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The Hayne Royal Commission and financial sector misbehaviour: Lasting change or temporary fix?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2023

Kevin Davis
Kevin Davis*
Affiliation:
The University of Melbourne, Australia
*
Kevin Davis, Department of Finance, Faculty of Business and Economics, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne, VIC 3010, Australia. Email: kevin.davis@unimelb.edu.au
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Abstract

The Hayne Royal Commission into Australian financial sector misbehaviour reported in February 2019. It is, however, unlikely to provide a lasting solution to problems of financial sector misbehaviour. It has identified a number of types of misbehaviour, their ‘proximate causes’ and recommended solutions to those. But, reflecting its limited mandate and limited time, it was unable to investigate the complex question of whether there are more deep-seated, fundamental issues driving financial sector misconduct, both in Australia and globally. This article argues that there are, and that consequently the benefits from the Royal Commission will be relatively short-lived, with misconduct likely to resurface, albeit in different guises.

Keywords

G20G28K40Financial regulationfinancial sector misconductRoyal Commission
Type
Regulating the labour and banking practice
Information
The Economic and Labour Relations Review , Volume 30 , Issue 2: Symposia: Australian Regulatory Failure: Labour Markets and Banking Practice Youth Precarity , June 2019 , pp. 200 - 221
Copyright
© The Author(s) 2019

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