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The “Memoirs” of Count Münnich

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 January 2017

David L. Ransel
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Since the first Russian publication of Count B. C. Münnich’s “Memoirs” in 1842 historians have employed them as a useful primary source on eighteenthcentury history. However, the Russian title, Zapiski, is misleading. Münnich was not writing his personal memoirs or even a state memorandum: instead he was offering a proposal for central government reform with an accompanying historical justification. Scholars have occasionally remarked on this aspect of the document. But it has gone unrecognized that Münnich’s writing also bore a strongly partisan political imprint. The political design only becomes clear in the context of the prolonged battle for position and influence waged between two powerful court parties in the first years of Catherine II’s reign. At a crucial stage in this struggle Münnich used his proposal in an apparent attempt to break the deadlock and facilitate Nikita Panin’s rise to power in late 1763.

Type
Notes And Comment
Information
Slavic Review , Volume 30 , Issue 4 , December 1971 , pp. 843 - 852
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies. 1971

References

1. The first two translations from the French original (Russkii vestnik, St. Petersburg, 1842, no. 1, pp. 77-134, and Russkaia starina, 1874, no. 1, pp. 73-105) contained many errors. Further references in this paper will be to the original publication, Ebauche pour dormer une idée de la forme du Gouvernement de l’empire de Russie (Copenhagen, 1774), or to the improved Russian translation, Zapiski fel'dmarshala grafa Minikha, ed. S. N. Shubinsky (St. Petersburg, 1874) (hereafter Zapiski grafa Minikha).

2. See, for example, K. N. Bestuzhev-Riumnin's preface to Zapiski grafa Minikha, pp. xvi-xvii; Chechulin, N. D., “Proekt Imperatorskogo Soveta,” Zhurnal Ministerstva narodnogo prosveshcheniia, 1894, no. 3, p. 80 Google Scholar; Ley, Francis, Le Maréchal de Münnich et la Russie au XVIIIe siècle (Paris, 1959), pp. 231–70 Google Scholar, which has a synopsis and analysis of the Ebauche; and the most recent reference, Petrova, V. A., “Politicheskaia bor'ba vokrug senatskoi reformy 1763 goda,” Vestnik Leningradskogo universiteta, vypusk 2 (April 1967), no. 8, p. 61 Google Scholar, where, however, Petrova mistakenly attributes the work to Ernst Münnich, the field marshal’s son.

3. Minikh, Ernst, “Zapiski grafa Ernsta Minikha, syna fel'dmarshala pisannye im dlia detei svoikh,” in Rossiia i russkii dvor v pervoi polovine XVIII veka (St. Petersburg, 1891), p. 13 Google Scholar; additional sources on Münnich's biography include Ley's work, cited in note 2, and Vischer, M., Münnich (Frankfurt, 1938)Google Scholar, as well as older studies: Büsching, Anton Friedrich, “Lebensgeschichte Burchard Christophs von Münnich,” Magazin fiir die Neue Historie und Geographie, vol. 3 (Hamburg, 1769), pp. 387–536 Google Scholar; Halem, G. A., Lebensbeschreibung des russisch-kaiserlichen Gencral-Feldmarschalls B. C. Grafen f. Münnich (Oldenburg, 1803)Google Scholar; Khmyrov, M. D., “Fel'dtseikhmeisterstvo grafa Minikha,” in Zapiski grafa Minikha, pp. 217–387 Google Scholar; Manstein, Christophe Hermann, Mćmoires historiques, politiques et militaires sur la Russie, 2 vols. (Paris, 1860)Google Scholar.

4. Manstein, Mémoires, vol. 2. For a critical view of some points in Manstein see “Zamechaniia na Zapiski Manshteina o Rossii, 1724-1744,” in Rossiia i russkii dvor, pp. 123-222; Arved Jürgensohn’s detailed investigation of the “Zamechaniia” (pp. 225-83) established Ernst Minikh as the author, a fact evidently not noticed by a recent scholar of this period, who continues erroneously to attribute the work to Peter Panin: S. M. Troitsky, “Istoriografiia ‘dvortsovykh perevorotov’ v Rossii XVIII v.,” Voprosv istorii, 1966, no. 2, p. 39.

5. The reasons for the Senate’s acquiescence in Catherine's coup d’état are illuminated in a recent article by Marc Raeff, “The Domestic Policies of Peter III and His Overthrow,” American Historical Review, 75, no, 5 (June 1970): 1289-1310.

