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DOES HOMO SAPIENS NEED A RECIPE FOR SURVIVAL? DO WE HAVE ONE?
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 May 2024
Abstract
It is argued that the natural and human vicissitudes of the Northern Hemisphere—or at least western European history between 1315 and 1648—provide a preview of the sort of consequences for humanity and its demography that will result from the serious if not catastrophic climate change that is now anticipated by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Game theory suggests that at least some nation-state players in the strategic problem that climate change raises will not choose Nash equilibria that mitigate the problem. The only feasible solution will be the discovery or invention of some non-greenhouse-gas-emitting energy source so cheap that its owner will be indifferent to free-riding by all other users of energy. Recent efforts to develop fusion reactors do not provide much hope for this eventuality.
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- © 2024 Social Philosophy & Policy Foundation. Printed in the USA
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Department of Philosophy, Duke University, alexrose@duke.edu. Competing Interests: The author declares none.
References
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