I am most grateful to the many people who have read various drafts of this article. In particular, I would like to thank Susan Morrissey, Sarah Davies, and Kevin McDermott whose comments were both challenging and encouraging. Participants in the “World towards Solidarity” conference held in Wroclaw in November 2010 pushed me to clarify many of my ideas. Mark D. Steinberg and the two anonymous reviewers helped me see the forest for the trees as they patiendy guided me in transforming what was essentially a dissertation chapter into a journal article. I have found wonderful friends and rigorous critics among graduate students and faculty members at the University of Toronto—I would especially like to thank Anna Hájková and Lilia Topouzova for organizing the Reading Group in Eastern European, Russian and Soviet History. Last but not least, a generous grant from the Petro Jacyk Foundation made it possible for me to work on this article during my tenure as a postdoctoral fellow at the Centre for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies at the University of Toronto.

1. This joke was overheard and noted down by the famous Ukrainian writer, Oles’ Honchar, on an airplane traveling from Kiev to the Crimea in August 1982. O. Honchar, Shchodennyky, vol. 2, ed. Valentyna Honchar (Kyiv, 2002-2004), 529-30. For other jokes, see Materially Samizdata (MS) 33:82, 8 October 1982, Document AS4728: “Informatsionnyi Biulleten’ SMOTa no26,” Moscow, December 1981-January 1982.

2. Amir Weiner uses the phrase to describe the Soviet leadership in the late 1960s. Weiner, Amir, “Déjà Vu All Over Again: Prague Spring, Romanian Summer and Soviet Autumn on Russia's Western Frontier,” Contemporary European History 15, no. 2 (May 2006): 184.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

3. Ekiert, Grzegorz, The State against Society: Political Crises and Their Aftermath in East Central Europe (Princeton, 1996), 12.Google Scholar

4. See Weiner, Amir, “The Empires Pay a Visit: Gulag Returnees, East European Rebellions, and Soviet Frontier Politics,” Journal of Modern History 78, no. 2 (June 2006): 333-76CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Volodymyr Dmytruk, Ukraina ne movchala: Reaktsiia ukrains'koho suspil'stva napodii 1968 roku v Chekhoslovachchyni (Kyiv, 2004).

5. Ekiert, State against Society, 11. To be sure, the Soviet Union and other east European countries did not share the structural features that facilitated the emergence of Solidarity in Poland (such as a strong Catholic Church and a private agricultural sector). See Schöpflin, György, “Poland and Eastern Europe,” in Abraham Brumberg, ed., Poland, Genesis of a Revolution (New York, 1983), 132-33.Google Scholar

6. Open Society Archive, Budapest (OSA), f. 300, sf. 6, s. 3, c. 2 (Unevaluated comments by recent emigrants, April 1982).

7. Soviet patriotism was not a new idea, dating back at least to the 1930s. It came back with a vengeance in the aftermath of the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, however. The plan for creating a united Soviet people was officially oudined at the Twenty-fourth Party Congress in 1971, and it remained a key policy throughout the Brezhnev period and beyond. Martin, Terry, The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939 (Ithaca, 2001), 450 Google Scholar; Dmitry M. Epstein, “Soviet Patriotism: 1985-1991,” in Egbert Jahn, ed., Nationalism in Late and Post-Communist Europe, Volume 1, The Failed Nationalism of the Multinational and Partial National States (Baden-Baden, 2008), 214.

8. See Péteri, György, “The Occident Within—or the Drive for Exceptionalism and Modernity,” Kritiha: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 9, no. 4 (Fall 2008): 929-37.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

9. For example, see Varga-Harris, Christine, “Forging Citizenship on the Home Front: Reviving the Socialist Contract and Constructing Soviet Identity during the Thaw,” in Jones, Polly, ed., The Dilemmas of De-Stalinization: Negotiating Cultural and Social Change in the Khrushchev Era (London, 2006), 101-16.Google Scholar

10. Yekelchyk, Serhy, “A Communal Model of Citizenship in Stalinist Politics: Agitators and Voters in Postwar Electoral Campaigns (Kyiv, 1945-53),” Ab Imperio: Studies of New Imperial History and Nationalism in the Post-Soviet Space 2 (2010): 104.Google Scholar

11. Yurchak claims that “late socialism became marked by the emergence of lifestyles and communities that… had a particular relation to authoritative discourse defined as ‘being vnye'—that is, occupying a position that was simultaneously inside and outside of the rhetorical field of that discourse, neither simply in support nor simply in opposition of it.” Yurchak, Alexei, Everything Was Forever, Untillt WasNoMore: The Last Soviet Generation (Princeton, 2006), 288.Google Scholar

