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Judicial Deference and Executive Control Over Administrative Agencies

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 January 2021

Gbemende Johnson
Gbemende Johnson*
Affiliation:
Hamilton College, Clinton, NY, USA
*
Gbemende Johnson, Hamilton College, 198 College Hill Road, Clinton, NY 13323, USA. Email: gxjohnso@hamilton.edu
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Abstract

Do judges defer to executives with increased institutional control over the executive branch? Administrative agencies play a key role in the policy implementation process. Executives could view aggressive judicial review of executive branch activity as a threat to executive power and negatively respond to perceived judicial intrusions. Governors across the country possess varying amounts of institutional authority over the agencies that comprise their states' executive branches. For example, in many states, executive branch officials are elected by the public or appointed by someone other than the governor. Increased fragmentation increases the difficulty of centralized management and decreases gubernatorial influence over the executive branch. I examine whether state supreme courts defer more to agencies in states where governors have more formal control over the executive branch. I find that state supreme courts are more likely to rule in favor of state administrative agencies in states where the governor has increased appointment power and increased power to review agency rulemaking.

Keywords

executive politicsgovernorsexecutive/judicial interactionjudicial politicspublic law
Type
Research Article
Information
State Politics & Policy Quarterly , Volume 14 , Issue 2 , June 2014 , pp. 142 - 164
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s) 2014

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