Research for this project was funded by Princeton University, the International Research and Exchanges Board, and the Professional Staff Congress of the City University of New York. I would like to thank the Slavic Review editor and two anonymous reviewers for their generous and constructive critiques.

1. Shane, Scott, Dismantling Utopia (Chicago, 1994), 153 Google Scholar. The phrase “Ostankino syringe“ as a critique for Soviet television also appeared in the official press in a short story by Vladimir Kuprin in 1981. See Kuprin, V, “Sorokovoi den',” Nash sovremennik, no. 11 (1981): 72–117 Google Scholar. Nash sovremennik was reprimanded for publishing Kuprin's story, among other materials. See Krechmar, Dirk, Politika i kul'tura pri Brezhneve, Andropove i Chernenko 1970-1985gg. (Moscow, 1997), 136-37Google Scholar.

2. By the early 1970s, Soviet television broadcasting signals reached upwards of 70 percent of the Soviet population, and there were an estimated 35 million television sets in the USSR. Matiushchenko, T. N. et al., Gazeta “Pravda“o sovetskom televidenii i radioveshchanii (Moscow, 1972), 27 Google Scholar. Roughly 67 percent of Soviet families owned a television set in 1974. That figure approached 90 percent for urban areas on average. Mickiewicz, Ellen Propper, Media and the Russian Public (New York, 1981), 19 Google Scholar. Leningrad approached saturation levels for television ownership far earlier (85.9 percent of Leningraders owned a set by 1967), and Moscow levels were similarly high. Firsov, B. M., Televidenie glazami sotsiohga (Moscow, 1971), 108 Google Scholar.

3. The dissidents’ “needle” reference is in fact a striking parallel to one of the main early theories of mass communications in the west, the “hypodermic effects” model. See Todd Gitlin, “Media Sociology: The Dominant Paradigm,” Theory and Society, vol. 6 (1978): 205-53. Mickiewicz also discusses the parallel; Mickiewicz, Ellen, Split Signals: Television and Politics in Soviet Society (New York, 1988), 181-83.Google Scholar

4. Technically speaking, the 1950s and 1960s were not television's first two decades in the USSR. Experimental broadcasts began as early as the 1920s, and regular broadcasts began in both Moscow and Leningrad in 1939. Suspended for the duration of World War II, broadcasting resumed in the postwar 1940s and took off in the early and mid-1950s. On the pre-World War II period, see A. Iurovskii, Televidenie: Poiski i resheniia (Moscow, 1983), 29-39; A. Iurovskii, “Pervye shagi,” Problemy televideniia i radio (Moscow, 1971), 95-108. Although there were plans to build a new television center in Moscow with a recordbreaking tower as early as 1956, construction did not begin at Ostankino until 1960 and was then repeatedly delayed due to a series of technical problems. The eventual complex had 200,000 square meters of workspace, including fourteen separately equipped studio blocs. The tower itself stands more than 500 meters tall. Iurovskii, Televidenie, 42. As the Ostankino center took shape, the Soviets were also busy extending their television network on the ground and, even more important, as of 1965, in space, with satellite technology. By 1967, the satellite system had connected far-flung regions in Siberia, the Far East, Central Asia, and the far north to Moscow.

5. Williams, Raymond, Television: Technology and Cultural Form (New York, 1975), xv.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

6. In the days before satellite technology, broadcasters relied on relay stations and cables to carry signals. While this put most of the Soviet population out of reach of foreign television broadcasters, the western borderlands—most notably, Estonia—formed an important exception. On the importance of foreign broadcasting in these regions, especially in 1968, see Amir Weiner, “Deja Vu All Over Again: Prague Spring, Romanian Summer and Soviet Autumn on the Soviet Western Frontier,“/owrwa/ of Contemporary European History 15, no. 2 (June 2006): 159-94. Satellites raised the specter of another hostile “invasion“ by foreign broadcasters. In the 1970s, the USSR would be a staunch proponent of international regulations to block the use of satellites for broadcasts to private homes without government consent—a position that had the support of many countries fearful of even greater American domination of the global television market. Segrave, Kerry, American Television Abroad (Jefferson, N.C., 1998), 110 Google Scholar. On the foreign radio “invasion” in the 1950s and the Soviets’ inability to block it, see Nelson, Michael, War of the Black Heavens: The Battles of Western Broadcasting in the Cold War (London, 1997)Google Scholar. On the connection between foreign radio and television development in the USSR, see Kristin Roth-Ey, “Mass Media and the Remaking of Soviet Culture, 1950s-1960s” (PhD diss., Princeton University, 2003), 250-60.

