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The Formation of the Militia in the February Revolution: An Aspect of the Origins of Dual Power

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 January 2017

Tsuyoshi Hasegawa
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The insurrection on February 27, 1917, totally annihilated the tsarist police system in Petrograd, the most important link tying the citizens to the government, thus throwing the capital into a state of anarchy. Quickly lawlessness crept into the streets, as drunken soldiers looted wine cellars to get even more drunk and criminals released from prisons easily acquired weapons. To the sober-minded, it was apparent that this intolerable disorder had to be stopped as quickly as possible. Yet, for the more committed revolutionaries, the insurrection was not yet finished; even on February 28 machine-gun shots were fired from rooftops and upper-floor windows of tall buildings—actions, people firmly believed, taken by the remnants of Protopopov's police or the counter-revolutionary officers. Whether for the restoration of law and order or for the defense of the revolution, Petrograd urgently needed an organized police force. Indeed, the future course of the revolution to a large extent depended on how the new police force would be organized. If a group which regarded the restoration of law and order as the most urgent task established an efficient police power in the streets, it would mean that the revolutionary process that had been set in motion would be halted. On the other hand, if the revolutionaries succeeded in arming the masses of insurgents for the defense of the revolution, that would surely mean the further intensification of the revolutionary process. An analysis of the formation of the militias in the February Revolution is, therefore, integrally related to the problem of power.

Type
Articles
Information
Slavic Review , Volume 32 , Issue 2 , June 1973 , pp. 303 - 322
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies. 1973

References

1. A. V., Peshekhonov, “Pervyia nedeli : Iz vospominanii o revoliutsii,” Na chushoi storone, 1 (1923) : 272–74Google Scholar. Also see various reports on looting to the Military Commission of the Duma Committee, “Fevral'skaia revoliutsiia v Petrograde (28 fevralia-1 marta 1917 g.),” Krasnyi arkhiv, 1930, no. 4-5 (41-42), pp. 65, 66, 71, 74.

2. “Fevral'skaia revoliutsiia v Petrograde,” pp. 63, 64, 67, 75, 76, 77.

3. The military question—or the soldatskii vopros, as it was put at the time—was a more important issue than the problem of militias in its direct bearing on the formation of a revolutionary power. The sequence of events from the formation of the Military Commission to the issuance of Order No. 1 and its aftermath and the respective attitudes of the Duma Committee, the Soviet Executive Committee, and the masses of soldiers toward the soldatskii vopros must be studied in detail and analyzed critically. That problem, however, is beyond the scope of this article.

4. For the analysis of the birth of dual power see my article, “The Problem of Power in the February Revolution of 1917 in Russia,” Canadian Slavonic Papers, 14, no. 4 (Winter 1972) : 611-32.

5. See, for instance, Leonard Schapiro, “The Political Thought of the First Provisional Government,” Oskar Anweiler, “The Political Ideology of the Leaders of the Petrograd Soviet in the Spring of 1917,” and Wolfe's, Bertram D. “Comment” on these two articles in Pipes, Richard, ed., Revolutionary Russia (Cambridge, Mass., 1968)Google Scholar. Although Wolfe acknowledges the importance of the mass movement, his analysis does not go beyond a mere designation of the term stikhiia to it. A notable exception is a study of the origins of Order No. 1 by John Boyd, who, utilizing the recent achievements by Soviet historians, particularly V. I. Miller, illuminates the interaction between the two centers of power at the top and the masses of soldiers at the bottom. See John R., Boyd, “The Origins of Order No. 1,” Soviet Studies, 19, no. 3 (January 1968) : 359–72.Google Scholar

6. I should mention here a little-known but significant article by a Japanese historian, Wada Haruki, “Nigatsu kakumei” (“The February Revolution“), in Eguchi Bokuro, ed., Roshiya kakumei no kenkyu (A Study of the Russian Revolution) (Tokyo : Chuo koron sha, 1968). Although I differ with the author on a number of points, this article makes an important contribution to the historiography of the February Revolution. Wada also discusses the problem of militia, but his treatment is descriptive rather than analytical, without specifically relating this problem directly to the origins of dual power.

