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Do States Circumvent Constitutional Supermajority Voting Requirements to Raise Taxes?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 January 2021

Soomi Lee Open the ORCID record for Soomi Lee [Opens in a new window]
Soomi Lee*
Affiliation:
University of La Verne, La Verne, CA, USA
*
Soomi Lee, Department of Public and Health Administration, University of La Verne, 1950 Third Street, CBPM 120, La Verne, CA 91750, USA. Email: slee4@laverne.edu
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Abstract

To constrain legislative taxing power, 16 U.S. state constitutions require a supermajority in both chambers to increase or impose taxes. Both supporters and opponents of the requirement argue that its effect fades away because states circumvent it in various ways, especially by raising fees that are not subject to the requirement. Existing literature, however, offers little and inconsistent evidence on whether the effect decays over time and whether the decay results from fee hikes. This article documents legal cases to show the ways in which states have responded to the requirement, estimates whether the effects of the requirement decay over time, and tests whether states raise fees instead of taxes after adopting such a requirement. Using state-level panel data, I find that the initial effectiveness of the requirement on tax burden does decay approximately a decade after enactment and that the decay is not the result of fee increases.

Keywords

supermajority vote requirementsupermajoritysupermajority ruleTELstate financefiscal institutionsbudget institutionsbudget processtax limit
Type
Research Article
Information
State Politics & Policy Quarterly , Volume 18 , Issue 4 , December 2018 , pp. 417 - 440
Copyright
Copyright © 1969 by The Modern Language Association of America

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