Bureaucratic Phenomenon. Also see Hoffmann “Paradoxes”; Jesse R. Pitts, “Continuity and Change in Bourgeois France,” in In Search of France; Wylie, Laurence, Village in the Vaucluse (Cambridge, Mass. 1967, rev. ed. New York 1964)Google Scholar; and Metraux, Rhoda and Mead, Margaret, Themes in French Culture: A Preface to a Study of French Community (Palo Alto 1954)Google Scholar.

¹⁹ Hoffmann, “Paradoxes,” 8.

²⁰ Roig was first impressed by a paper presented to the Fifth World Congress of the International Association of Political Science by David Easton and Robert D. Hess, “The Child's Political World” (Paris 1961). Easton and Hess were reporting on a national survey of American children that has since been more fully reported in Hess, Robert and Torney, Judith, The Development of Political Attitudes in Children (Chicago 1967)Google Scholar and Easton, David and Dennis, Jack in Children and the Political System: The Origins of Political Legitimacy (New York 1969)Google Scholar. Roig and Billon-Grand draw periodically for comparisons on various reports by these investigators and on the study of New Haven, Connecticut children reported in Greenstein, Fred I., Children and Politics (New Haven 1965)Google Scholar.

²¹ As Professor Roig laconically puts it, there were “des pétitions émanant d'associations et de syndicats, des prises de positions diverses, etc.” (p. 14).

²² Chap. IX is an exception, but there the attempt is to discover whether patterns exist among different attitude-questions, and die independent variables of sex, age, or type of school are excluded.

²³ Another corroboration: the French girls, like adult females in several countries, are more likely to be “pacifistic” on questions about war, harsh punishment for crimes, and revolution (pp. 69–70, 115). For some American findings on sex differences and a summary of the relevant literature, see Greenstein, chap. 6, and Hess and Torney, chap. 8.

²⁴ For an introduction to the complexities of French school organization see Halls, W. D., Society, Schools and Progress in France (Oxford 1965)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, chap. 6.

²⁵ For the rationale behind this assertion, see Greenstein, 78–84.

²⁶ Unfortunately strictly comparable American data are hard to come by, but the American surveys consistently find fewer adults who claim political interest than could possibly generate an 80 percent incidence of overheard political conversations by children. Th e proportion of American adults who reported that tfiey “talked with someone and tried to persuade hi m how to vote” was about one-third in the Survey Research Center's 1952, 1956, 1960, and 1964 national surveys. For these and similar SRC findings see Robinson, John and others, Measures of Political Attitudes (Ann Arbor, Michigan 1968)Google Scholar.

²⁷ The item was “Avezvous entendu des grandes personnes parler de politique? Souvent-Quelquefois-Jamais” (p. 169).

²⁸ For a comprehensive study of American children's exposure to television and its consequences, see Schramm, W., Lyle, J., and Parker, E. B., Television in the Lives of Our Children (Stanford 1961)Google Scholar.

²⁹ See Henry Ehrmann's chapter on “Political Socialization through the Mass Media,” in his Politics in France (Boston 1968), 152–68Google Scholar.

³⁰ Langton, Kenneth P. and Jennings, M. Kent, “Political Socialization and the High School Curriculum in the United States,” American Political Science Review, LXII (September 1968), 852–67CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³¹ Also see LaPierre, Jean-William and Noizet, Georges, Une Recherche sur le Civisme des Jeunes à la Fin de la Quatrième République (Aix-en-Provence 1961), 11–12Google Scholar.

³² Both the francophilia and the lack of training in self-government are unforgettably described in Jean Boorsch's “Primary Education,” in the number of Yale French Studies entitled “Why Jeannot Can Read,” xx (Winter-Spring 1958–59), 28, 31–35.

³³ LaPierre and Noizet (pp. 86–89) present the results of interviews with older secondary-school students who exhibit idealized attitudes toward “the State” but rather tolerant views toward “gypping the government, 68–89.

³⁴ Greenstein, chaps. 3 and 4.

