The American states have pursued several different approaches to create jobs and foster economic development, including reducing the social cost of labor. I show that state labor costs are markedly lower in 1995 than in 1970, based on a factor analysis of wages and state regulations affecting unions and the cost of labor. Corporate low-wage strategies, international and interstate competition for business, and the growing weakness of labor unions are posited to account for this. But regression analysis shows that lower labor costs have had no significant impact on rates of job creation since 1980, have reduced unemployment only slightly, and have been less effective in the latter respect than either tax cuts or other economic development policies. Moreover, reducing labor costs can have adverse consequences, such as rising income inequality, slower growth in gross state product and productivity, and a less competitive position for states in the international economy.

The American states provide, arguably, the world's most advantageous venue in which to test general propositions about political behavior and policymaking (Jewell 1982; Brace and Jewett 1995). One would be hardpressed to design a better system of polities for conducting political research. The states represent fifty units of analysis with broadly similar political structures, cultures, and populations, but with significant variation across a range of social, policy, and institutional characteristics important to many political theories. Unlike the examination of single units of government, such as the U.S. federal government, the variation in these characteristics allows scholars to test hypotheses of cause-and-effect relationships of political behavior and policymaking in a valid way. But unlike the comparison of different countries, the comparison of states does not produce so much variation that it overwhelms scholars' ability to identify relationships that might exist. Just as the states are a natural laboratory for public policy (New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann 1932), they are also a natural laboratory for testing hypotheses derived from political theory. Furthermore, the accessibility of state government officials makes quite feasible many research strategies that would be unthinkable in the study of federal officials and institutions.

State governments have recently adopted many policies creating competition in service provision. These policies typically are expected to reduce costs and improve quality through organizational innovation. I present an analysis of one such initiative—the creation of charter schools. Using evidence from a survey-based study comparing charter schools and traditional public schools, I explore the relationship between competition and organizational innovation. I find that competition does appear to promote innovative local practices. But the evidence also suggests that competition can limit communication within the practitioner community, which, in turn, can stifle the diffusion of innovative ideas. Thus, policy design for local innovation may be more effective when competition is augmented with state-level strategies that promote inter-organizational cooperation and learning.

Debate rages over whether Americans have become enormously litigious, but little research considers why Americans file cases in the first place or adequately considers rates of litigation over time. This article examines tort filings in ten representative states over a 20-year period and analyzes the impact of social, political, policy, and legal system factors that may account for case filings. We find that filing rates vary substantially over time within individual states, which adds to cautions about claims of general litigiousness. Our analysis also demonstrates that social complexity, opportunities for political participation, and social policy are the most important explanations for variations in filing rates. The tendency of Americans to use the courts to resolve disputes is related to the milieu in which they live and how the political system responds to demands for participation and social support.

Cross-sectional analyses of American state data testing models in which state size is a meaningful predictor face a nonobvious problem of limited observations. Quite simply, the limited number of large states, and especially the presence of the uniquely large state of California, provides few observations to anchor regression estimates. We explore this problem with close attention to Gray and Lowery's (1996a) energy, stability, area (ESA) model of interest system density, both replicating their results with new data and highlighting the utility and limitations of analyzing unusual cases in comparative state research. After replicating the ESA model, several diagnostics for analyzing outliers, leverage, and influence are examined. We show how supplemental data analyses can be used to assess the source, severity, and, sometimes, the solution of the problem.

In 1996, more than half of the states considered legislation banning same-sex marriages. This article examines these events as a geographic expansion of the scope of the conflict rather than as traditional state-centered policy innovation. I argue that the diffusion of same-sex marriage bans was determined by the organized efforts of advocacy coalitions and internal state characteristics rather than by regional diffusion or communication among policy experts. I use state-level data collected from activists, media accounts, and official sources to establish the organized efforts to ban same-sex marriage. I then develop and empirically test a model of policy diffusion to predict both state consideration and adoption of policies banning same-sex marriage. The findings suggest that the diffusion of these policies is best explained by the presence of an organized national campaign by conservative religious groups, the local resources of interest groups, and other internal state characteristics rather than by regional diffusion patterns. I also find that the influence of state characteristics may vary during the policymaking process.