7. For the now classic formulation of the USSR as a “propaganda state,” see Kenez, Peter, The Birth of the Propaganda State: Soviet Methods of Mass Mobilization, 1917-1985 (Cambridge, Eng., 1985)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The leading Soviet-era historian of Soviet television policy and development, A. Iurovskii, wrote diat the regime had made “serious errors” in developing television in the 1950s due to its “underestimation of its propaganda potential.” Iurovskii, Televidenie, 106; see also Iurovskii, , Televizionnaia zhurnalistika (Moscow, 1998), 71 Google Scholar. For the concurring views of western scholars, see Mickiewicz, Media and tlie Russian Public, 18; Feigelson, Kristian, L'URSS et sa television (Paris, 1990), 58 Google Scholar; Hopkins, Mark, Mass Media in the Soviet Union (New York, 1970), 251 Google Scholar; Paasilinna, Reino, Glasnost and Soviet Television: YLE-Finnish Broadcasting Company (Yleisradio, Finland, 1995), 94.Google Scholar

8. Mickiewicz's main works on Soviet-era television are: Media and the Russian Public; Split Signals; and Changing Channels: Television and the Struggle for Power in Russia (Durham, 1999). See also Bailes, Kendall, Soviet Television Comes of Age: A Review of Its Accomplishments and a Discussion of the Tasks Facing It (New York, 1968)Google Scholar; Rodgers, Rosemarie, “The Soviet Mass Media in the Sixties: Patterns of Access and Consumption,” fournal of Broadcasting 15, no. 2 (1971): 127-46CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hollander, Gayle Durham, Soviet Political Indoctrination: Developments in Mass Media and Propaganda since Stalin (New York, 1972)Google Scholar; David E. Powell, “Television in the USSR,“Public Opinion Quarterly 39, no. 3 (Autumn 1975): 287-300;Jonathan Saunders, “A Very Mass Media,” Television Quarterly 22, no. 3 (1986): 7-27; Thomas Remington, The Truth of Authority: Ideology and Communication in the Soviet Union (Pittsburgh, 1988).

9. Although the Ostankino complex was inaugurated in 1967, many former television professionals and scholars consider 1970 a watershed because, in that year, television's official status was codified with a change in leadership and in bureaucratic structures: what had once been the State Committee for Radio and Television under the USSR Council of Ministers was now renamed the State Committee of the USSR Council of Ministers for Television and Radio, or Gosteleradio; this was an elevation of status for broadcasting overall, but especially for television, which now got first billing. The revamped Gosteleradio was also headed by a powerful new chairman, as discussed below.

10. Higgins, Marguerite, Red Plush and Black Bread (Garden City, N.Y., 1955), 40.Google Scholar

11. Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1970g. (Moscow, 1971), 466; Problemy televideniia i radio (Moscow, 1971), 210, 246. There was of course tremendous variation in television ownership from republic to republic. The overwhelming majority of sets was always to be found in the RSFSR, with Ukraine a distant second. The proportion of sets in the RSFSR did decline over time, however (from 78 percent of the total in 1958 to 63 percent in 1965). Regional variation, although an extremely important subject, is beyond the scope of this study.

12. The top three countries were the United States, Canada, and Great Britain.

13. A 1964 UNESCO publication reported a saturation level of 13.9 sets per 100 inhabitants for the Federal Republic of Germany, 7.5 for France, but only 3.2 for the USSR. Their figure for the number of sets overall—7 million—is significantly lower than the 10 to 11 million one finds in Soviet sources, however. The 1964 UNESCO report tallied a saturation level of 2.7 sets per 100 inhabitants for Hungary, 3.3 for Poland, 0.3 for Bulgaria, 10 for Czechoslovakia, 9 for the German Democratic Republic. See World Communications: Press, Radio, Television, Film (New York, 1964).

14. N. N. Mesiatsev, interview, Moscow, July 2002. Mesiatsev was chairman of the State Committee for Radio and Television from 1964 to 1970.

15. NarodnoekhoziaistvoSSSRv 1970g (Moscow, 1971), 378.

16. Ibid., 466.

17. Starr, S. Frederick, “New Communications Technologies and Civil Society,” in Graham, Loren, ed., Science and the Soviet Social Order (Cambridge, Mass., 1990), 19–50 Google Scholar. This figure included trucks and buses as well as cars. Starr argues that die postwar promotion of television fits a Soviet pattern with roots in tsarist state practices of promoting “vertical“ rather than “horizontal” technologies for communication.