³⁵ Compare the American findings in Ibid., pp. 58–59,

³⁶ However, the largely working-class children in the terminal program have a slightly higher recognition-rate of the late Communist leader (by 6 percent) and of Socialist leader Mollet (by 7 percent) than the older secondary-school students. Partisan information tends to be lower than other types of political information in French secondary-school children. J.-W. LaPierre and G. Noizet report that, of a battery of twenty political-information questions on international affairs, institutions, current events, and parties, the three items with the highest nonresponse rate are partisan items. See their “L'information Politique du Jeunes Français en 1962,” Revue Française de Science Politique, xiv (June 1964), 492Google Scholar.

³⁷ Greenstein, chap. 3, and the citations there of the literature through 1965; Jaros, Dean, Hirsch, Herbert, Fleron, Frederick J. Jr., “The Malevolent Leader: Political Socialization in an American Sub-Culture,” American Political Science Review, LXII (June 1968), 564–75CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Roberta Sigel, “Image of a President: Some Insights into the Political Views of School Children,” Ibid. (March 1968), 216–26.

³⁸ Also, when asked whom they would like to resemble when they grow up, only 1 percent of the Grenoble children named De Gaulle; when asked whom they would not like to resemble, 10 percent named him (40–42), although as with American children the choice of a political figure as a negative exemplar often indicates reluctance to share the vicissitudes of his office rather than animosity. Greenstein, 142.

³⁹ See the exceedingly valuable review by Davies, A. F., “The Child's Discovery of Nationality,” Australian and New Zealand Journal of Sociology, iv (October 1968), 107–25CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴⁰ But the “il faut les fusilier” option should not be interpreted as superpatriotism; small children very commonly use hyperbole. Among the older children interviewed by LaPierre and Noizet, 56 percent thought that conscientious objection was excusable or justifiable; “Les Jeunes Français devant L'objection de Conscience,” Revue Française de Sociologie, iv, No. 3 (July-September 1963), 259–74Google Scholar.

⁴¹ Ehrmann, 60.

⁴² The phrase “party identification” was introduced by the University of Michigan Survey Research Center to describe psychological membership in political parties—that is, the citizen's feeling that he is a Democrat or a Republican (or a Tory or a Radical Socialist). See the sources cited in Greenstein, Fred I., The American Party System and the American People (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1963)Google Scholar, chap. 3, and Campbell, Angus, Converse, Philip E., Miller, Warren E., Stokes, Donald E., Elections and the Political Order (New York 1966)Google Scholar.

⁴³ Converse, Philip E. and Dupeux, Georges, “Politicization of the Electorate in France and the United States,” Public Opinion Quarterly, xxvi (Spring 1962), 1–23CrossRefGoogle Scholar; reprinted as chap. 14 of Campbell and others. Our citations are to the original article. For an earlier treatment see Masters, R. D., “Une Méthode pour Mesurer la Mobilité des Attitudes Politiques,” Revue Française de Science Politique, x (September 1960), 658–72CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For an original application of the Converse and Dupeux analysis to comparative political analysis see Payne, James L., Patterns of Conflict in Colombia (New Haven 1968)Google Scholar. In France, the fluidity of the party vote and the weakness of party identification was analyzed in several of the “Cahiers” of the Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques. See, in particular, Georges Dupeux, “Le Comportement des Electeurs François de 1958 à 1962,” and Michelat, Guy, “Attitudes et Comportements Politiques à L'automne 1962,” in Le Référendum d'Octobre et les Elections de Novembre 1962, (Paris 1965), 173–287Google Scholar.

⁴⁴ This seems to be the interpretation given by Wylie to the large Poujadist vote in 1956. “Their vote for Poujade was a vote against taxation; it was an extremist vote against government; it was also a means of differentiating themselves still more radically from their neighbors.” Wylie, 1964 edn., p. 329.

