Hostname: page-component-7479d7b7d-qs9v7 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-13T00:18:32.802Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

A Query About Assumptions on International Organization

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2011

Gerhart Niemeyer
Get access

Extract

In seeking a rational solution to policy problems, we select and approach the relevant facts in the light of underlying assumptions. Both knowledge of the object and rational certainty about the course to be taken can be attained only by proceeding from assumptions concerning values as well as causal relations. Our thinking is scientific (or, if one prefers another term, rationally disciplined rather than merely emotional) insofar as these indispensable assumptions are made deliberately, methodically, and critically. In applying thought to the problem of international organization, we have not done as well in this respect as we ought. It may be worthwhile, therefore, to call attention to the task of critically examining the assumptions on which the study of problems of international organization actually proceeds.

Type
Research Note
Information
World Politics , Volume 7 , Issue 2 , January 1955 , pp. 337 - 347
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1955

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 “That of which the mind by any of its activities takes cognizance” (Webster).

2 This is not a plea for one assumption in favor of another. Assumptions are means for understanding reality. Precisely for that reason, however, we should be aware of all the available means and the problem of using them judiciously and rationally.

3 Cf. Easton, David, The Political System, New York, 1953, pp. 228ff.Google Scholar

4 This is, of course, not equivalent to saying that the study of these matters should be value-bound, in the sense of refusing to see reality unless it happens to confirm one's own preferences. The scholar's probing mind can and should be detached and objective even as he seeks to grasp the value significance of the affairs that he studies.