18. Dizard, Wilson, “Television in the USSR,” Problems of Communism 12, no. 6 (1963): 39.Google Scholar

19. Wireless radio sets were also exempted from fees under the new dispensation, which Izvestiia proclaimed a “nice gift” to Soviet owners. “Podarok desiat’ millionam,“ hvestiia, 27 August 1961, 6. Fees, collected quarterly from radio and television owners, provided a major revenue stream—almost 95 million rubles in 1961 alone. This figure nearly covered the overall budget for investments in radio and television for that year (102 million rubles). Ob“iasnitel'naia zapiska k proektu proizvodstevenno-finanasovogo plana Goskomiteta Soveta Ministrov SSSR po radioveshchaniiu i televideniiu na 1963 god,“ Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Moscow (GARF), f. 6903, op. 7, d. 542,1. 10. In 1962, the fee on televisions was technically replaced by a one-time tax included in the price of the set. Poland, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, and Hungary all maintained their licensing systems for radio and television into the 1970s. See Burton Paulu, Radio and Television Broadcasting (Minneapolis, 1974).

20. Higgins reported a ten-month wait in 1955. Higgins, RedPlush, 42. The first massproduced set (known as KVN-49) dates to 1949; by 1961, there were more than seventy models for sale. M. Likhachev, “Sovetskie televizory dolzhny byt’ luchshim v mire,” Ekonomicheskaia gazeta, 18 July 1961.

21. In 1959, Irving R Levine of CBS reported that the Rubin, with a 12-by-14-inch screen, was die most expensive at 2,600 rubles. Levine, Main Street, USSR: Selections from the Original Edition (New York, 1960), 66. Joseph Evans of the Wall Street Journal saw a set “with a microscopic screen” selling for 850 rubles and one “with only a slightiy larger screen” for 2,000 rubles in 1957. Joseph Evans, Through Soviet Windows (New York, 1957), 60. Marguerite Higgins saw sets ranging from 1,600 to 4,000 rubles (for a 17-inch screen). Higgins, Red Plush, 42. For the 1960s, we can cite Mark Hopkins's report of a 240-ruble set in Khabarovsk, and Ekomomicheskaia gazeta's listing of the Temp-6 at 280 rubles. Hopkins, Mass Media, 253; Ekonomicheskaia gazeta, 18 July 1961. These later prices reflect the 1959 currency devaluation.

22. Evans estimated the average monthly salary in 1957 at 600-650 rubles, with urban professionals earning considerably more (for example, 1,100 rubles per month for an interpreter in Tbilisi). Evans, Through Soviet Windows, 13, 21. Television sets were also among the first goods that Soviet consumers could buy on installment plans.

23. The screen for the popular KVN model measured just 18 centimeters diagonally. Magnifying lenses were often attached to sets for this reason.

24. V. Kuibyshev, “Nuzhdy telezritelei,“/zw5ft'ia, 26 October 1958, 4.

25. V. Bezgulyi, “Za ekranom televizora,“/zvestita, 17 July 1960, 8; L. Shumov, “Bel'mo na televizore,” Ogonek, 1960, no. 48; “Posle vystupleniia Ogonka: Kogda zhe prozreiut televizory?“ Ogonek, 1961, no. 6. The task of locating the right parts was made more complicated by the large number of different sets in production, up to eighty-seven by 1965. Urvalov, V A., Ocherki istorii televideniia (Moscow, 1990), 152.Google Scholar

26. Viewers complained about problems with broadcast quality (wavy, unclear images, whistles and hisses, and so on) and about fingers and other extraneous objects making their way on camera. Given the conditions, it is a wonder many television studios put out any programming at all. Riga's first studio in the 1950s, for example, was so small that they could only fit one person on camera at a time. It was also terrifically hot (42 degrees Celsius), as were most Soviet studios due to the low quality of their lighting technology. “Stenogramma soveshchaniia u nachal'nika upravleniia po voprosam razvitiia televideniia, 1.II.1956,” GARF, f. 6903, op. 1, d. 499,1. 92.

27. Harrison Salisbury, “What Russians See on TV,” New York Times, 11 July 1954.

28. Family situation, however, was the one factor that did correlate: families with children were more likely to buy a television set than families without; married couples were more likely to have sets than people living on their own. Firsov, B. M., Puti razvitiia sredstv massovoi kommunikatsii (Moscow, 1977), 114-15.Google Scholar

29. Iurovskii, Televidenie, 43. These are the official Soviet-era figures, but there were also a large number of unofficial and semi-official stations, as discussed below. A recent study focusing on television technology estimates that 275 stations were in operation in I960, with numbers continuing to rise in the early 1960s. Urvalov, Ocherki istorii televideniia, 150,146.