⁴⁵ On an index of involvement, such as following political news and attending campaign meetings, the French tend in the aggregate to be less politically involved, or no more politically involved, than Americans. Some of the lesser involvement seems to be explained by the lower mean educational level in France.

⁴⁶ The authors are especially careful about describing their findings in detail. As they put it, “less than 45 percent of those who did not refuse to answer die question were able to classify themselves in one of the parties or splinter groups, while another 10 to 15 percent associated themselves with a more or less recognizable broad tendance (‘left,’ ‘right,’ a labor union, etc.). The cross-national differences of 20 to 30 percent are sufficiently large here to contribute to fundamental differences in the flavor of partisan processes in the two electorates. For a long time, we wrote off these differences as products of the incomparable circumstances or of reticence on the part of die French concerning partisanship … [but] the hypothesis of concealed partisanship was very largely dispelled by a close reading of the actual interviews. It is undeniable that nearly 10 percent of the French sample explicitly refused to answer the question, as compared with a tiny fraction in the United States. However, we have already subtracted this group from die accounting. Beyond the explicit refusals, the remarks and explanations which often accompanied statements classified as ‘no party,’ or as ‘don't know which party,’ had a very genuine air about them which made them hard to read as hasty evasions. No few of these respondents were obviously embarrassed at their lack of a party; some of them confessed that they just hadn't been able to keep track of which party was which. The phrase ‘je n'y ai jamais pensé’ was extremely common. Others indicated that they found it too hard to choose between so many parties; some indicated preferences for a specific political leader but admitted diat they did not know which party he belonged to or, more often, had no interest in the identity of his party, whatever it might be. Others, forming a tiny minority of the non-party people, rejected the notion of parties with some hostility.” Converse and Dupeux, 9–10.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 1.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 11.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 14.

⁵⁰ Greenstein, Children and Politics, chap. 4.

⁵¹ Hess and Torney, 90.

⁵² See, for example, the survey evidence presented in Fichelet, Monique and others, “Les Français, la Politique et le Parti Communiste,” in Cahiers du Communisme, No. 12 (December 1967)Google Scholar and No. 1 (January 1968).

⁵³ Actually, only 33 percent of the cinquième children defined “party.” The residual 5 percent (and 4 percent of the total sample) made anti-party statements—for example, “ils existent à embêter la France,” or “à ennuyer la France.”

⁵⁴ Deutsch and others conclude: “The traditional predictors of the Left and the Right have almost all disappeared.” 26–29. Also see Fougeyrollas, Pierre, La Conscience Politique dans la France Contemporaine (Paris 1963)Google Scholar.

⁵⁵ On Catholic France, see the classical work of Siegfried, Tableau; Wylie, Laurence and others, Chanzeaux: A Village in Anjou (Cambridge 1966)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Tilly, Charles, The Vendée (Cambridge 1964)Google Scholar. On “Red” France, see the case studies in Wright, Gordon, Rural Revolution in France (Stanford 1964)Google Scholar; Morin, Edgar, Commune en France (Paris 1967)Google Scholar; and Lord, J.H.G., Petrie, A. J., and Whitehead, L. A., “Political Change in Rural France: The 1967 Election in a Communist Stronghold,” Political Studies, xvi (June 1968), 15376Google Scholar. Very little has been written on urban Communist strongholds like those in the banlieue of Paris.

⁵⁶ Occasional dissenters, like Nathan Leites, have argued that ideological cleavages are not the major source of cleavage in the political elite either. See Leites' On the Game of Politics in France (Stanford 1959)Google Scholar; also see the evidence presented in McRae, Duncan Jr., Parliaments, Parties, and Society in France 1946–1958 (New York 1967)Google Scholar, chap. 7.

⁵⁷ Ehrmann, 47–49. In his study of western France, Siegfried commented that he knew of “an imposing number of French towns where the Republican state does not feel itself fundamentally in charge” because of the dominance of Catholic schools. Siegfried, 399. The various assertions in the literature on this basis of cleavage seem to us in general not to distinguish sufficiently between (1) past versus present levels of cleavage and (2) hypothesis versus empirical documentation.