12. Anti-regime nationalism was a distinct presence. At the same time, however, as Dmitry Gorenburg demonstrates, urbanization and the reduction in native language education led to a strong degree of “linguistic assimilation and re-identification” in the non-Russian parts of the USSR under Brezhnev. See Farmer, Kenneth C., Ukrainian Nationalism in the Post-Stalin Era: Myth, Symbols, and Ideology in Soviet Nationalities Policy (The Hague, 1980)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Gorenburg, Dmitry, “Soviet Nationalities Policy and Assimilation,” in Arel, Dominique and Ruble, Blair A., eds., Rebounding Identities: The Politics of Identity in Russia and Ukraine (Washington, D.C., 2006).Google Scholar

13. See Kaiser, Robert J., The Geography of Nationalism in Russia and the USSR (Princeton, 1994).Google Scholar

14. Nevertheless, the leadership of the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU) did make some overtures to the Ukrainian intelligentsia in the late 1970s. See Lytvyn, Volodymyr et al., eds., Ukraina: Politychna istoriia, XXpochatok XXIstolittia (Kyiv, 2007), 899–915.Google Scholar

15. Shcherbyts'kyi's predecessor, Petro Shelest, was very vocal in condemning developments in Czechoslovakia, thus seeking to demonstrate to Moscow that his limited endorsement of Ukrainian culture was different from Czechoslovak policies, despite—or perhaps because of—his genuine fear that the Prague Spring might spill over into Ukraine. For his part, Shcherbyts'kyi was much less alarmed by the unfolding events in Czechoslovakia, and he was less supportive of military intervention. Grey Hodnett and Peter Potichnyj have partly attributed this apparent paradox to economic considerations, but it is also conceivable that Shcherbyts'kyi was less threatened by “national” forms of opposition to Soviet rule in the outer empire than his CPU rival. Because Alexander Dubcek's “national road toward socialism” cast doubts on the extent to which edinonational interests were compatible with existing Soviet-style regimes, the Czechoslovak crisis posed a potential challenge to Shelest's alliance with the Ukrainian cultural intelligentsia. By contrast, Shcherbyts'kyi's political vision equated loyalty to Soviet institutions witfi political stability, social benefits, and economic growth. Hodnett, Grey and Potichnyj, Peter J., The Ukraine and the Czechoslovak Crisis (Canberra, Australia, 1970), 85, 123.Google Scholar

16. Mason, David S., “Solidarity as a New Social Movement,” Political Science Quarterly 104, no. 1 (Spring 1989): 41 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Ekiert, Grzegorz, “Rebellious Poles: Political Crises and Popular Protest under State Socialism, 1945-89,” East European Politics and Societies 11, no. 2 (March 1997): 325-27.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

17. Ekiert, “Rebellious Poles,” 331.

18. Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv noveishei istorii, Moscow (RGANI), f. 89, op. 46, d. 59,11. 6-7 (Additional measures to organize counterpropaganda with regard to the Polish events, 4 October 1980).

19. Cited in Teague, Elizabeth, Solidarity and the Soviet Worker: The Impact of the Polish Events of 1980 on Soviet Internal Politics (London, 1988), 74.Google Scholar

20. Teague, Solidarity and the Soviet Worker, 69.

21. Ibid., 321-22.

22. RGANI, f. 5, op. 77, d. 105,11. 2-7 (Informing the population about the Central Committee resolution concerning the Polish events, 15 October 1980).

23. Cook, Linda J., The Soviet Social Contract and Why It Failed: Welfare Policy and Workers’ Politics from Brezhnev to Yeltsin (Cambridge, Mass., 1993), 65–79.Google Scholar

24. RGANI, f. 5, op. 77, d. 105,11. 49-53 (Reactions to the Polish events in Ukraine, 2 October 1980).

25. Tsentral'nyi derzhavnyi arkhiv hromads'kykh ob“ednan’ Ukrainy, Kyiv (TsDAHO), f. 1, op. 25, s. 2048, ark. 122-28 (Political work in workers’ collectives following the events in Poland, 12 November 1980).

26. The bulk of these gatherings took place in parts of western Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania, and Latvia with significant Polish minorities. RGANI, f. 5, op. 77, d. 105,11. 2 - 7, 49-53.