30. Iurovskii, Televidenie, 43,108.

31. G. Khaliletskii, “Goresti mestnogo televideniia,” Literaturnaia gazeta, 27 August 1957, 2.

32. Ivan Mashchenko, Telebachennia Ukraini (Kiev, 2004), 1:52.

33. “Na ekrane televizora—dosaafovtsy,” Sovetskii patriot, 13 September 1961, in “Stat'i o televidenii, opublikovannye v tsentral'noi i mestnoi pressy za 1961 g.,” GARF, f. 6903, op. 3, d. 175,1. 73; Mashchenko, Telebachennia, 91.

34. Officially, the Goskomitet was a committee of the USSR Council of Ministers. Goskomitet is an abbreviated form of the full name in Russian, Goskomitet po radioveshchaniiu i televideniiu pri Sovete Ministrov SSSR. After 1957, all Soviet republics (excluding the RSFSR) developed analogous committees in their state administrations.

35. Tis'ma v TsK KPSS i SM SSSR o rabote Goskomiteta po radioveshchaniiu i televideniiu pri Sovete Ministrov SSSR,” GARF, f. 6903, op. 1, d. 543,1. 79. Some “amateur“ (sometimes also called “dwarf“) stations were capable of broadcasting their own programs; others were simply relay stations for broadcasts from other stations. There were more stations of all kinds in the industrially developed areas of Russia and Ukraine than in other parts of the USSR.

36. Ibid., 80.

37. “Stenogramma vystupleniia t. Chernysheva—zam. pred. Gosudarstvennogo Komiteta na soveshchaniia direktorov telestudii Ukrainy,” Tsentral'nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv vysshikh organov vlasti i upravleniia Ukrainy (TsGAVO), f. 4915, op. 1, d. 3438,1. 5.

38. At a 1963 meeting, Goskomitet's chief directed his staff to write the regional party organizations as follows: “The Central Committee is demanding that we straighten things out, otherwise there will be a thousand television centers in the country, and each one will offer its own programs. We in Moscow are not satisfied with your programs.” If the Goskomitet was unable to “come to an agreement” with these regional party organizations, he said, then it would “take the matter up with the CC CPSU biuro [sanktsioniruem eto meropriatie cherez biuro TsKKPSS].” Trotokol no. 8 i stenogramma zasedaniia Goskomiteta i materialy k nim,” GARF, f. 6903, op. 1, d. 783,1.109. Problems with amateur television operations in Ukraine continued into 1964. “Dokladnye zapiski, pis'ma, spravki otdelovTsKKP Ukrainy,” Tsentral'nyi derzhavnyi arkhiv hromads'kykh ob“iednan’ Ukrainy (TsDAHO), f. 1, op. 31, d. 2562,11.134-38.

39. For materials related to the decree, “O bor'be s vrazhdebnoi propadandoi,” see Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv noveishei istorii (RGANI), f. 5, op. 33, d. 106. For references to the importance of developing television as a means of protecting the population from enemy radio, see ibid., 1. 26. Khrushchev also mentioned television development in these terms at an April 1963 meeting of the Central Committee Presidium. See Fursenko, A. A., ed., Prezidium TsK KPSS, 1954-1964: Chemovye protokol'nye zapisi zasedanii, stenogrammy, postanovleniia (Moscow, 2003), 714.Google Scholar

40. According to Firsov, Khrushchev was greatly concerned about die possibility of hostile outsiders seizing the airwaves. Widiin a few days of Khrushchev's return, Firsov reports, a new security system (with guards and identification cards) was introduced at all of the country's television stations. B. M. Firsov, interview, St. Petersburg, June 2002. It is interesting to note that Mikhail Kharlamov, head of Gosteleradio from 1962 to 1964 (and a close associate of die Khrushchev family) accompanied Khrushchev on his 1959 trip to die United States. Pierre Salinger, John F. Kennedy's press secretary, told a Washington Post reporter in 1962 that he believed Kharlamov's appointment was one reason for what he called die “Soviet TV boom.” Salinger had recendy returned from discussions on cultural exchange in die USSR. Laurence Laurent, “Soviet TV Boom at Familiar Stage,” Washington Post, 18June 1962.

41. Iakovlev, Aleksandr, Omutpamiati (Moscow, 2001), 142.Google Scholar

42. For die text of die decree, “O dal'neishem razvitii sovetskogo televideniia,” see Klimanova, L. S., ed., O partiinoi i sovetskoi pechati, radioveshchanii i telexndenii (Moscow, 1972), 536-41.Google Scholar According to Mark Koenig, in die post-Stalinist era, only two odier Central Committee decrees on propaganda rivaled die 1960 decree for die amount of publicity diat attended dieir publication (decrees concerning ideology issued in May 1979 and July 1983). Koenig, Mark, “Media and Reform: The Case of Youdi Programming on Soviet Television (1955-1990)” (PhD diss., Columbia University, 1995), 93.Google Scholar

43. Aldiough agitation is technically different from propaganda (propaganda delivers many ideas to a few people, agitation communicates a few ideas to die masses), I follow Kenez's lead in Birth of the Propaganda State and use die terms interchangeably. For a discussion of die tensions between die Soviet propaganda tradition and broadcast technologies, see Mickiewicz, Split Signals, esp. chap. 5.

