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Nonprofit Organizations and the Corporate Community

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 January 2016

Harold Salzman  and
G. William Domhoff
Harold Salzman
Affiliation:
Brandeis University
G. William Domhoff
Affiliation:
University of California, Santa Cruz
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Extract

Numerous network studies demonstrate that interlocking directors unite corporations in the United States into a tight-knit corporate community (e.g., Sonquist and Koenig, 1975; Mariolis, 1975; Mizruchi, 1982). In addition, nonnetwork studies of foundations, universities, and other nonprofit organizations suggest that corporate officers and directors play a large role in the governance of such institutions (e.g., Hartnett, 1969; Dye, 1976; Useem et al., 1976; Salzman and Domhoff, 1980; Useem, 1981). However, there are no studies that cast light on the structural position of nonprofit institutions in relation to the well-established corporate network.

Type
Research Article
Information
Social Science History , Volume 7 , Issue 2 , Spring 1983 , pp. 205 - 216
Copyright
Copyright © Social Science History Association 1983 

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