The implementation of federal programs provides an opportunity for state officials to impose their own interests on the policy process. The federal government delegates administrative power to the states to implement federal programs. Because elected state officials serve as one of the principals to street-level bureaucrats, these officials should be able to influence these street-level agents to implement policy to further state needs. However, very little research has examined whether street-level bureaucrats act strategically to benefit state interests as they implement policy. In this article, I use Seemingly Unrelated Regression analysis to examine variation in award rates across the 50 states in two federal disability programs, SSI and SSDI. My findings reveal that program incentives lead state street-level bureaucrats to act strategically in implementing these programs. State bureaucrats reduce access to federal programs when state governments incur costs associated with those programs, especially under conditions of fiscal stress.

This study uses a three-state survey to examine how state legislators and legislative candidates view the ballot initiative process. We hypothesize that state legislators see the initiative as a rival to the legislature, and that the initiative is evaluated in terms of expectations about policy outcomes. We test whether opinions about the initiative are related to legislative incumbency, partisan interests, or both. We find that incumbents, regardless of party, are more interested in constraining the initiative than non-incumbents. We also find an independent effect of partisanship, with Republicans having a more positive view of the initiative than Democrats.

In general, state public policy responds positively to increased electoral participation among social groups. However, consistent with the racial threat hypothesis, this pattern appears to reverse itself for African Americans: as blacks turn out in greater proportions they actually incur decreasing policy responsiveness. Another research tradition suggests that political parties play a crucial mediating role between interests and government. Thus, African Americans may be able to counter this backlash effect by increasing their participation in the Democratic partisan coalition. Using a variety of pooled time series techniques, we demonstrate the general robustness of the racial backlash model but find that when African Americans increase their contribution to the Democratic coalition, state policy responds better to their interests. This result demonstrates the centrality of parties for democratic responsiveness.

Research on Asian American politics is hampered by data limitations. Asian Americans comprise a small proportion of the population, and few political candidates are of Asian descent. However, because the Asian American population is growing quickly, interest in the group's political behavior has grown. One source of data that can be exploited to understand Asian American political behavior is the state of Hawaii. Hawaii provides a natural experiment since the majority of its citizens are Asian American and Asian political candidates are commonplace. This study of Hawaiian politics focuses on Asian American campaign finance behavior. I find that as Asian Americans locate themselves in more multicultural settings, they become more politically strategic, less focused on national-origin groupings, and more inclined to embrace a pan-ethnic identity.

We examine the effects of state economic conditions on gubernatorial popularity using time-series analyses of gubernatorial approval ratings for 10 states. We find that although unemployment rates affect some governors' approval ratings, the dynamics of gubernatorial approval are highly idiosyncratic. Our results suggest that a single model may be inadequate to describe patterns of public approval, even for candidates elected to similar offices. The unique personal characteristics of the officeholder, as well as differing constituent expectations, may be at least as important as the general economic variables typically included in models of public approval.

Students of race and politics in the U.S. have long asserted a relationship between the racial composition and public policies of states. A related but distinct line of research demonstrates a strong connection between white attitudes about the perceived recipients of social welfare spending—blacks and members of other minority groups—and support for these programs. This article bridges these lines of scholarship by asking how racial diversity shapes aggregate attitudes about minorities in the American states and how these opinions in turn influence welfare spending. Using public opinion data from the General Social Survey (1974–96), I find that diversity has a direct influence on welfare policy in the states, as well as an indirect influence through shaping majority-group racial attitudes. Diversity and racial attitudes are found to have these effects even when controlling for factors traditionally used to explain variation in state spending levels, such as party competition, lower class mobilization, ideology, and state capacity.

Proposition 227, passed by California voters in 1998, aimed to dismantle bilingual programs in public schools and to replace them with English-only programs. Bilingual education, a long-standing program in California, involved mostly Hispanic students of limited English skills who were taught initially in their native language, and then were gradually transitioned into English-only classes. Using individual-level data from one southern California school district, I find that in 1998, before Proposition 227, limited-English-proficient (LEP) students enrolled in bilingual classes had lower scores in reading than LEP students who were not enrolled in bilingual classes, and who were, in general, more proficient in English. In math, bilingual students had test scores as good as those of non-bilingual LEPs. But in 1999, after Proposition 227, the same set of bilingual students had reading and math scores that were no worse than those of non-bilingual LEPs. Proposition 227, which interrupted bilingual programs and emphasized English instruction, did not set bilingual LEP students back relative to non-bilingual LEPs, and it may have even benefited them.