44. Inkeles, Alex, Public Opinion in the Soviet Union (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), 122.Google Scholar

45. Kazakov, G., “Televidenie—moguchee sredstvo kommunisticheskogo vospitaniia,” Kommunist, 1959, no. 8: 68.Google Scholar

46. One practical suggestion was to include radio and television redaktory (editors) in the ranks of their nomenklatura. Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv sotsial'no-politicheskoi istorii (RGASPI), f. 1M, op. 32, d. 1168,1. 21.

47. See Solnick, Stephen, Stealing the State (Cambridge, Mass., 1998), esp. chap. 4.Google Scholar

48. In addition, every television studio was to “regularly broadcast at a set day and time a program with answers to questions from the population by leaders from the ministries and administrations, as well as local party, Soviet, and social organizations, and people's deputies.” Klimanova, Opartiinoi i sovetskoi pechati, 539. For the text of the 1962 decree, which also covered radio, see ibid., 542-48.

49. “Sokrashchennaia stenogramma zasedaniia kollegi Gosudarstvennogo Komiteta Soveta Ministrov SSSR po radioveshchaniiu i televideniiu,” TsGAVO, f. 4915, op. 1, d. 3430,1. 34.

50. The story had an unhappy ending for Kuznetsov, who decided to scrap die minister's tape and run his own commentary. Akhough the head of the Goskomitet had authorized the change, he was powerless to protect Kuznetsov's job when his party superiors objected. Kuznetsov was banished from on-air appearances for six months. Kuznetsov, G. V., “Zapiski lishnego cheloveka,” in Zasurskii, la. N., ed., Televizionnaia mozaika (Moscow, 1997), 38–39 Google Scholar.

51. Iakovlev, A., “Televidenie: Problemy, perspektivy,” Kommunist, 1965, no. 13: 74.Google Scholar

52. Igor Il'inskii, “Razmyshleniia u televizora,” Literaturnaia gazeta, 12 May 1956, 1.

53. Troekt postanovleniia Soveta Ministrov SSSR ‘O merakh pomoshchi Ministerstvu kinematografii SSSR po vypolneniiu plana dokhodov ot kino,'” RGASPI, f. 17, op. 133, d. 339,11. 75-77.

54. “Stenogramma zasedaniia pervogo plenuma Vsesoiuznoi komissii kinoprokata ot 23 noiabria 1966 g.,” Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv literatury i isskustva (RGALI), f. 2936, op. 4, d. 1308,1. 93. In point of fact, film attendance did decline in the USSR as elsewhere in die world with die spread of television technology. The statistical high-water mark for attendance was 1968. Zhabskii, M., Kino: Prokat, reklama, metodika, praktika (Moscow, 1982), 16.Google Scholar

55. Norman Sklarewitz, “Themes and Variations: TV—Soviet Style,” Wall Street Journal, 1 September 1964.

56. For die Goskomitet's letter protesting die Bolshoi's policy in 1958, see “Spravka o propagande opernykh proizvedenii po radioveshchaniiu i televideniiu,” GARF, f. 6903, op. 1, d. 542,1. 49.

57. The Central Committee's 1960 decree addressed diis problem and directed die film industry and administrators in dieater, music, and sports to cooperate widi televi sion. Later that year, however, the Goskomitet complained to the Central Committee that many local organizations were still refusing to comply with requests from the television studios. “Pis'ma v TsK KPSS i SM SSSR o rabote Goskomiteta po radioveshchaniiu i televideniiu,“ GARF, f. 6903, op. 1, d. 623, 1. 148. According to the editor in charge of programming for literature and drama in the 1960s, many Moscow theaters were still refusing to cooperate at the end of the decade. V N. Kozlovskii, interview, Gosteleradiofond Oral History Project, Moscow, February 2002.

58. Iakovlev, “Televidenie,” 71.

59. Notable cultures figures, such as Komei Chukovskii and Iraklii Andronnikov, did participate in Soviet television programming right from the start. But, particularly in the 1950s, they were the exception rather than the rule. For Andronnikov's views, see Andronnikov, Iraklii and Andronnikova, Manana, “Zametki o televidenii,” Iskusstvo kino, 1963, no. 2: 98–102 Google Scholar. The Andronnikovs’ essay was part of an unusual series in Iskusstvo kino on television's relationship to theater and cinema.