7. Sukhanov, N. N., Zapiski o revoliutsii, 7 vols. (Berlin, Petrograd, and Moscow, 1922-23), 1 : 132.Google Scholar

8. At least three persons can be identified as appointed commissars : A. Shliapnikov (Bolshevik) for the Vyborg District, A. V. Peshekhonov (Popular Socialist) for the Petrograd District, and Surin (Socialist Revolutionary) for the Lesnoi District. See A., Shliapnikov, Semnadtsatyi god, 4 vols. (Moscow and Petrograd, 1923-31), 1 : 154 Google Scholar. Later Surin was discovered to be a former tsarist Okhrana agent. See V. M., Zenzinov, “Fevral'skie dni,” Novyi Zhurnal, no. 35 (1953), p. 220 Google Scholar. Peshekhonov was not informed of this decision until the following day (Peshekhonov, “Pervyia nedeli,” p. 266). The places designated as district headquarters were known as the legal centers of the workers’ organizations before the revolution, such as the offices of the workers’ sick-funds and cooperative associations in major factories, the stock markets, a night school, dining halls of major factories, and the office of social work. Only seven district headquarters were designated. See Izvestiia Petrogradskogo Soveta rabochikh deputatov (hereafter Izvestiia), supplement to no. 1 (Feb. 28, 1971).

9. Shliapnikov, Semnadtsatyi god, 1 : 154.

10. Izvestiia revoliutsionnoi nedeli, no. 2 (Feb. 28, 1917).

11. Ibid. The Military Commission of the Duma Committee also appointed Kryzhanovsky head of the city militia (“Fevral'skaia revoliutsiia v Petrograde,” p. 99).

12. Burdzhalov, E. N., Vtoraia russkaia revoliutsiia : Vosstanie v Petrograde (Moscow, 1967), p. 272 Google Scholar. See also Rech', no. 55 (Mar. 5, 1917), p. 3.

13. Burdzhalov, Vtoraia russkaia revoliutsiia, p. 272.

14. Z. Kel'son, “Militsiia fevral'skoi revoliutsii : Vospominaniia,” Byloe, 29 (1925) : 162. It is not certain if the City Duma designated district headquarters for all the districts in Petrograd. Kel'son mentions only four district centers. It is interesting to compare this list with the list of district headquarters designated by the Soviet Executive Committee. While the Soviet concentrated on the workers’ sections, the City Duma placed its emphasis on the administrative center of the city.

15. Burdzhalov, Vtoraia russkaia revoliutsiia, p. 272. The other institutions which supported the city militia were the United Russian Technical Society, the Society of Technology, Electronic Engineers, and Civil Engineers, and the Metallurgical Society.

16. Kel'son, “Militsiia fevral'skoi revoliutsii,” p. 162; Rech', no. 55 (Mar. 5, 1917), p. 3. Later, on March 11, the central headquarters of the city militia were transferred to the gradonachal'stvo

17. Kel'son, “Militsiia fevral'skoi revoliutsii,” p. 163.

18. Burdzhalov, Vtoraia russkaia revoliutsiio, p. 272; Rech', no. 55 (Mar. 5, 1917), p. 3.

19. Leiberov, I. P., “Petrogradskii proletariat vo vseobshchei politicheskoi stachke 25 fevralia 1917 g.,” in Oktiabr' i grazhdanskaia voina v SSSR : Sbornik statei k 70- letiiu akademika I. I. Mintsa (Moscow, 1966), p. 39.Google Scholar

20. Startsev, V. I., Ocherki po istorii Petrogradskoi Krasnoi gvardii i rabochei militsii (Moscow and Leningrad, 1965), pp. 43–44.Google Scholar

21. G. I. Zlokazov, “O zasedanii Petrogradskogo Soveta rabochikh i soldatskikh deputatov,” in Oktiabr' i grazhdanskaia voina v SSSR, p. 50.

22. Startsev, Ocherki po istorii Petrogradskoi Krasnoi gvardii, pp. 43-44; Kel'son, “Militsiia fevral'skoi revoliutsii,” p. 175.

23. Kel'son, “Militsiia fevral'skoi revoliutsii,” p. 175.

24. Startsev, Ocherki po istorii Petrogradskoi Krasnoi gvardii, p. 56.

25. Ibid., p. 44.

26. Ibid. The formation of a militia in the factories Aivaz and Old Parviainen was reported in Izvestiia, no. 3 (Mar. 2, 1917), p. 3.

27. Startsev, Ocherki po istorii Petrogradskoi Krasnoi gvardii, p. 44.

28. Raionnye sovety Petrograda v 1917 godu, 3 vols. (Moscow, 1966), 3 : 180-81.

29. “Fevral'skaia revoliutsiia v Petrograde,” p. 96.