⁵⁸ The correlation between religiosity and voting for the two parties of the Left during die Fourth Republic was never less than —.45, McRae, 247; for survey data, see, for example, Michelat and others, 13.

⁵⁹ For a summary of the youth survey findings, see Ehrmann, 53. On Catholic organizations see Bosworth, William, Catholicism and Crisis in France (Princeton 1962)Google Scholar and Wright, chap. 8.

⁶⁰ Greeley, Andrew and Rossi, Peter, The Education of Catholic Americans (Chicago 1966)Google Scholar, chap. 5. Approximately 20 percent of French children attend parochial schools, but such schools are still in the majority in such traditionally Catholic departments as the Vendée, the Haute-Loire and the Maine-et-Loire. Curricular differences have mainly disappeared, as Catholic schools accept government subsidies that require them to tailor their courses to the public school curriculum. See Halls, pp. 80–81.

⁶¹ We may be taxed with having failed to see that the apparently more “liberal” responses of the parochial-school children to this question really disguises a “conservative” response: “Why should we Catholics be willing to die for their (the Republicans') country?” We have considered this interpretation but think it too sophisticated to account for children's responses.

⁶² Some typical citations: Pitts, 249–61; Hoffmann “Heroic Leadership,” 114–17; McRae, 17–19; Wylie, Village, 330–37; Metraux and Mead, 1–68; Crozier, Part III. Also sec Kesselman, Mark, The Ambiguous Consensus (New York 1967); pp. 9–12Google Scholar; Wolfenstein, Martha, “French Parents take their Children to the Park,” in , Mead and Wolfenstein, (eds.), Childhood in Contemporary Culture (Chicago 1955)Google Scholar; and Wylie, “Social Change at the Grass Roots,” in In Search of France, 139–234. A well-balanced blend of traditional interpretations and recent data will be found in Ehrmann, chap. 3.

⁶³ Kesselman, 9.

⁶⁴ Wylie, “Social Change,” 231.

⁶⁵ Pitts, 259.

⁶⁶ The argument is judiciously summarized in Hoffmann, “Heroic Leadership,” 114–16.

⁶⁷ For a fuller discussion, see Greenstein, Fred I., Personality and Politics: Problems of Evidence, Interference, and Conceptualization (Chicago 1969)Google Scholar, especially the discussion of “linkage” in chapter 5.

⁶⁸ Ibid., chap. 2.

⁶⁹ The effect of family structure upon children's attitudes is discussed in Hess and Torney, chap. 3, and in Lane, Robert E., “La Maturation Politique de L'adolescent aux Etats-Unis et en Allemagne,” in the Revue Française de Sociologie vii (1956), 598–618Google Scholar.

⁷⁰ This seems to us to be a principal shortcoming of what evidently is the only effort to employ notions from the French national-character literature in political socialization research: Pinner, Frank A., “Tarental Overprotection and Political Distrust,” American Academy of Political and Social Science, Annals CCCLXI (September 1965) 58–70CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁷¹ See, for example, Dennis, Jack, Lindberg, Leon, McCrone, Donald, and Stiefbold, Rodney, “Political Socialization into Democratic Orientations in Four Western Systems,” Comparative Political Studies i (April 1968), 71–101CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁷² David O. Sears, review of Hess and Torney, “The Development of Political Attitudes in Children,” Harvard Educational Review xxxviii (Summer 1968), 571–78Google Scholar.

⁷³ Hanfmann, Eugenia and Getzels, Jacob W., “Interpersonal Attitudes of Former Soviet Citizens, as Studied by a Semi-Projective Method,” Psychological Monographs, No. 389 (1955)Google Scholar.

⁷⁴ Adelson, Joseph and O'Neil, Robert P., “Growth of Political Ideas in Adolescence: The Sense of Community,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, iv No. 3 (1966), 295–306CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Lynette Beall, “Political Thinking in Adolescence,” (University of Michigan 1967). Unpublished dissertation.