27. RGANI, f. 5, op. 77, d. 105, 11. 49-53; TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 25, s. 2216, ark. 5-8 (Summary of questions posed to lecturers on 25 March 1981); RGANI, f. 5, op. 84, d. 76, 11. 30-33 (Reactions to the CPSU Central Committee letter to the army, 16 June 1981), 35-39 (Reactions to the CPSU Central Committee letter in Ukraine, 16June 1981).

28. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 25, s. 2048, ark. 96-100 (Political situation in L'viv oblast, 14 November 1980); TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 25, s. 2216, ark. 12-13 (Workers’ questions during discussions surrounding the Twenty-sixth Congress, 7 April 1981).

29. RGANI, f. 5, op. 84, d. 76, 11. 61-64 (Reactions to Brezhnev's interview in the army, 6 November 1981), 65-70 (Reactions to Brezhnev's interview in Ukraine, 6 November 1981).

30. Derzhavnyi Arkhiv Kyivs'koi Oblasti, Kyiv, f. P5, op. 90, s. 399, ark. 4 - 6 (Lecturers’ work in the Bila Tserkva region, 30 December 1981).

31. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 25, s. 2295, ark. 12-14 (Information following the introduction of martial law in Poland, 14 December 1981).

32. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 25, s. 2295, ark. 10-11 (Reactions to the Polish events in Zhytomir oblast, 14 December 1981).

33. See Davies, Sarah, Popular Opinion in Stalin's Russia: Terror, Propaganda, and Dissent, 1934-1941 (Cambridge, Eng., 1997), 7–13.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

34. The region was a site of violent conflict in the 1940s and the early 1950s and became a center of dissidence in the 1960s and the early 1970s. See Farmer, Ukrainian Nationalism.

35. Roman Solchanyk, “Polska a sowiecki zachod,” Suchasnist: Zeszyt xa jeyku polskim, nos. 1-2 (1985): 79, 82, 86.

36. Derzhavnyi arkhiv L'vivs'koi oblasti, L'viv (DALO), f. P3, op. 46, s. 85, ark. 84-86 (Reactions to the Polish events in L'viv oblast, 23 April 1981).

37. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 25, s. 2048, ark. 114-17 (Opinions expressed in queues outside shops, no date).

38. By March 1981, local officials had confiscated 55 bibles, 500 copies of a religious calendar, and 1,100 religious books and brochures in Russian and Ukrainian that Polish citizens had posted to private addresses in the USSR, including many in western Ukraine. RGANI, f. 89, op. 46, d. 81, 11. 15-20 (Additional measures to control the distribution of Polish publications in the USSR, 19 March 1981).

39. Iurii Zaitsev, “Pol's'ka opozytsiia 1970-80-kh rokiv pro zasady ukrains'kopol's'koho porozuminnia,” in Iurii Slyvka, ed., Deportalsii ukraintsiv tapoliakiv: Kinets 1939- pochatok 50-kh rokiv (L'viv, 1998), 57; TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 25, s. 2287, ark. 43 (On finding Solidarity publications in L'viv oblast, 8 October 1981).

40. According to official data, there were 258,000 Poles in Ukraine in 1979. Most of them lived in the western borderlands and around Zhytomir. Karol Grünberg and Boleslaw Sprengel, Trudne sqsiedztwo: Stosunki pohko-ukrainskie w X-XKwieku (Warsaw, 2005), 706; TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 25, s. 2048, ark. 122-28.

41. See, for example, Farmer, Ukrainian Nationalism, 178.

42. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 25, s. 2295, ark. 51-53 (Situation in L'viv oblast following the events in Poland, 14 December 1981).

43. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 25, s. 2048, ark. 114-17.

44. Teague, Solidarity and the Soviet Worker, 42-43.

45. Russian Union of Solidarists, O ruchu robotnianym zv Rosji i Polsce (Warsaw, 1985), 30-32, 70-71; MS 35/80, 13 October 1980, Document AS4092: A. Sakharov and 9 other signatures, “Zaiavlenie Ob“edinennomu mezhzavodskomu stachechnomu komitetu v Gdan'ske,” Moscow, probably 30 August 1980; MS 22/81, 8June 1981, Document AS4321: Mykola Pohyba, a blue-collar worker, “Otkrytoe pis'mo Ukrainskoi pravozashchitnoi gruppe,” st. Bucha, Kyiv oblast, 4 November 1980; See also O. Bazhan, “Zovnishn'opolitychni aktsii SRSR u 50-80-ti rr. ta ikh vplyv na rozvytok opozytsiinoho rukhu v Ukraini,” Zarkhiviv VUChK-HPU-NKVD-KHB2/4 (2000).