30. Izvestiia, no. 2 (Mar. 1, 1917), p. 3.

31. Startsev, Ocherki po istorii Petrogradskoi Krasnoi gvardii, p. 43; Raionnye sovety Petrograda, 1 : 365.

32. Izvestiia, no. 4 (Mar. 3, 1917), p. 4. It is significant that Izvestiia elected to describe the formation of the city militia and totally ignored the workers’ militia in the Vasilievsky District.

33. Raionnye sovety Petrograda, 1 : 365.

34. Startsev, Ocherki po istorii Petrogradskoi Krasnoi gvardii, p. 45. Sergeev was replaced by another Bolshevik, Ivanov, in late March.

35. Velikaia Oktiabr'skaia Sotsialisticheskaia Revoliutsiia : Dokumenty i materialy, 6 vols. (Moscow, 1957-59), vol. 1 : Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie v Rossii posle sverzheniia samoderzhaviia (Moscow, 1957), pp. 455-56.

36. Raionnye sovety Petrograda, 1 : 73.

37. Startsev, Ocherki po istorii Petrogradskoi Krasnoi gvardii, p. 44.

38. Peshekhonov, “Pervyia nedeli,” pp. 266-67.

39. After the Duma Committee's decision to take power, Miliukov devoted all his energy to establishing sole legitimacy for the new government, avoiding the interference of the Petrograd Soviet. In his speeches addressed to the soldiers on February 28 he warned of the danger of “dual power“—a term that was used first by him and later acquired wide currency. See Izvestiia revoliutsionnoi nedeli, no. 2 (Feb. 28, 1917).

40. Izvestiia, no. 2 (Mar. 1, 1917), p. 3. The same proclamation with a slight change was also printed in Izvestiia, no. 3 (Mar. 2, 1917), p. 4.

41. Peshekhonov, “Pervyia nedeli,” p. 271.

42. Ibid., p. 304.

43. Ibid., pp. 304-5.

44. Ibid., p. 305. It is not known how widespread the election for the citizens’ committee was in the district, what relations it established with the Duma Committee or the city militia, what happened to it subsequently, or whether similar organizations existed in other districts in Petrograd.

45. Ibid., p. 306. It is not clear what relation existed between the commandant appointed by the Military Commission and the city militia. Admittedly, there is a lacuna in available evidence indicating any relation between Peshekhonov's commissariat and the city militia. Since the Duma Committee seized control of the Military Commission, which had been created on the initiative of the Soviet, the Military Commission made some efforts to restore order by assigning units to various districts. These efforts, however, remained ineffective, since the Military Commission was more preoccupied with the tasks of higher priorities—the occupation and the protection of the strategically important positions and buildings, and the restoration of the military discipline in the army units.

46. Ibid., pp. 288-89, 295, 299.

47. Startsev, Ocherki po istorii Petrogradskoi Krasnoi gvardii, p. 45; Kel'son, “Militsiia fevral'skoi revoliutsii,” p. 172.

48. Startsev, Ocherki po istorii Petrogradskoi Krasnoi gvardii, pp. 45-46.

49. With the exception of the Rozhdenstvensky and Kolomna Districts, it is not known in detail how the city militia extended its authority to the districts.

50. Izvestiia, no. 4 (Mar. 3, 1917), pp. 4-5.

51. Izvestiia, no. 3 (Mar. 2, 1917), p. 4.

52. G. I. Zlokazov, Petrogradskii Sovet rabochikh i soldatskikh deputatov v period mirnogo razvitiia revoliutsii (fevral'-iiun’ 1917 g.) (Moscow, 1969), p. 53.

53. Zlokazov, “O zasedanii Petrogradskogo Soveta,” pp. 53-55.

54. Izvestiia, no. 2 (Mar. 1, 1917), p. 3.

55. Kel'son, “Militsiia fevral'skoi revoliutsii,” p. 167.

56 Ibid., p. 167.

57. Ibid., p. 168; Startsev, Ocherki po istorii Petrogradskoi Krasnoi gvardii, p. 48.

58. “Protokoly Isp. Kom. Petrogr. Sov. Rab. i Sol. Dep. za 3-11 marta 1917 g.,” in “Fevral'skaia revoliutsiia v dokumentakh,” Proletarskaia revoliutsiia, 1923, no. 1 (13), p. 324.

59. Raionnye sovety Petrograda, 1 : 124.

60. Ibid., 2 : 96.

61. Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie v Rossii posle sversheniia samodershaviia, p. 488.

