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The Role of Constitutional Features in Judicial Review

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 January 2021

Adam R. Brown Open the ORCID record for Adam R. Brown [Opens in a new window]
Adam R. Brown*
Affiliation:
Brigham Young University, Provo, UT, USA
*
Adam R. Brown, Department of Political Science, Brigham Young University, 745 Kimball Tower, Provo, UT 84602, USA. Email: brown@byu.edu
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Abstract

American state constitutions vary tremendously in their length, amendment rate, and age. These three variables—especially the first two—strongly influence the rate at which state supreme courts strike down state actions for violating the state constitution. Longer, more detailed constitutions reduce policy flexibility, increasing judicial invalidations; rarely updated constitutions may fail to address modern concerns, increasing invalidations; and recently adopted constitutions may contain fragile logrolls and similar shortcomings, also increasing invalidations. These findings add new considerations to a rich literature on judicial review in state supreme courts.

Keywords

judicial politicsjudicial behaviorjudicial behaviorstate constitutionsfederalism
Type
Research Article
Information
State Politics & Policy Quarterly , Volume 18 , Issue 4 , December 2018 , pp. 351 - 370
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s) 2018

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