6. On Bestuzhev’s policies in Elizabeth's reign and his disgrace see Kaplan, Herbert, Russia and the Outbreak of the Seven Years’ War (Berkeley, 1968)Google Scholar; Bil'basov, V. A., “Pervye politicheskie pis'ma Ekateriny II,” Istoricheskie monografii, vol. 3 (St. Petersburg, 1901), pp. 3–125 Google Scholar; for the Orlovs see Barsukov, A. P., “Kniaz' Grigorii Grigor'evich Orlov,” Rasskazy is russkoi istorii XVIII veka po arkhivnym dokumentam (St. Petersburg, 1885), pp. 59–190.Google Scholar

7. Nikita Panin and Grigorii Teplov had outlined this program in the decree announcing Catherine’s accession to the throne: Osmnadtsatyi Vek, vol. 4 (Moscow, 1869), pp. 216-23. The authorship is confirmed by Danish Ambassador Haxthausen’s dispatch from St. Petersburg, July 19/30, 1762, Danske Rigsarkivet, TKUA, Russland A III, vol. 80, no. 127 (hereafter DRa with volume and number), which may be taken as reliable, since the Danish representatives enjoyed Panin's particular confidence at this time. An especially revealing example—where Panin hinted that a coup d’état was about to take place—is contained in Haxthausen to Bernstorff, St. Petersburg, June 10/21, 1762, DRa, vol. 80 (no number). Further evidence of the Danish secretary Schumacher’s wellinformed position is in V. A. Bil'basov, Istoriia Ekateriny II, vol. 1 (Berlin, 1900), pp. 119-20n.

8. The final draft of the decree announcing the reform and Panin’s memorandum motivating the proposal are published in Sbornik Imperatorskogo russkogo istoricheskogo obshchestva (St. Petersburg, 1867-1916), 7: 202-17 (hereafter SIRIO).

9. Studies of Panin's foreign policy system, known as the “Northern Accord,” include Chechulin, N. D., Vneshniaia folitika Rossii v nachale tsarstvovaniia Ekateriny II, 1762-1774 (St. Petersburg, 1895)Google Scholar; Aleksandrov, P. A., Severnaia sistema (Moscow, 1914)Google Scholar; and, on the origins of the program, K. Rahbek Schmidt, “Wie ist Panins Plan zu einem Nordischen System entstanden?” Zeitschrift fiir Slawistik, 2, no. 3 (1957): 406-22.

10. Judging from Teplov’s letter to Panin in late August, the empress had no objections to the reform proposal and was seriously considering its implementation: G. N. Teplov to N. I. Panin, Aug. 29, 1762, Tsentral'nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv drevnikh aktov (Moscow), fond 11, delo 660.

11. But see my article “Nikita Panin's Imperial Council Project and the Struggle of Hierarchy Groups at the Court of Catherine II,” Canadian Slavic Studies, 4, no. 3 (Fall 1970): 443-63.

12. The change was immediately noted by foreign ambassadors. British envoy Buckingham to Lord Halifax, Moscow, Feb. 14, 1763 (N.S.), The Despatches and Correspondence of John, Second Earl of Buckinghamshire, Ambassador to the Court of Catherine II of Russia, 1762-1765, ed. A. Collyer (London, 1900), 1: 222 (hereafter Despatches Buckingham); Prussian envoy Solms to Frederick II, Moscow, Mar. 31/Apr. 11, 1763, SIRIO, 22: 49.

13. See especially Solms to Frederick II, St. Petersburg, July 8/19, 1763, SIRIO, 22: 85-86. On the party split and the problems it was causing for the empress see Catherine's letter to the Senate, June 4, 1763 (N.S.) in Büsching’s Magazin, vol. 7 (Hamburg, 1774), pp. 247-48; and as seen by the foreign envoys, Solms to Frederick II, St. Petersburg, June 20/July 1, June 24/July 5, July 1/12, July 22/Aug. 2, and July 25/Aug. 5, SIRIO, 22: 79-84, 94-95, 96, . respectively; Buckingham to Halifax, St. Petersburg, July 1 and Aug. 22, 1763 (N.S.), Despatches Buckingham, 2: 43, 56-57, respectively; Swedish envoy Posse to Chancellery President, St. Petersburg, June 20/ July 1, June 27/July 8, July 11/22, July 25/Aug. 5, 1763, Svenska Riksarkivet (hereafter SRa), Muscovitica, vol. 309, nos. 42, 44, 48, 52, respectively, and Jahnke to Chancellery President, St. Petersburg, Aug. 5/16, 1763, vol. 339, no. 55.