60. As many commentators have observed, it is quite common for new media to struggle to establish their cultural legitimacy. In the Soviet context, cinema won the right to call itself “art” as early as the 1920s, thanks to the support of Bolshevik leaders, especially Lenin, and to a complicated campaign of self-promotion. See Ian Christie, “Canons and Careers: The Director in Soviet Cinema,” in Taylor, Richard and Spring, Derek, eds., Stalinism and Soviet Cinema (London, 1993), 142-70Google Scholar. Although radio also enjoyed official support in the USSR, its enthusiastic workers were far less successful in promoting radio broadcasting as artistry. See Marchenko, T., Radiotear (Moscow, 1970)Google Scholar; Sherel', A. A, Audiokul'tura XX veka (Moscow, 2004).Google Scholar

61. See, for example, Rudol'f Boretskii's comments in A. Iu. Rozov, ed., Shabolovka, 53: Stranitsy istorii televideniia (Moscow, 1988), 148-58.

62. Low rates of pay applied to freelancers as well as staff, making it difficult to attract talented outsiders. See “Pis'ma v TsK KPSS i SM SSSR o rabote Goskomiteta po radioveshchaniiu i televideniiu,” GARF, f. 6903, op. 1, d. 542, 11. 1-4, for letters from the Goskomitet pleading to the Central Committee to raise the rates in 1958. E. V. Beliaeva, host of the classical music program Muzykal'nyi kiosk, reported she was paid four rubles per show plus five rubles per script in the 1960s. E. V. Beliaeva, interview, Gosteleradiofond Oral History Project Interview, Moscow, 2002.

63. Video technology was not widely available in the USSR until the 1970s. Professional training for television dates to 1958, with courses at the Journalism Faculty of Moscow State University. Iurovskii, Televidenie, 109. For a discussion of professionalization, see Koenig, “Media and Reform.” For some of the implications of video for Soviet television, see Roth-Ey, “Mass Media and the Remaking of Soviet Culture,” chap. 5.

64. Sergei Lapin, the new head of Gosteleradio beginning in 1970, took important administrative measures to raise the status of television in the Soviet cultural system— measures that went along with the shift in official status. Lapin, it is said, had an especially close working relationship with Brezhnev and was dius able to ensure that no real criticism of television made it into die press. Under his tenure, television professionals were decorated widi state honors (such as People's Artist of the USSR ) for die first time. For a discussion of die Lapin era, see the roundtable sponsored by die journal Zhumalist, “Zapreshchaetsia zaplyvat’ dal'she vsekh!” Zhumalist, 1988, no. 8: 24-29; Ocherki po istorii rossiiskogo televideniia (Moscow, 1999), 155-238.

65. Firsov, Puti razvitxia, 111.

66. hvestiia, 27 November 1957, 4; “Televizory v more,” Ogonek, 1959, no. 20; “S televizorom v avtomobile,” Ogonek, 1965, no. 25.

67. Magnitogorskii rabochii, 10 December 1961, in GARF, f. 6903, op. 3, d. 175,1. 7.

68. Sovetskaia kul'tura, 4 January 1962, in GARF, f. 6903, op. 3, d. 175,1.19.

69. In this connection, it is interesting to note that television sets were often given pride of place in a corner near the window—the best spot in a room, according to Soviet standards. See, for example, the images in “V mebilirovannye kvartiry,” Ogonek, 1960, no. 24. Svetlana Boym argues that die corner location, coupled witii the tendency to drape die sets with lacey cloths, indicates that uiey had taken die place of icons in traditional Slavic dwellings. Boym, S., “Everyday Culture,” in Shalin, Dmitri N., ed., Russian Culture at the Crossroads (Boulder, Colo., 1996), 174.Google Scholar I am grateful to Susan Reid for sharing her observations about television sets and Soviet home decor.

70. Sappak, V, Televidenie i my (Moscow, 1962), 42 Google Scholar; emphasis in die original.

71. Sergei Muratov and Georgii Fere, “Telepanorama—Oktiabr',” Sovetskaia kul'tura, 4 November 1965, 3; my emphasis.

72. One 1957 article made die point—twice—by promising diat a new set “fully meets die demands of die demanding TV viewer.” “Vas vidiat i slyshat milliony,” Sovetskaia kul'tura, 18 June 1957. Anodier report on new sets from 1961 described a love for new products as “wholly natural” because each new product offered die consumer “greater convenience and more fully satisfies his needs.” “Novye tovary dlia sovetskogo cheloveka,“ Ekonomicheskaia gazeta, 7 August 1961, 39.