46. MS 36/81, 25 September 1981, Document AS4429: Mikhail Zotov, member of SMOT, artist, “Vyderzhki iz pis'ma (noiabr’ 1980) o reaktsiiakh tol'iattinskikh rabochikh na pol'skie sobytiia,” Moscow, no earlier than 27 January 1981; Russian Solidarity Union, O ruchu robotnianym, 51-52.

47. The authors of the survey conducted 618 informal conversations with inhabitants of the Moscow region—the respondents had no connection to the dissident movement and were not aware that they were taking part in an opinion poll. OSA, f. 300, sf. 85, s. 46, c. 5, file 1 (S. Pukhov, “Attitudes toward the Solidarity trade union among inhabitants of Moscow“).

48. See Polly Jones, “From the Secret Speech to the Burial of Stalin: Real and Ideal Responses to De-Stalinization,” in Jones, ed., Dilemmas of De-Stalinization.

49. RGANI, f. 5, op. 77, d. 105, 1. 8 (Most characteristic questions about the Polish events, no date); TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 25, s. 2048, ark. 84-88 (Reactions to meeting of Warsaw Pact leaders among the population of Ukraine, 13 December 1980).

50. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 25, s. 2295, ark. 1-4 (Reactions to the Polish events among the population of Ukraine, 12 May 1981).

51. OSA, f. 300, sf. 6, f. 3, c. 2 (Unevaluated comments by recent emigres, January 1983).

52. Kramer, Mark, “The Czechoslovak Crisis and the Brezhnev Doctrine,” in Fink, Carole, Gassert, Philipp, and Junker, Detlef, eds., 1968: The World Transformed (Cambridge, Eng., 1998), 142-43.Google Scholar

53. Dmytruk, Ukraina ne movchala.

54. Weiner, “Déjà Vu All Over Again,” 186-88. For the situation in 1956, see Weiner, “Empires Pay a Visit.” By contrast, Weiner shows that, in 1968, gulag returnees were no longer a threat to Soviet power in the region. Moreover, the invasion of Czechoslovakia came before the crisis of the Prague Spring got out of control. Among other factors, memories of war and the Hungarian uprising, as well as the presence of a cohesive cohort of war veterans, helped to maintain stability in the borderlands.

55. Weiner, Amir, “Robust Revolution to Retiring Revolution: The Life Cycle of the Soviet Revolution, 1945-1968,” Slavonic and East European Review 86, no. 2 (April 2008): 230.Google Scholar

56. For example, see Tumarkin, Nina, The Living and the Dead: The Rise and Fall of the Cult of World War II in Russia (New York, 1994).Google Scholar

57. Shordy before the introduction of martial law, Pravda wrote that “certain provocateurs are questioning the existing Soviet-Polish border,” evoking “legitimate indignation among Soviet people.” Current Digest ofthe Soviet Press 33, no. 50 (13January 1982): “On the Situation in Poland,” Pravda, 11 December 1981.

58. George Kolankiewicz goes so far as to argue that, partly under the influence of Poland, Iurii Andropov tried to increase societal discipline and promote the idea of “law and order.” Andropov appeared to believe that Poland was an extreme example of societal disobedience and that the militarization of its society was necessary to strengthen work discipline and bring back order. The USSR itself, while not nearly as unstable, needed “militarisation at one remove” to combat absenteeism, high labor mobility, work indiscipline, as well as laxity in management and plan fulfillment. Meanwhile, appreciative of the dangers of mutual overidentification, which discredited the Soviet system at home and encouraged anti-Soviet feelings in Poland, journalists began to emphasize that Warsaw, lagging behind on the road toward communism, should follow its own policies, albeit within the confines of “a clearly defined set of legal and political norms.” George Kolankiewicz, “The Polish Question: Andropov's Answer?” in Leonard Schapiro and Joseph Godson, eds., The Soviet Worker: From Lenin to Andropov, 2d ed. (London, 1984), 259, 272-75, 277.

59. Yurchak, Everything Was Forever, 164.

60. Ibid., 283.

61. Stephen Kotkin defines “speaking Bolshevik” as the “barometer of one's political allegiance to the cause.” Kotkin, Stephen, Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization (Berkeley, 1995), 220.Google Scholar Here I build on the ideas of Ethan Pollock, whose study of the immediate postwar years distinguishes between articulations of loyalty to the Soviet homeland and expressions of allegiance to the party. Pollock, Ethan, ‘“Real Men Go to the Bania': Postwar Soviet Masculinities and the Bathhouse,” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 11, no. 1 (Winter 2010): 52.Google Scholar

62. Although this term can be translated as “workers,” trudiashchiesia were distinct from rabochie or “blue-collar workers.” Often this usage seemed to encompass all loyal citizens.