14. Catherine provided him assistance in his writing and gave him a standing invitation to consult with her in cabinet each day at six o’clock. See letter cited in Ley, Le Maréchal de Münnich, p. 230. Their correspondence was filled with syrupy professions of mutual esteem, prompting Catherine to write, “Our letters would be like declarations of love, if your patriarchal age did not impart such dignity to them” (Zapiski grafa Minikha, p. xxvi).

15. After taking over the government in November 1740 Münnich had ordered Bestuzhev arrested. See Minikh, “Zapiski syna fel'dmarshala,” p. 106. If one can believe Büsching, this action must have left serious scars. He relates that after the arrest Bestuzhev incriminated the former favorite, Biron. But when confronted by Biron, Bestuzhev regretted his statements and asked that the protocol record all his previous admissions as false. Then he added: “Ich sage es frei heraus, dass mich der Feldmarschall Münnich angestiftet, und mir meine Freiheit versprochen habe, wenn ich wider den Herzog etwas angeben würde. Die grausame Begegnung, welche mir wiederfahren ist, und gräuliche Drohungen, haben mir diese Beschuldigungen ausgepresset.” See “Lebenslauf des vormaligen Grosskanzlers Grafen Alexei Bestuschef-Riumin,” Magazin, vol. 2 (Hamburg, 1768), p. 419. Later from exile Münnich tried to exculpate himself with lengthy appeals, which Bestuzhev studiously ignored. See especially the letter in N. Kostomarov, “Fel'dmarshal Minikh i ego znachenie v russkoi istorii,” Vestnik Evropy, 19, no. 9 (1884): 35-37; reproduced in part by Ley (who also notes the Bestuzhev-Münnich enmity), Le Maréchal de Münnich, p. 192.

16. The precise date of Münnich’s writing cannot be pinpointed. But it clearly belongs to the latter half of 1763. He sent the manuscript to. Büsching in late November of that year, and from the accompanying notes one can determine that Münnich submitted his work to Catherine some time before that—that is, at the same time she was resolving the issue of the court struggle. See Büsching’s, Wöchentliche Nachrichten (1774), no. 40, pp. 311–14Google Scholar. Other evidence indicates that the text was still being touched up late in the year. See Academician Miller's letter to Dumaresque (quoted in part below), Zapiski grafa Minikha, p. xvi.

17. Although the place of publication is given as “Copenhagen, 1774,” the types used were not to be found in Denmark. The copy in the Danish Royal Library contains the following clarification: “wahrscheinlicher zu Leipzig gedruckt bei Breitkopf, [oder] im Hartnashschen Verlage zu Riga; aber gewiss nicht zu Kopenhagen.” For a detailed, if inconclusive, discussion of the publication history see Arved Jürgensohn, “Die Memoiren des Feldmarschalls Münnich und sein Ebauche,” Russische Revue (1886), esp. pp. 329-36.

18. Zapiski graja Minikha, p. xvi.

19. A. P. Bestuzhev-Riumin to Empress Elizabeth, Jan. 19, 1756, Leningradskoe otdelenie, Institut istorii, fond 56, opis' 1, delo 142, listy 249-63. For an interesting analysis of Bestuzhev’s actions at this time see Kaplan, Russia and the Outbreak of the Seven Years’ War, pp. 38-41.

20. Münnich, Ebauche, p. 174.

21. “A Conference, an unheard-of monster, was set up: nothing was provided in it, and consequently everything was left to irresponsibility; and having wrested from the Ruler a law to the effect that edicts signed by the Conference would compel execution everywhere, they [the favorites] cut off the Monarch from all business of state and, consequently, also from all knowledge of their activities” (SIRIO, 7: 207).

22. Münnich, Ebauche, p. 15O.

23. SIRIO, 7: 205; English translation from Marc Raeff, ed., Plans for Political Reform in Imperial Russia, 1730-1905 (Englewood Cliffs, 1966), p. 58.