73. See Reid, Susan E., “Cold War in die Kitchen: Gender and die De-Stalinization of Consumer Taste in die Soviet Union under Khrushchev,” Slavic Review 61, no. 2 (Summer 2002): 211-52.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

74. Radio, too, might be called a “necessity,” but it was not a new technology and did not figure in die culture as life changing in die same manner as television. Also, diere were far fewer complaints about radio (sets and programming), and so die radio listener was less often portrayed as abused and demanding.

75. Ocherkipoistoriirossiiskogotelevideniia, 143.

76. The article goes on in a humorous tone to calculate the actual enjoyment factor of evening programming on television at “6-7 percent.” Viktor Slavkin, “Sem'protsentov vesel'ia,” Sovetskaia kul'tura, 9 September 1965, 3.

77. I use “his” advisedly, considering the wide disparity in television viewership rates for men and women in the USSR discussed below.

78. There is an interesting distinction to be drawn here between the way “televisionwatching“ figured in die culture conceptually and the way it functioned as an actual social practice. In point of fact, in the USSR at this time, most people watched television in groups (as was true of early television the world over). Nonetheless, in press accounts, “television-watching” very often figured as a solitary, isolating pastime.

79. “Kak vy provodite svobodnoe vremiia,” Komsomol'skaia pravda, 24 February 1966,1.

80. Firsov identified die four groups as “highly moderate,” “moderate,” “endiusiastic,“ and “highly enthusiastic.” The first group, about one-third of the total in his estimation, watched up to three hours of television per week, while the second group of roughly die same size, watched from three to ten hours. The “enthusiastic” groups, on the other hand, spent from ten to twenty-seven hours per week (widi die top group, 16.5 percent of die total, logging fifteen to twenty-seven). Firsov, Televidenie, 118-19. This is die same Boris Firsov who headed up die Leningrad Studio in die 1960s.

81. Odier studies from die period confirmed die gender gap. A study of viewers in Dnepropetrovsk, Zaporozh'e, Odessa, and Kostroma found diat men watched eleven hours per week on average, while women watched only six. Firsov, Putt razvitiia, 118.

82. Mickiewicz, Media and the Russian Public, 19-23.

83. Firsov, Televidenie, 124.

84. V Slavkin, “Chto by my delali bez televideniia?” Sovetskaia kul'tura, 11 November 1965, 4.

85. Iu. Sheinin, “Domashnii ekran: Drug ill vrag?” Literaturnaia gazeta, 29 January 1969, 8. Another critic posed the question thus: “Television: relaxation from work or from thinking?” Georgii Fere, Tovarishch TV (Moscow, 1974), 14.

86. Similarly, Firsov's pioneering sociological study featured a ringing endorsement of “humanist” Soviet television but also managed to familiarize readers widi contemporary critiques of television via a discussion of western media sociology. Firsov also took an entire chapter to dispute the existence of telemania in the USSR. Firsov, Televidenie, chaps. 2-5; for the discussion of “telemania,” see chap. 10.

87. See Galochkina, G., ed., Televidenie priglashaet detei (Moscow, 1976)Google Scholar; V S. Korobeinikov told readers that doctors had determined it was harmful to watch television after “intense emotional activity,” especially for children; children also suffered, he said, from “immoderate, unsystematic television watching” in general. Korobeinikov, V S., Goluboi charodei: Televidenie i sotsial'naia sistema (Moscow, 1975), 125 Google Scholar; V. Zhuravleva and G. Al'tov, “Sila telepritiazheniia,” Sovetskaia kul'tura, 29 May 1965,1. Cinema's effects on children had aroused similar fears in the 1920s.

88. Korobeinikov, Goluboi charodei, 128. The research division of the Goskomitet also expressed concerns about television's effects on young viewers. In a 1966 report, researchers cited recommendations from die Institute of Hygiene diat schoolchildren be limited to one hour of television a day on no more than three days per week. They also noted diat researchers in capitalist and socialist countries had established diat it was best for children to watch programs designed specially for them according to a strict schedule. Because Soviet television did not follow a strict schedule, diey argued, it direatened dieir health. GARF, f. 6903, op. 3, d. 343,11. 6-10.