Recent macro-level studies examining the indirect effects of direct legislation on public policy in the American states are decidedly mixed. This study tests whether the macro-level logic of legislative behavior in response to ballot initiatives holds true at the micro-level for individual legislators. I examined the determinants of legislative votes on “counter-majoritarian” legislation—bills that directly challenge the outcomes of earlier statewide ballot initiatives. In 1999, the Colorado state legislature tried to overturn the outcomes of three previous ballot contests. I find that in two of the three cases, a legislator's vote on these bills was related to the vote in his or her district on the respective ballot initiative. This helps explain why many legislators will vote contrary to the outcome of a statewide initiative vote.

We compare spending in concurrent senate and gubernatorial elections to determine if campaign finance laws influence candidate campaign spending. We find that candidate-based public financing combined with spending limits influence candidate spending, but the effect is largely dependent on the level of the limits. We find that contribution limits do not influence candidate spending. If the goal of reform is to reduce candidate spending—or to affect electoral competition or voter turnout by reducing candidate spending—our results suggest that state public financing is more likely to be successful than contributions limits.

Term limit laws for state legislators now exist in 19 states. While these laws were passed as early as 1990, they have only recently actually forced legislators from office. Prior to the 2000 elections, only two states (California and Maine) had experienced virtually complete legislative turnover in at least one chamber as a result of term limits. Nine other states have had at least one cohort of legislators forced out of office. Now that a significant portion of these legislative bodies has been replaced by term limits, we can begin to examine the consequences of this reform. We report findings from a survey of lobbyists in five term-limits states. We find strong consensus among these lobbyists that term limits have caused the state political influence structure to shift away from the legislature and toward the governor, administrative agencies, and interest groups. With regard to the impact on internal operations and procedures of the legislature, we discover considerable variation across states, variation that, in part, is related to legislative professionalism.

Researchers commonly apply inferential statistical procedures to population data from the 50 U.S. states as if they were estimating population parameters from sample statistics. This method is incorrect because with population data there is no need to make inferences about quantities that are already known. Instead, authors should simply provide evidence that their specified model provides a good fit to the data. Summary measures of variance as well as the full engine of Bayesian statistics perform this function. This research note demonstrates why the current practice of making inferences from population data with the null hypothesis significance test is wrong, provides some specific examples of problems in the literature, and gives prescriptive advice about correctly assessing and conveying empirical model results.

Previous research has found strong evidence of a pro-winner vote misreport bias in the National Election Studies (NES). We extend this research by examining the reported vote for U.S. senator and governor in the 1990, 1992, and 1994 NES and in the 1990 and 1992 Senate Election Studies (SES). We find continuing evidence of a pro-winner misreport problem. In contrast, we uncover no significant pro-winner bias in state exit polls conducted by the media. We test two commonly asserted explanations of the source of this misreport bias, but find no evidence that the problem is related either to the number of days between the election and the survey interview or to incumbency. Finally, we test a model of the misreport process that suggests that less politically engaged and less politically sophisticated voters are most likely to over-report support for the winner. Our results here are mixed; we find some evidence that Independents are more likely to misreport in favor of the winner, but we find no evidence that education level affects the likelihood of misreporting.

How do people hold elected officials accountable for expected economic conditions in a system of government in which jurisdiction and responsibility are divided such as they are in the United States? Due to the president's visibility, people may hold all elected officials of the president's party responsible for economic conditions. Or, people may be able to differentiate between state and national economic conditions and jurisdictional responsibilities and hold governors of either party accountable for state economic conditions. I use ordered probit to analyze a pooled model of 13 individual-level mid-1990s Michigan opinion surveys and find no evidence that individuals consistently rely on a presidency-centered referenda model of cognition when evaluating the state's governor. Instead, gubernatorial performance ratings reflect an incumbent-centered accountability model. The evidence also suggests jurisdictional accountability, where gubernatorial evaluations are influenced by state economic expectations, but not by national economic expectations.

We test the “white backlash” hypothesis—that white racial conservatism grows as black population density increases—using methods and data parallel to those upon which the concept was originally developed. A 1996 Kentucky referendum vote to strike school segregation from the state constitution serves as a rare measure of “old-fashioned racism.” We estimate the white vote for segregation using ecological inference techniques, and show that the county-level pattern of white segregationist support for this referendum actually runs in the opposite direction from that predicted by the backlash hypothesis. Precinct-level Kentucky analysis and county-level analysis of a related South Carolina referendum validate our finding against the white backlash hypothesis. We conclude that the frequent failure of recent research to find white backlash, especially among urban voters, therefore cannot be explained away by the absence of measures of old-fashioned racism. Rather, the geographical pattern of American racial conservatism seems to have changed since the successes of the Civil Rights movement.