63. Dunham, Vera S., In Stalin's Time: Middleclass Values in Soviet Fiction (Durham, 1990), 4, 13-17, 244.Google Scholar

64. Lewin, Moshe, The Soviet Century, ed. Gregory Elliott (London, 2005), 320-25.Google Scholar

65. Brooks, Jeffrey, “Socialist Realism in Pravda: Read All about It!” Slavic Review 53, no. 4 (Winter 1994): 986-87.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

66. As Mark Edele argues, Soviet veterans emerged as a status group in the late 1970s. Mark Edele, Soviet Veterans of the Second World War: A Popular Movement in an Authoritarian Society, 1941-1991 (Oxford, 2008), 181.

67. RGANI, f. 5, op. 84, d. 76,11. 35-39.

68. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 25, s. 2295, ark. 51-53.

69. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 25, s. 2048, ark. 84-88.

70. OSA, f. 300, sf. 6, s. 3, c. 1 (Attitudes of Soviet citizens to the strike movement in Poland, September 1980-February 1981).

71. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 25, s. 2048, ark. 84-88; TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 25, s. 2295, ark. 1-4; RGANI, f. 5, op. 84, d. 76,11. 35-39.

72. OSA, f. 300, sf. 6, s. 3, c. 2 (Unevaluated comments by recent emigrants, July 1982).

73. OSA, f. 300, sf. 6, s. 3, c .2 (Soviet citizens’ attitudes toward Poland since martial law: Agitprop, western radio and the evolution of opinion, September 1982).

74. OSA, f. 300, sf. 6, s. 3, c. 1 (Soviet citizens’ attitudes toward Poland, October 1981).

75. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 25, s. 2048, ark. 84-88.

76. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 25, s. 2295, ark. 1-4.

77. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 25, s. 2600, ark. 79 (Sending gifts for Polish children, 16 December 1983).

78. RGANI, f. 89, 46, d. 67,11. 5-7 (The role of foreign tourism in influencing Polish citizens, 14 November 1980); DALO, f. P3, op. 44, s. 77, ark. 2 - 4 (Informing the population of L'viv oblast about CPSU relations with foreign communist parties, 29 November 1980); DALO, f. P3, op. 46, s. 84, ark. 1-2 (Informing the population of L'vivoblast about CPSU relations with foreign communist parties, 6 November 1981).

79. Fifty percent of Soviet citizens preparing to visit Poland were party members, the great majority were active in the Komsomol, and they included leading students, workers, and sportsmen. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 25, s. 2600, ark. 51 (Exchanges of student brigades between Poland and the USSR, 22 July 1983).

80. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 25, s. 2287, ark. 33-37 (Party work conducted with Polish brigades in the USSR, 27 March 1981).

81. Archiwum Akt Nowych, Warsaw (AAN), z. 1354, s. LVI, t. 967 (Cultural cooperation with socialist countries).

82. AAN, z. 1354, s. XI, t. 472, str. 39 (Measures to strengthen relations with the USSR, 2 May 1982).

83. Risch, William Jay, The Ukrainian West: Culture and the Fate of Empire in Soviet Lviv (Cambridge, Mass., 2011), 74–75.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

84. DALO, f. P3, op. 46, s. 85, ark. 84-86.

85. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 25, s. 2048, ark. 122-28.

86. Ibid.

87. As a recent émigré recalled in 1982, “some Kievans regarded the Poles as their sworn enemies, observing that ‘we feed these dirty scum, we sell them whole factories, and they want to go over to the west.'” OSA, f. 300, sf. 6, s. 3, c. 2 (Unevaluated comments from recent emigrants, August 1982).

88. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 25, s. 2048, ark. 114-17.

89. RGANI, f. 5, op. 77, d. 105,11. 49-53.

90. Between January and May 1981,110,000 Polish citizens passed through Chernivtsi oblast on the way to and from Romania and Bulgaria, and many “transit tourists” stopped off to trade and see the sites of L'viv, too. Meanwhile, about 5,000 Poles visited L'viv oblast between October and December 1980 as part of organized tour groups, although their numbers declined significantly in 1981. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 25, s. 2287, ark. 8-10 (Behavior of Polish tourists passing through Chernivtsi oblast, 10 June 1981); DALO, f. P3, op. 46, s. 85, ark. 4 - 9 (Opinions expressed by Polish tourists, 22 January 1981); RGANI, f. 89, 46, d. 67,11. 5-7.