62. Raionnye sovety Petrograda, 1 : 83-84.

63. Startsev, Ocherki po istorii Petrogradskoi Krasnoi gvardii, p. 52.

64. Ibid., p. 55; Raionnye sovety Petrograda, 1 : 86, 2 : 111. The salary the militiamen received from their employers while at militia duties apparently was not their full salary. The workers of the Putilov Factory demanded only half.

65. Startsev, Ocherki po istorii Petrogradskoi Krasnoi gvardii, pp. 57-58.

66. Ibid., pp. 55-56.

67. Ibid., p. 57.

68. Peshekhonov, “Pervyia nedeli,” pp. 273-74.

69. “Fevral'skaia revoliutsiia v Petrograde,” pp. 64, 67, 69, 76, 90.

70. Burdzhalov, Vtoraia russkaia revoliutsiia, p. 275. Boyd mentions that this order was issued on February 27 (“The Origins of Order No. 1,” p. 362). Since the Duma Committee did not take over the Military Commission until two o'clock on the morning of February 28, it could not have been issued on February 27.

71. M. Rafes, “Moi vospominaniia,” Byloe, 19 (1922) : 193; Zlokazov, “O zasedanii Petrogradskogo Soveta,” pp. 58-60. It is interesting to note that the minutes of the Soviet session as reported in Izvestiia do not mention anything about this debate. See Izvestiia, no. 2 (Mar. 1, 1917), p. 2.

72. See Boyd, “The Origins of Order No. 1,” pp. 362-72; V. I. Miller, “Nachalo demokratizatsii staroi armii v dni fevral'skoi revoliutsii (Zasedanie Petrogradskogo Soveta 1 marta 1917 g. i prikaz No. 1),” Istoriia SSSR, 1966, no. 6, pp. 26-43.

73. Engelhardt's statement in Izvestiia, no. 3 (Mar. 2, 1917), p. 1.

74. Izvestiia, no. 5 (Mar. 4, 1917), p. 4.

75. Startsev, Ocherki po istorii Petrogradskoi Krasnoi gvardii, pp. 50-51. A comparison between these figures and the total number of weapons seized by the insurgents during the insurrection leads to the obvious conclusions that Kryzhanovsky's appeal had no effect at all and that the insurgents kept their weapons. According to I. I. Mints, the weapons captured by the insurgents from the Arsenal alone numbered 40, 000 rifles and 30, 000 revolvers, not to mention the weapons taken from the various regimental armories. More than 2, 000 shells and 2, 000, 000 cartridges fell into the hands of the masses. See Mints, I. I., Istoriia Velikogo Oktiabria, 3 vols. (Moscow, 1967)Google Scholar, vol. 1 : Sverzhenie samodershaviia, p. 538. In addition, the workers of the Sestroretsk Weapon Factory handed most of the weapons they had captured from the factory stock to the insurgents in Petrograd (1, 247 rifles, 48 sporting guns, 64 pistols and revolvers, and 100, 000 cartridges). See Tsybul'sky, V. A., “Rabochie sestroretskogo zavoda v 1917 g.,” Istoriia SSSR, 1957, no. 4, p. 144 Google Scholar. Moreover, despite the opposition from the Duma Committee as well as from the Soviet Executive Committee, the Military Commission was compelled to surrender to the insurgents (under their strong pressure) the weapons that came under its control. Zlokazov states that the Military Commission gave the workers 24, 000 rifles and 400, 000 cartridges between March 2 and March 4. See Zlokazov, Petrogradskii Sovet rabochikh i soldatskikh deputatov, p. 55.

76. Zlokazov, “O zasedanii Petrogradskogo Soveta,” p. 52.

77. Izvestiia, no. 2 (Mar. 1, 1917), p. 3.

78. Revoliutsionnoe dvishenie v Rossii posle sverzheniia samoderzhaviia, p. 462.

79. Kel'son, “Militsiia fevral'skoi revoliutsii,” p. 175.

80. Ibid. The surrender of weapons to the workers’ militia was discontinued in April, when the commander of the Petrograd Military District, General Kornilov, refused city militia access to the military supply depots. According to Startsev, the workers’ militia received no fewer than 1, 000 rifles and 650 revolvers and pistols from the city militia from March to the middle of April. See Startsev, Ocherki po istorii Petrogradskoi Krasnoi gvardii, pp. 54-55.

81. For a more detailed discussion on this matter see my article, “The Problem of Power in the February Revolution of 1917 in Russia.”