1 The scope of the present essay necessarily excludes any attempt to penetrate the meaning of the Sino-Soviet dialogue or, more generally, the influence which Lenin's teachings on disarmament exert on Soviet or Chinese actions.

2 () (2nd ed., 30 vols.; Moscow, 1926-32), XIX, 30; XVII, 197, 206. All references to Lenin's Sochineniia in this paper are to the second edition unless otherwise noted.

3 Ibid. See XII, 318; XIX, 314-22; XX, 67; XXII, 505-8.

4 Ibid., VIII, 395-97. While concerned primarily with domestic affairs in Russia, Lenin's remarks may be addressed in part to pacifist tendencies throughout Europe encouraged by Tsar Nicholas II's convoking of the Hague Peace Conference in 1899 (convoked again in 1907). See, e.g., Nikolai Notovitch, La Pacification de I'Europe et Nicolas II (Paris, 1899).

5 (), XIX, 314-32. An extensive list of references to Lenin's criticisms of “disarmament” as a slogan of the “Lefts” and Centralists, 1914 to 1917, may be found in the index to the fourth edition of Lenin's collected works, Cnpaeounuu moM K 4 U3danuw conuueuuu B. H. leuuua (Moscow, 1955), Part I, p. 499.

6 CoHuneuun, XIX, 314 passim (emphasis in the original).

7 Ibid., pp. 181, 184.

8 Ibid., XII, 318.

9 Ibid., XIX, 314-22; XXI, 365 passim; XXV, 281.

10 See Friedrich Engels, Herr Eugen DiXhring's Revolution in Science (Anti-Duhring) (New York, 1939), p. 189. See also below, note 46. See, however, Engel's subsequent advocacy of disarmament in Kann Europa abriisten? (Nuremberg, 1893).

11 (), ConunenuA, XIX, 314 ff.

12 Cited in Eudin, Xenia J. and Fisher, Harold H., eds., Soviet Russia and the West, 1917-1927 (Stanford, 1957), pp. 49–51 Google Scholar. For a Soviet discussion of the origins of the principles of “peaceful coexistence,” see () edited by A. A. Gromyko (Moscow, 1962). For a Western account of this facet of Soviet foreign policy showing the role played by Trotsky, Lenin, Chicherin, and Stalin, see Griffiths, Franklyn J. C., “Origins of Peaceful Coexistence: A Historical Note,” Survey, No. 50 (Jan., 1964), pp. 195–201.Google Scholar

13 A survey of Soviet Russia's peace treaties signed in the first years of the Bolshevik regime and culminating in the very detailed provisions of the Russo-Finnish Treaty of June 1, 1922, indicates that the following principles were incorporated, to varying degrees, in many of the treaties between the Soviet government and the Central Powers, Japan, the “succession states,” and Russia's neighbors, such as Rumania and Poland: (1) suspension of hostilities during the peace negotiations; (2) cessation of hostilities after signing the peace, including a cessation of economic warfare, and of propaganda and other interference in the internal affairs of either party; (3) establishment of neutral zones along territorial and water frontiers, within which the number of soldiers and the quantity and quality of equipment would be limited; (4) evacuation and demobilization in certain areas, including the surrender of property and equipment to one side or the other (e.g., to Germany and Estonia from Russia, and to Russia from Georgia); (5) prohibition on either party's soil of irregular or regular forces, or their recruitment, supply, or transit, the purpose of which was to incite violence or social change in the territory of the other party; (6) a similar prohibition regarding political organizations or pretender governments; (7) pledges to support international agreements to neutralize Estonia, the Gulf of Finland, the Baltic Sea, Holland, and Lake Ladoga, if such agreements were worked out; (8) pledges to establish a most-favored-nation trade agreement between the parties; (9) respect for the right of national self-determination. Details of the treaties are readily available, albeit with some serious inaccuracies, in Leonard Shapiro, ed., Soviet Treaty Series (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1950), I, passim; see his bibliography for original sources; see also the two volumes by Jan F. Triska and Robert M. Slusser: A Calendar of Soviet Treaties, 1917-1957 (Stanford, 1959) and The Theory, Law and Policy of Soviet Treaties (Stanford, 1962).