91. DALO, f. P3, op. 46, s. 85, ark. 84-86.

92. DALO, f. P3, op. 46, s. 85, ark. 4-9; TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 25, s. 2295, ark. 1-4.

93. RGANI, f. 5, op. 84, d. 76,11. 35-39.

94. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 25, s. 2048, ark. 96-100.

95. DALO, f. P3, op. 46, s. 85, ark. 84-86.

96. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 25, s. 2048, ark. 96-100. As Shcherbyts'kyi's protégé, Dobryk likely helped to reverse the nationalities policy of the 1960s and thus to emphasize the importance of Soviet patriotism in the borderlands. Lewytzkyj, Borys, Politics and Society in Soviet Ukraine, 1953-1980 (Edmonton, 1984), 147-48.Google Scholar

97. The term bandits was often used as a shorthand for gulag returnees who included many “bourgeois nationalists” from west Ukraine. See Miriam Dobson, ‘“Show the Bandits No Mercy!': Amnesty, Criminality and Public Response in 1953,” in Jones, ed., Dilemmas of De- Stalinization, 21-40.

98. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 25, s. 2048, ark. 117-21 (Opinions expressed in workplaces, no date).

99. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 25, s. 2048, ark. 117-21.

100. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 25, s. 2048, ark. 96-100.

101. RGANI, f. 5, op. 77, d. 105,1. 8.

102. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 25, s. 2216, ark. 15-18 (Questions posed by workers in Ukraine, 22 April 1981).

103. RGANI, f. 5, op. 77, d. 105,11. 2-7.

104. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 25, s. 2048, ark. 96-100.

105. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 25, s. 2541, ark. 23-25 (Characteristic questions posed by workers, 1 March 1983).

106. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 25, s. 2048, ark. 108 (Anonymous letter, no date).

107. Davies, Sarah, ‘“Us against Them': Social Identity in Soviet Russia, 1934-41,” Russian Review 56, no. 1 (January 1997): 70.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

108. TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 25, s. 2048, ark. 114-17.

109. Ibid.

110. DALO, f. P3, op. 44, s. 85, ark. 43-46 (Situation in L'yiv oblast, no date).

111. Epstein, “Soviet Patriotism,” 209.

112. This reflected the growing ambitions of postwar Soviet society as described by Katerina Clark, who argues that most of the working population “endeavoured to comport themselves as was deemed fit for a person of their standing” precisely because they “sought to rise in the hierarchy of status and enjoy a higher standard of living.” Katerina Clark, The Soviet Novel: History as Ritual (Bloomington, 2000), 197.

113. AAN, z. 1354, s. LVI, t. 1860 (Meetings in Moscow held between 9 and 12 January 1983).

114. AAN, z. 1354, s. LVI, t. 1121 (Ukrainian writers’ delegation in Poland, 24 November 1984).

115. In her analysis of amateur theaters of the Khrushchev period, Susan Costanzo explains that “the use of grazhdanstvennost’ to legitimise controversial artistic content and to encourage members of the public to support it reveals a changing role for citizens in the post-Stalin era… . That citizen might be an amateur performer who offered new, sometimes uncomfortable ways to understand Soviet society.” Costanzo, Susan, “Amateur Theatres and Amateur Publics in the Russian Republic, 1958-71,” Slavonic and East European Review 86, no. 2 (April 2008): 394.Google Scholar

116. Yekelchyk, “Communal Model of Citizenship,” 119.

117. Despite helping to fuel Russification, Zhuk claims, the spread of western popular music encouraged local youth in eastern Ukraine to develop a strong regional identity that alienated them from the increasingly restrictive top party apparatchiks in Moscow, facilitated the growth of informal networks involving black marketers, and underpinned a cynical attitude toward the official ideology in the early 1980s. Zhuk, S. I., Rock and Roll in the Rocket City: The West, Identity, and Ideology in Soviet Dniepropetrovsk, 1960-1985 (Washington, D.C., 2010), 215-79.Google Scholar

118. Risch, Ukrainian West, 70-81.

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121. Riabchuk, Mykola, Dvi Ukrainy: Real'ni mezhi, virtual'ni viiny (Kyiv, 2003), 304.Google Scholar