24. Münnich, Ebauche, pp. 184-85.

25. SIRIO, 7: 205. Ley, Le.Maréchal de Münnich, p. 256, n. 1, also saw in this passage a reference to Panin, but since Ley had access to only a limited number of Russian sources with the aid of a translator, he did not develop any analysis with respect to court politics.

26. SIRIO, 7: 205. Another striking similarity in the two projects rnay be seen in an attack on the powerful Conference secretary, Dmitrii Volkov. Panin wrote that the Empress Elizabeth “turned over work and cares to the arrogant Volkov. Under the pretext of administering a bureaucratic order that did not exist, this man, in fact, performed the functions of a prime minister; he ruled the ministers themselves, selected and decided affairs on his own and forced ministers to sign them, invoking either the name of the Sovereign or, under cover of Her will, the favorite’s desires. Caprice was the only rule in selecting business for decision” (SIRIO, 7: 207). Münnich, who could not speak with authority about Elizabeth’s reign, nevertheless reinforced this argument with an example from Peter Ill’s time: “Les personnes en faveur, Melgounow, Goudowitz, et surtout Wolkow, qui faisait la fonction de secrétaire privé, qui maniait la plume et avait l’oreille du maitre, étaient fort-audessus à l’égard des suffrages de tous ceux qui étaient membres de la Commission, de sbrte que ce que Wolkow trouvait convenir faisait la forme du gouvernement sous l’empereur Pierre III” (Ebauche, pp. 182-83).

27. Münnich, Ebauche, pp. 146-47. iGoogle Scholar

28. Münnich, Ebaitclie, pp. 171-72.Google Scholar

29. Catherine did, however, institute the other reform proposed by both Panin and Münnich. In December 1763 she ordained the division of the Governing Senate into six departments, each handling particular categories of state business. Two departments were to be located in Moscow. See Polnoe sobranie zakonov rossiiskii imperii (hereafter PSZ), 1st ser., vol. 16, no. 11, 989.

30. The empress was compelled to end her skillful balancing of the two parties. News of the death of the Polish King Augustus reached St. Petersburg in October, and Russia had to be prepared for the succession fight with a consistent and effective foreign policy unhindered by party disputes. Catherine had been persuaded to a pro-Prussian orientation and therefore placed Panin in command. Although S. M. Solov'ev, Istoriia Rossii s drevneishikh vremen, vol. 13, bk. 25 (Moscow, 1965), pp. 195, 306n.Google Scholar, indicates the date of this change from a Senate order as November 5 (O.S.), diplomatic reports confirm that it occurred at least a week earlier. Solms to Frederick II, St. Petersburg, Oct. 28/Nov. 8, 1763, SIRIO, 22: 1445; Jahnke to Chancellery President, St. Petersburg, Oct. 28/Nov. 8, 1763, SRa, Muscovitica, vol. 339, no. 79. Panin was also put in charge of the Navy Department, given access with the general procurator to all state secrets, and consulted regularly on internal affairs. See Jahnke to Chancellery President, St. Petersburg, Oct. 28/Nov. 8 and Oct. 31/Nov. 11, 1763, SRa, Muscovitica, vol. 339, nos. 80, 81; Solms to Frederick II, St. Petersburg, Nov. 25/Dec. 6, 1763, SIRIO, 22: 168; Catherine to N. I. Panin, Nov. 23 (O.S.), 1763, “Pis'ma i zapiski imperatritsy Ekateriny II k grafu Nikite Ivanovichu Paninu,” Chteniia v imperatorskom obshchestve istorii i drcvnostci rossiiskikh, vol. 2, pt. 2 (Moscow, 1863), p. 3; also Catherine's papers in SIRIO, 7: 349, 354-97 passim.

31. Prince Nikolai Repnin, Panin’s nephew by marriage, was appointed plenipotentiary minister to Warsaw. Solms to Frederick II, St. Petersburg, Oct. 14/25, 1763, SIRIO, 22: 139. Adam Olsufiev was raised to senator when the Senate was reorganized shortly thereafter according to Panin’s plan. See PSZ, vol. 16, no. 11, 989.

32. PSZ, vol. 16, no. 11, 955.

33. They were allowed so little knowledge of the Prussian negotiations that Panin could assure Solms that Bestuzhev and Orlov would read about the treaty in the newspapers. Solms to Frederick II, St. Petersburg, Oct. 21/Nov. 1, 1763, SIRIO, 22: 146.