14 Eudin and Fisher, op. cit., pp. 49-51.

15 (), XXV, 281. In March, 1919, Lenin's notes on the Draft Program of the Russian Communist Party stated that the party “decisively rejects reactionary petty-bourgeois illusions” and “hopes for disarmament” as counterrevolutionary. It juxtaposed to such slogans a program of “disarming” and “suppressing the resistance of the exploiters.” Ibid., XXIV, 97. This part of Lenin's statement, however, was not included in the party program. One suggestion that Lenin “stuck by his guns” derives from an exchange of letters with Trotsky late in 1921. Trotsky wrote on October 23 that he was planning a brochure to answer those who criticized the absence in Soviet military doctrine of a theory of “offensive revolutionary wars.” Trotsky inquired of Lenin what he had written in this regard and whether relevant Communist Party resolutions had been made. Lenin's reply (undated) referred to four of his articles which touched on the subject—“Against the Current,” “On [the Slogan of ?] Disarmament,” “The Collapse of the First International,” “Socialism and War“—and to party resolutions of the 1914-17 period. Trotsky Archive, Houghton Library, T-708.

16 () (Moscow, 1929), pp. 131-32.

17 See the “Theses on the Forthcoming Washington Conference” drawn up by the Executive Committee of the Communist International on August 15, 1921, in Degras, Jane, ed., The Communist International, 1919-1943: Documents (2 vols.; London, 1956-60), I, 285 ff.Google Scholar; see the collection of articles, Om Bamunimoua do Tewyu (Moscow, 1922); see Zinoviev's remarks on the Washington Conference to the Congress of the Toilers of the Far East, given in Eudin, Xenia J. and North, Robert C., eds., Soviet Russia and the East, 1920- 1927: A Documentary Survey (Stanford, 1957), p. 222 Google Scholar. For a number of striking parallels between Moscow's response to the 1922 Washington Treaty and Peking's reaction to the 1963 Test Ban, cf. the Chinese government's statement of July 31, 1963, “Advocating the Complete, Thorough, Total and Resolute Prohibition and Destruction of Nuclear Weapons [and] Proposing a Conference of the Government Heads of All Countries of the World.” Peking Review, No. 31 (Aug. 2, 1963), pp. 7-8.

18 () (2 vols.; Moscow, 1957), II, 162-72. See also Louis Fischer, The Soviets in World Affairs, 1917-1929 (2 vols.; Princeton, 1951), I, 461-64; for an article specifically on Lenin's contributions to Soviet policy at Genoa, see () (Moscow, 1963), pp. 58-84.

19 Central Party Archives, Collection 2, File 1, Docs. 22638 and 22991, cited in L. Bezymensky and N. Matkovsky, “The Co-existence Policy—Early Beginnings,” New Times, No. 11 (Mar. 14), 1962, p. 9.

20 (), XXVII, 169-77, 225-26, 290, 312-14; see also the 4th ed. (38 vols.; Moscow, 1941-58), XXXIII, 319-20, 354.

21 () (Moscow, 1930), XIII, 15.

22 Ibid. (Moscow, 1959), XXXVI.

23 This translation is slightly altered from that used in New Times.

24 One item in Chicherin's letter which he did not propose at Genoa was that the world congress “might take over the Hague Tribunal with its optional arbitration and other functions. We shall accept [Chicherin stated] arbitration between a capitalist country and the Soviet state only if the court is composed of an equal number of members from each side, so that half of the members will be imperialists and the other half Communists.” For the verbatim report and associated materials of the Genoa Conference, see () (Moscow, 1922).

25 As reproduced in () the first three words italicized were underlined in the original three times by Lenin, and the next ten words two times. The words italicized in Lenin's reply appear to have been underlined by him just once. The Chicherin- Lenin exchange is in XXXVI, 451-54.

26 The first document is to be printed in Vol. XLIV and the second in XLV of () (Moscow).

27 The pacifist wing, according to Lenin, consisted of “petty bourgeois, pacifist and semipacifist democracy, of the type of the Second International or the Two-and-one-half International, and then the Keynes type, and so o n … . “ The group from which it was to be split was the “crass,” “aggressive,” “reactionary bourgeoisie.“

28 Erroneously rendered in the Current Digest of the Soviet Press (XVI, No. 15 [May 6, 1964], p. 23): “as one of the few chances in capitalism's world evolution for a new system” —a serious mistake apparently originating in the dual meaning of mirnyi.

29 () ,XXVII, 169-77.

