¹ The term revolution, as used in this paper, is defined as a sweeping, fundamental change in political organization, social structure, economic property control and the predominant myth of a social order, thus indicating a major break in the continuity of development.

For a comprehensive discussion of the controversial concept consult: Meusel, Alfred, “Revolution,” Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 15 vols., New York, Macmillan, 1930–1935, vol. XIIIGoogle Scholar; Geiger, Theodor, “Revolution,” Handworterbuch der Soziologie, Stuttgart, 1931Google Scholar; Brinton, Crane, The Anatomy of Revolution, New York, W. W. Norton, 1938CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Soule, George, The Coming American Revolution, New York, Macmillan, 1934Google Scholar; Pettee, George S., The Process of Revolution, New York, Harper & Bros., 1938Google Scholar; Rosenstock-Huessy, Eugen. Out of Revolution, New York, W. Morrow, 1938Google Scholar; Lenin, V. I., State and Revolution, London, 1919Google Scholar; See, Henri, Evolution et Révolutions, Paris, 1929Google Scholar; Yoder, Dale, “Current Definitions of Revolutions,” American Journal of Sociology, Vol. XXXII, No. 3 (November, 1926), pp. 433–41CrossRefGoogle Scholar; MacIver, R. M., The Web of Government, New York, Macmillan, 1947, Chapter XII, pp. 360–400.Google Scholar

It is significant for the spiritual climate of our time that the concept of revolution has been used frequently, loosely and often contradictorily. While the 19th century applied it almost exclusively in respect to spectacular political change, it is now-a-days widely referred to in other fields by the suffix of a qualifying adjective such as industrial, managerial, colonial, cultural, scientific, technological, etc., in which case not so much a sudden upheaval as a long-range process is emphasized together with the far-reaching change caused by the “revolution” in this specific field. This confusing usage is even visible in politics proper, e.g., in the coining of phrases such as “New Deal Revolution,” “Revolution of the British Labour Government.” As a matter of fact, any significant evolutionary process will appear as a revolutionary change provided that this transformation is observed over a sufficiently prolonged period as to present a fundamental shift. True, the violent outburst is usually preceded in all great historical revolutions by an extended preliminary period that initiates and largely accomplishes the change long before the actual seizure of power through revolution sets the final stage by openly breaking outmoded institutions, power relations and social usages. In this sense revolutions represent only an acceleration and crystallization of the evolutionary process. See Edwards, Lyford P., The Natural History of Revolutions, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1927Google Scholar; Mosca, Gaetano, The Ruling Class, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1939Google Scholar; Pareto, Vilfredo, The Mind and Society, 4 vols., New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1935, Vol. IVGoogle Scholar; Michels, Robert, Umschichtungen in der herrschenden Klassen nach dem Kriege, Stuttgart, 1934.Google Scholar

Hazy though the border lines may be, drawn between revolution and evolution, it is still imperative not only for a much-needed conceptual housecleaning, but even more so for appropriate policies, meeting the contemporary revolution, to distinguish between radical breaks in the continuity of development and persistent transformations that are accomplished within the framework of existing institutions, flexible enough to make the necessary adjustments, to integrate rising strata into the ruling system, and to relinquish outmoded forms and groups. The effective prevention of the revolution will depend on the existence and cultivation of certain prerequisites for peaceful change. On the other hand, the attempt toi forestall the revolution by declaring the status quo as a desirable aim is probably one of the surest shortcuts to the very revolution which the “forces of stability” are eager to prevent. It is a fatal fallacy to identify significant change with revolution. Every living society must allow for far-reaching change. The study of the processes and channels through which it is effected constitute the key problem of constructive politics. It has been correctly stated that the warning signal for any society, internal and international, is the petrification of its controlling powers. Thus, promising forces are frustrated from joining in the “circulation of elites” and are finally pushed into revolution, breaking the natural fluctuation within society. See Sorokin, Pitirim A., The Sociology of Revolution, Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott, 1925Google Scholar; and, Handman, Max S., “The Bureaucratic Culture Pattern and Political Revolutions,” American Journal of Sociology, Vol. XXXIX, No. 3 (November, 1933), p. 307Google Scholar; Lederer, Emil, Einige Gedanken zur Soziologie der Revolutionen, Leipzig, 1918Google Scholar; Wolpert, J. F., “The Myth of Revolution,” Ethics, Vol. LVIII, No. 4 (July, 1948), pp. 245–55.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

² “All revolutions start in principle as world revolutions. … Their symbols and principles must, in the opinion of their initiators, become universal or nothing.” Wright, Quincy, A Study of War, 2 vols., Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1942, II, 1110.Google Scholar

³ Copernicus, , De revolutionibus orbium caelestium, 1543.Google Scholar On the chronological development of the concept see Rosenstock-Huessy, Eugen. Revolution als Politischer Begriff in der Neuzeit, Breslau, 1931.Google Scholar

⁴ Friedell, Egon, A Cultural History of the Modern Age, 3 vols., New York, A. A. Knopf, 1930–1932, II, 368.Google Scholar

⁵ “Sur le sens du mot révolutionnaire,” Condorcet, , Oeuvres complètes, 12 vols., Paris, 1847, XII, 516.Google Scholar

⁶ This definition corresponds to the concept of “social revolution” in Marxist terminology. “Social Revolution is distinguished from Revolution in society (as any social phenomena of nature) by the fact that it is not the result of the action of the blind, spontaneous forces of nature. Social Revolution is made by people, by social classes, who pursue definite interests and have put up definite goals. …” (Malaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopedia, Moscow, 1930, Vol. VII). It is on the basis of this concept that contemporary Bolshevism believes that it has invented and developed a science of human society that allows it to foresee and to engineer the course of history. “Marxist-Leninist theory is science of the development of society, science of proletarian revolution, science of the construction of Communist society.” J. Stalin, History of the Communist Party.