89. Iu. Koginov, “Krest'ianin vernul'sia s raboty,” Pravda, 2 January 1967, 2.

90. For Williams's argument about die domestic location of television in die west, see Williams, Television, 17-25. See also Mickiewicz, Media and the Russian Public, 40. Aldiough it is hard to imagine now, in die 1930s and 1940s, diere were many people, even in die United States and Great Britain, who had doubts about whedier television was suited to home use. Some assumed diat television would be too expensive to reach a truly mass audience, while odiers looked at die tremendous popularity of radio and assumed television could not compete. Odiers considered die tiny screen of die home set a problem and imagined television's future in dieaters specially equipped widi projection screens. Smitii, Andiony, ed., Television: An International History (Oxford, 1995), 110.Google Scholar

91. The decision to locate television in public spaces was a source of inter-ministerial conflict in Nazi Germany. See William Uricchio, “Television as History: Representations of German Television Broadcasting, 1935-1944,” in Murray, Bruce and Wickham, Christopher, eds., Framing the Past: The Historiography of German Cinema and Television (Carbondale, 1992), 167-96Google Scholar. In Japan in die 1950s, the nascent industry put television sets in hundreds of outdoor locations. Upwards of 9,000 people gadiered in front of diese sets at any given time; diroughout die 1950s, diese sets were die Japanese people's main exposure to television. See Shunya Yoshimi, “Television and Nationalism: Historical Change in die National Domestic TV Formation of Postwar Japan,” European Journal of Cultural Studies 6, no. 4 (2003): 459-87.

92. Ocherkipo istorii rossiiskogo televideniia, 37; Egorov, V V., Televidenie: Teoriia ipraktika (Moscow, 1993), 7 Google Scholar.

93. Moscow's Sokolniki Park showed television in an open-air pavilion seating 200-300 people, while a Zhdanov district park had a special hall outfitted with nine sets and charged 2 rubles at die door. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 133, d. 339,1. 75. One veteran television professional recalled his first encounter widi die medium in a workers’ club in 1950. “All I remember is a big room where about forty people sat in die dark attentively watching a smallish box widi a magnifying lens.” They were watching a dieatrical performance, Pushkin. Rozov, ed., Shabolovka, 67. According to Feigelson, programs from die main channel in Moscow were often re-broadcast in rural movie dieaters in die mid to late 1950s. Feigelson, L'URSS et sa télévision, 53.

94. For examples from die Tomsk region (1956), see GARF, f. 6903, op. 1, d. 499, 11. 17-20. For die Kiev studio's activities, see “Stenogramma zasedaniia GURI Ministerstva Kul'tury SSSR,” GARF, f. 6903, op. 1, d. 500,1. 37 (for 1956) and “Informatsii obkomov KP Ukrainy: Po voprosu uluchsheniia razvitiia radioveshchaniia i televideniia,” TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, d. 2447,11. 28-37 (for 1960).

95. GARF, f. 6903, op. 1, d. 499,1. 5.

96. See Reid, “Cold War in the Kitchen.”

97. Marling, Karal Ann, As Seen on TV: The Visual Culture of Everyday Life in the 1950s (Cambridge, Mass., 1994), 272 Google Scholar; Taubman, William, Khrushchev: The Man and His Era (New York, 2003), 416 Google Scholar. When the exhibition was winding down, RCA, the company that had supplied the television equipment, offered to sell it at an advantageous price; the Soviets turned them down. RGANI, f. 5, op. 33, d. 95,1. 3.

98. Reid, “Cold War in the Kitchen,” 219. An internal Goskomitet report on the future of television in 1960 also promised every family a set within twenty years. GARF, f. 6903, op. 1, d. 655,1. 17. Six years later, television sets and refrigerators were still being singled out for attention, as noted in the New York Times. Harry Schwartz, “Soviets Stressing TVs and Refrigerators, New York Times, 20 October 1966, 35.

99. V Danilov, “Eshche 1,000,000 zritelei,” Pravda, 3 May 1968, 1; “Moguchee sredstvo kommunisticheskogo vospitaniia,” Pravda, 7 May 1960, 1. The “birdiplace” claim refers to Russian scientist A. S. Popov, who announced his first radio broadcast in 1895. Soviet television also celebrated itself, in programs such as 25 let televideniiu (1964) hosted by veteran journalist Iurii Fokin and the special 1967 “Radio Day” edition of Goluboi ogonek.

100. R. Boretskii, “When There Are Many Channels,” Sovetskaia kul'tura, 11 September 1965, 2-3, in Current Digest of the Soviet Press 17, no. 39 (1965): 13. Soviet media made much of the all-union nature of Ostankino, as did television's top official at die time in his recent memoirs. Mesiatsev, N. N., Davnoeperezhitoe (Moscow, 2000), 27 Google Scholar. In early 1966, Mesiatsev and odiers traveled to Great Britain, France, and Italy widi die express purpose of comparing die Ostankino project to existing facilities diere. Upon dieir return, they reported diat Ostankino would be comparable and, in some respects (e.g., its overall broadcast capacity), superior to European television centers. “Sravnitel'naia otsenka proekta stroitel'stva obshchesoiuznogo teletsentra s zarubezhnymi teletsentrami,” RGANI, f. 5, op. 58, d. 25,11. 23-24.