30 The Riga Protocol is given in MamepuaJiu teuy93cnou %OH0e'peHVluu, pp. 52-53.

31 Ibid., pp. 78-87.

32 (), XXXVI, 488. A footnote to the document states that the Central Executive Committee decided, on May 24, that since the Genoa Conference put off the resolution of important questions until the Hague Conference, the Soviet government and War Commissariat should consider a reduction of the Red Army only after the results of the Hague Conference were known.

33 Conférence de Moscou pour la limitation des armements (Moscow, 1923), p. 5.

34 Central Party Archives, Collection 17, File 3, Docs. 323, 325, cited in Bezymensky and Matkovsky, op. cit., pp. 16-17.

35 Conference de Moscou…, pp. 46-51, 101-3, 155-58. For the development of Soviet policy on this question, see Triska and Slusser, The Theory, Law and Policy of Soviet Treaties, pp. 381-88.

36 For the debate over the conflicting sets of figures, see Conference de Moscou …, pp. 188 ff. For fuller treatment of the causes for the failure of the conference, see Walter C. Clemens, Jr., “Origins of the Soviet Campaign for Disarmament: The Soviet Position on Peace, Security, and Revolution at the Genoa, Moscow and Lausanne Conferences, 1922- 1923” (unpubl. Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1961), pp. 170-240. Among the reasons for the collapse of the conference were: (1) the basic distrust which caused the conferees to be armed in the first place. Russia's good faith was questioned by Prince Radziwill, who pointed out that a 25 per cent reduction in the Red Army was planned regardless of the outcome of the Moscow Conference. (It had been predicted by Frunze as early as March, 1922.) Hence, such a reduction would not constitute a concession; (2) a possible pressure upon Poland by France not to conclude a disarmament treaty outside the League of Nations framework; (3) the fact that an across-the-board cut of 25 per cent would probably have harmed the military posture of the Baltic states and Poland more than that of the Soviet regime. In this connection, a member of the Polish Institute of International Affairs has indicated to the author that Polish archives include instructions to the Polish delegation to avoid any reciprocal reduction of forces which would leave the combined Polish-Finnish-Baltic forces numerically smaller than the Red Army. A reduction of the Red Army by 25 per cent would still have left it somewhat larger than the Polish-Finnish- Baltic armies, but smaller if the Rumanian army were added to this combination (see Clemens, op. cit., p. 213).

37 See Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs, 1922-1923: Records of Proceedings and Draft Terms of Peace (Cmd. 1814; London, 1923).

38 For documented Western studies of Soviet disarmament diplomacy since 1923, see, e.g., Maria Salvin, “Soviet Policy Toward Disarmament,” International Conciliation, No. 428 (Feb., 1947), pp. 42-111; John W. Spanier and Joseph L. Nogee, The Politics of Disarmament: A Study in Soviet-American Gamesmanship (New York, 1962); Walter C. Clemens, Jr., “Ideology in Soviet Disarmament Policy,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Mar., 1964. Both Soviet and Western sources are included in Walter C. Clemens, Jr., “Soviet Policy Toward Disarmament,” in Thomas T. Hammond, ed., Soviet Foreign Relations and World Communism: A Selected, Annotated Bibliography of 6,000 Books in 25 Languages (Princeton, 1964).

39 Much documentation is in Edward H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923 (3 vols., London, 1951-53), III, 271, passim. See also Walter C. Clemens, Jr., “Bolshevik Expectations of a German Revolution During War Communism” (essay for Certificate of the Russian Institute, Columbia University, 1957).

40 See () (Moscow, 1959), pp. 53-54.

41 Article by Frunze, on Mar. 25, 1922, in () (Moscow, 1934), pp. 86-87.

42 See “Appeal to All Peoples of the World” by Tenth All-Russian Congress of Soviets on December 27, 1922, in () (in three parts, the third of which has two sections; Moscow, 1925-28), III/i, 224-25.

43 Vladimir A. Antonov-Ovseenko, “The Red Army,” Communist International (London), No. 24 (1923), p. 35. See Walter C. Clemens, Jr., “Soviet Disarmament Proposals and the Cadre-Territorial Army,” Orbis, Winter, 1964.

44 See The New York Times, 1922, for the following days and pages: Dec. 4, p. 3; Dec. 7, p. 2; Dec. 8, p. 3; Dec. 10, p. 2; Dec. 12, p. 2; Dec. 13, p. 13; see also the article by Herbert Sidebotham, Apr. 12, 1922, p. 2.