⁷ “Wenn zwei Krisen sich kreuzen, so frisst momentan die stärkere sich durch die schwächere hindurch.” Burckhardt, Jakob, Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen, Stuttgart, 1905, p. 179.Google Scholar

⁸ Lundberg, Isabel C., “World Revolution, American Plan,” Harpers Magazine, December, 1948, pp. 38–46.Google Scholar

⁹ These patterns ascribed to the contemporary international civil war parallel essentially those of modern dictatorship as analyzed in my earlier Permanent Revolution, The Total State in a World at War, New York, Harper & Bros., 1942.

The main difference derives from the fact that this dictatorial rule is now being transposed to an international plane. This wider field of action naturally calls for more complex strategies taking due account of national differentiations, social conditions, historical traditions, “sovereign rights.” Mere size obviously accentuates the strains and stresses of the new dictatorial empires. To predict, however, their early breakdown merely under the weight of these inner tensions may be as erroneous as were the many forecasts of the Third Reich's collapse from within before its final defeat from without.

¹⁰ See Borkenau, Franz, The Communist International, London, 1938.Google Scholar

¹¹ See Fischer, Ruth, Stalin and German Communism, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1948.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹² Friedrich Engels already testified to the necessary changes of revolutionary strategy in the introduction of the newly edited Class Struggles in France, 1848–1850, London, 1895, reprinted under the title The Revolutionary Act, New York, New York Labor News, 1922.

“The fighting methods of 1848 are obsolete today in every respect.… The barricade had lost its charm; the soldier saw behind it no longer the people but rebels … the officer … had become familiar with the tactical forms of street battles.” See also Neumann, Sigmund, “Engels and Marx: Military Concepts of the Social Revolutionaries,” in Earle, Edward M., ed., Makers of Modern Strategy, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1943.Google Scholar

While the kindergarten stage of the 1848 revolution may impress today's sophisticated as naïve, incongruous, and aimless it would be wrong to underestimate the military threat of the barricades at the time. The writings of military experts at the time give ample testimony of the deep impression left by the revolutionary fighters. However small their number, they were looked upon as a superior and insurmountable power as puzzling to the professional military class as were the Riffs to the colonial armies of twentieth century Europe. Cavaignac who first succeeded at Paris in breaking the “myth of the barricades” was celebrated as the great military genius of the century.

The new urban architecture originated in the Paris of Napoleon III under the very impact of these June battles of 1848.

See Schulz, Hugo, Grosskampftage der Revolution 1848–49, Wien, 1929.Google Scholar

¹³ See SirLockhart, Robert Bruce, “The Czechoslovak Revolution,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. XXVI, No. 4 (July, 1948).Google Scholar

¹⁴ See Dulles, Allen W., Germany's Underground, New York, Macmillan, 1947Google Scholar; Gisevius, Hans B., To the Bitter End, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1947Google Scholar; The Fon Hassell Diaries, Garden City, Doubleday, 1947; Pechei, Rudolph, Deutscher Widerstand, Erlenbach-Zurich, 1947Google Scholar; Schlabbrendorff, Fabian von, Offiziere Gegen Hitler, Zurich, 1946Google Scholar; Rothfels, Hans, The German Opposition to Hitler, Hinsdale, Ill., H. Regenery, 1948Google Scholar; Andreas-Friedrich, Ruth, Berlin Underground, 1938–1945, New York, Henry Holt, 1947Google Scholar; Trevor-Roper, H. R., The Last Days of Hitler, New York, Macmillan, 1947.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Gyorgy, Andrew, “Political Trends in Eastern Europe,” Foreign Policy Reports, Vol. XXIX, No. 3 (November 15, 1948).Google Scholar

¹⁶ Fairbank, John K., The United States and China, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1948Google Scholar; Gyorgy, Andrew, Governments of Danubian Europe, to be published in 1949Google Scholar; Wolf, Charles, The Indonesian Story, New York, John Day, 1948Google Scholar; Emerson, Rupert, “The Indonesian Case,” World Politics, Vol. I, No. 1 (October, 1948), pp. 59–81.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁷ On the essential differentiation between momentary tactics, flexible strategies and rigid fundamental policies see Historicus, , “Stalin on Revolution,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. XXVII, No. 2 (January, 1949), pp. 175–214.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁸ Neumann, Sigmund, The Future in Perspective, New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1946, pp. 96 ff.Google Scholar and pp. 170 ff.

¹⁹ Almond, Gabriel A., “The Resistance and the Political Parties of Western Europe,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. XLII, No. 1 (March, 1947), pp. 27–61.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²⁰ Zhdanov, Andrei, The International Situation, Moscow, 1947.Google Scholar

²¹ The Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute (Text of the published correspondence), Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1948.