45 (), XXVII, 225-26. For earlier signs of Lenin's interest in exploiting the “wavering” bourgeoisie, see his April-May, 1920, work Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder, analyzed below, and other comments in February and March of that year in () (4th ed.), XXX, 295-96, and (2nd ed.), XXV, 100.

46 Ibid.

47 See, e.g., texts referred to in notes 16 and 17 above; see also Ilpaeda and Iheecmujt, Dec. 2 to 15, 1922; see also Clemens, “Origins of the Soviet Campaign for Disarmament,” pp. 223 ff. Louis Fischer has suggested to the author still another reason why Lenin did not expect any disarmament agreement: the relative military superiority of the capitalist states vis-a-vis the Soviet state provided no material basis for a Soviet quid pro quo in return for a reduction of capitalist forces.

48 () (Moscow, 1960), p. 41. One remarkable exercise in deductive logic by a Soviet writer pieces together Krupskaia's recollections with notes and books in Lenin's library in the Kremlin, with Lenin's own writings such as Empirio-Criticism (1908), with the fact that scientists and science fiction writers such as H. G. Wells were beginning to write on “atomic war” during Lenin's lifetime, and with Lenin's frequent conversations with physicists and other scientists. From such Kremlinology the Soviet writer concludes that Lenin “realized that the revolutionary changes then occurring in science and technology could lead to new technical and military discoveries, which xvould make war so destructive as to produce a universal, popular movement for complete disarmament and would lead to the elimination of war from human experience.” M. Goryainov, “Lenin on Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Problem of Eliminating War,” unpublished manuscript, p. 5. For bringing this manuscript to his attention, the author wishes to thank Professor Seymour Melman. In an interview with H. G. Wells, Lenin is reported to have stated: “If we are able to establish interplanetary connections … , the potentiality of technology—having become unlimited— will put an end to force as a method of progress.” Epo6JieMU Mupa % cov,%iam,3M.a, No. 11, 1959, p. 6. The interview appears to have taken place in 1920, but the statement recorded does not appear in one account by H. G. Wells recording an interview with what he called “The Dreamer in the Kremlin,” Russia in the Shadows (London, n.d.), pp. 123-42.

49 Goryainov, op. cit., pp. 19-20, 30-32.

50 See (), VIII, 397; XIX, 314-32. For many quotations from Marx, Engels, and Lenin predicting this pattern of events, see H. H. ByxapHH, Mexdynapodme noAOXcenue u 3adcmu KoMunmepua (Moscow, 1928). This pattern of development is foreseen and approved in the 1919 Program of the Russian Communist Party, given in English in N. I. Bukharin and E. Preobrazhensky, The ABC of Communism (London, 1922), pp. 113-39. The pattern of development predicted by Engels long before 1917, a Soviet writer on disarmament, F. I. Notovich, declared in a book published in 1929, was completely confirmed by the Russian Revolution. No other road than that foreseen by Engels and actually taken by the Russian Revolution, Notovich argued, “exists for the other countries.” For the quotation from Engels referred to by Notovich, see Engels, Herr Eugen Duhring's Revolution in Science (Anti-Dühring), p. 189, and () (Moscow, 1929), pp. 165-66. This last work was recommended to the present author in February, 1959, by several members of the faculty of history at Moscow State University.

51 This work by Lenin is cited in a recent Soviet article as illustrative of Lenin's approach to peaceful coexistence. Lenin “taught the party and the government the complicated art of compromises in those conditions when they are useful to the cause of the working class.” (), op. cit., p. 60.

52 (), XXV, 229 ff.

53 Ibid., pp. 231-32.

54 Ibid., pp. 223 ff. Another part of the brochure, while admonishing Dutch and German leftists for their extreme exaltation of Soviet over bourgeois rule, may suggest another Kremlin approach to disarmament, especially total disarmament: “The surest way of discrediting a new political (and not only political) idea; and of damaging it, while ostensibly defending it, is to reduce it to absurdity. For any truth, if it is made ‘exorbitant'…. if it is exaggerated, if it is carried beyond the limits in which it can be applied, can be reduced to absurdity.” Ibid., XXV, 2034.

55 Degras, op. cit., I, 331-33.

56 (), op. cit., III/i , 190-92. Lenin's draft, however, did not speak of “disarmament” but said only that the “danger of war” persisted after the Genoa Conference. () (4th ed.), XXXIII, 319-20.

57 Ibid.; () (Moscow, 1922), pp. 28-30, 119-26; Degras, op. cit., I, 345-46.

58 Degras, op. cit., I, 345-46.

59 Ibid., I, 307, 316, 320, 329, 333, 337-340, 349, 374 ff., 416-33; (), XXVII, 372-73.

60 For documentation, see Clemens, “Origins of the Soviet Campaign for Disarmament,” pp. 233-35.

61 () (Moscow, 1923), p. 52; Ilpaeda, Dec. 14, 1922; H3eecmuR, Dec. 5, 1922.

62 (), XXVII, 489. For a similar statement by the Profintern, see H3oecmun, Dec. 1, 1922, p. 2.

63 () (Moscow, 1933), pp. 322-23.

64 Eudin and Fisher, op. cit., p. 199.

65 See, e.g., Theodore H. von Laue, “Soviet Diplomacy: G. V. Chicherin, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, 1918-1930,” The Diplomats, 1919-1939, ed. Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert (Princeton, 1953), pp. 234-81; Robert M. Slusser, “The Role of the Foreign Ministry,” in Russian Foreign Policy: Essays in Historical Perspective, ed. Ivo J. Lederer (New Haven, 1962), pp. 211 ff.

66 For discussion of Trotsky's and Frunze's differences, see Dmitri Daniel Fedotoff White, The Growth of the Red Army (Princeton, 1944), pp. 165 ff. For the disagreement between Chicherin and Radek, compare Chicherin's report to the Central Executive Committee in Mamepuajiu teuy93CK0ii itowfiepenvfliu, pp. 15-20, with Karl Radek, Genua: Die Einheitsfront des Proletariates und die Kommunistische Internationale (Hamburg, 1922), pp. 17-28, 36-39. For an analysis of “Left” and other resistance to Lenin's regime, see Leonard Schapiro, The Origin of the Communist Autocracy: Political Opposition to the Soviet State, First Phase, 1917-1922 (Cambridge, Mass., 1955). Trotsky endorsed the gradual reduction in the size of the regular armed forces and their partial transfer to a militia (cf. Clemens, “Soviet Disarmament Proposals and the Cadre-Territorial Army,” loc. cit.). The only dispute uncovered between Trotsky and Lenin concerning arms reductions is an exchange of correspondence related to Morved [Morskaia Vedemost'?], apparently a department charged with coast guard and hydraulic administration duties. Lenin wrote the War Commissar on July 30, 1921, reminding him that a commission on the “liquidation” of the Morved had been formed under the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. Trotsky was directed by Lenin to reply when this liquidation would be carried out and by whom. Trotsky replied on August 2, 1921, stating that there was a War Council Commission on the reorganization (not liquidation) of Morved; that the War Council has so far recommended only internal organization changes in Morved; that Morved had been reduced from 180,000 to 45,000 men in the last three months and that its supplies were being produced for this smaller figure; and that the commission's chairman, Gusev, foresaw no further reduction in the size of Morved, at least not for eight months. Morved, according to Trotsky, was responsible for general port construction, shore guarding, mine laying, and trawling. To transfer these tasks, as Lenin suggested, to the NKPC (Narodnyi komissariat putei soobshchenii)—responsible especially for the railroads —would not reduce the number of workers but merely place them under other administration. And this would be “dangerous.” Trotsky noted however that certain organizational (tituliarnye) reforms were still needed. The People's Commissariat of Naval Affairs (apparently the previous administrator of Morved) would be abolished and its name changed (apparently by absorbing it into a Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs). The special naval commissariat, Trotsky said, had long ceased to exist, so that there was now neither a commissar nor a governing board. Whether the liquidation of the naval commissariat was carried out formally by the Central Executive Committee or informally, Trotsky stated, was of little importance. Concluding his reply, Trotsky told Lenin he could not carry out Lenin's request to issue the “corresponding orders” to liquidate Mowed, since it was unclear to what they should correspond. He denied Lenin's inference that there had been a delay in the War Commissariat. If there was, however, then there was “misunderstanding and haste outside the military administration.” Trotsky Archive, Houghton Library, T-688, T-689.