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Agrarian Problems and the Moscow-Peking Axis

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 January 2017

Karl A. Wittfogel
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Extract

Officially the one-centeredness of the Communist world ended in 1943. In that year the Communist International, which had recognized the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as the hegemon, was dissolved, because the new political situation demanded the “great flexibility and independence” of the various “sections.“ The people's democracies that a few years later came into being in Eastern Europe emphasized, as Brzezinski has noted, that they “were to be sovereign—not Soviet. Their relations with the USSR were to be, naturally, ‘friendly’ but founded on mutual recognition of the principles of independence and noninterference in internal affairs.“ Thus ideologically the transformation of international communism into a complex with many allegedly independent power-holding and power-seeking Communist parties was proclaimed long before Togliatti in 1956 asserted that the Communist world was becoming “polycentric.”

Type
Articles
Information
Slavic Review , Volume 21 , Issue 4 , December 1962 , pp. 678 - 698
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies. 1962

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References

1 See Resolution on the Dissolution of the Communist International, World News and Views, XXIII, No. 22 (May 29, 1943), 169 and 170.

2 Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict (rev. ed.; New York, 1961), p. 36.

3 first presented the idea of the Communist Axis in the memorandum, “Objectives and Methods of America's Policy in Asia after China's Shift into the Communist Orbit,” which was written for the U.S. Department of State in the summer of 1949, and I elaborated this idea in a number of articles: “Russia and Asia,” World Politics, Vol. II, No. 4 (July, 1950); “How to Checkmate Stalin in Asia,” Commentary, Oct., 1950; “A New Policy for Asia,” New Leader, Feb. 19, 1951; “The Influence of Leninism-Stalinism on China,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Sept., 1951

4 , Feb. 15, 1956.

5 Ibid., June 4, 1958.

6 Christian Science Monitor, Mar. 25, 1953.

7 “Industrialization of China Bogs Down in Russian Reluctance,” Christian Science Monitor, Mar. 25, 1953.

8 Charles, David A., “The Dismissal of Marshall P'eng Teh-huai,” The China Quarterly, Oct.-Dec, 1961, p. 75.Google Scholar

9 Tang, Peter S. H., Communist China Today, Vol. I (2nd rev. ed.; Washington, D.C., 1961), p. 82.Google Scholar

10 Ibid., pp. 81-82.

11 For this formulation, see Wolfe, Bertram D., Khrushchev and Stalin's Ghost (New York, 1957), p. 1957 Google Scholar.

12 Wittfogel, Karl A., Oriental Despotism (New Haven, 1957), p. 107.Google Scholar

13 fatu, p. 106.

14 Ibid., p. 339. I pointed to this phenomenon in sections of Oriental Despotism written in the spring of 1953, i.e., after Stalin's death and at a time when most commentators expected group leadership to prevail in the USSR.

15 Wittfogel, Karl A., “A Stronger Oriental Despotism,” The China Quarterly, Jan.-Mar., 1960., p. 32.Google Scholar Walker, Richard L., “Chairman Mao and the Cult of Personality,” Encounter (London), June, 1960 Google ScholarPubMed, passim.

16 See Wittfogel 1949 memorandum “Objectives and Methods of America's Policy in Asia …,” Section F. See also note 3 above for articles published in 1950 and 1951

17 See Wittfogel, Karl A., “The Russian and Chinese Revolutions: A Socio-Historical Comparison,” The Yearbook of World Affairs (London, 1961), pp. 61 ff.Google Scholar; Tang, op. cit., p. 570; Zagoria, Donald S., The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-1961 (Princeton, 1962), pp. 10 ff.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

18 Rush, Myron, The Rise of Khrushchev (Washington, D.C., 1958), p. 19 Google Scholar and passim.

19 See Jen-min jih-pao (Peking), Oct. 26, 1953; cf. Survey of China Mainland Press, American Consulate General, Hong Kong, No. 725, p. 42 (hereafter cited as SCMP).

20 Mah, Feng-hwa, “The First Five-Year Plan and Its International Aspects,” Three Essays on the International Economics of Communist China (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1959), p. 81.Google Scholar

21 Mah, Feng-hwa, “The Financing of Public Investment in Communist China,” Journal of Asian Studies, XXI, No. 1 (Nov., 1961), p. 36.Google Scholar

22 Jen-min jih-pao, Oct. 26, 1953; cf. SCMP, No. 725, p. 41.

23 Cf. Mah, “ The First Five-Year Plan …,” p. 88; Tang , op. tit., pp. 520-21.

24 Ssu-ch'i Ai, “Study Stalin's Theories in Our Struggle for Building Socialism in One Country,” Hsüeh Hsi, Mar., 1954; cf. SCMP, No. 780, p p. 27 and 29.

25 Cf. Lenin's ideas of nonantagonistic contradictions under socialism.

26 Doak Barnett, A., Communist Economic Strategy: The Rise of Mainland China (Washington, D.C., 1959), pp. 26–27 Google Scholar. Cf. Mah, “ The First Five-Year Plan …,” p. 88.

27 Edward Crankshaw i n New York Herald Tribune, Feb. 12, 1961.

28 Wolfe, Khrushchev and Stalin's Ghost, pp. 88, 102-3, 238, and 246.

29 ibid., p. 102.

30 An editorial in Jen-min jih-pao of July 1, 1957, admitted that this policy was a calculated “dark scheme,” i.e., a trap (SCMP, No. 1567, p. 20).

31 For a detailed account, see Roderick MacFarquhar, The Hundred Flowers Campaign and the Chinese Intellectuals (London, 1960), passim.

32 Ackley, Gardner, Macroeconomic Theory (New York, 1961), p. 549.Google Scholar

33 Samuelson, Paul A., Economics: An Introductory Analysis (5th ed.: New York, Toronto, London, 1961), p. 6.Google Scholar

34 Ibid., p. 489.

35 Sumner H. Slichter, who stresses the significance of the technological factor in economic change, does not in his stimulating Economic Growth in the United States (Baton Rouge, La., 1961) discuss the technological basis of the peculiarity of American agriculture in which, as he reports, small enterprises continue to play a much greater role than they do in industry (pp. 144-45 and 169).

36 Samuelson, op. cit., p. 412.

37 Jasny, Naum, The Socialized Agriculture of the USSR (Stanford, 1949), p. 419.Google Scholar

38 See below.

39 Cf. Karl A. Wittfogel, “The End of the Chinese Peasantry,” New Leader, Feb. 13, 1956.

40 Jen-min jih-pao, Sept. 22, 1957; cf. SCMP, No. 1626, p. 11.

41 See SCMP, No. 1557, p. 10.

42 Mao Tse-tung, “On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People,” New Leader, Supplement No. 2, Sept. 9, 1957, p. 35.

43 ibid., p. 56.

44 SCMP, No. 1523, pp. 11 ff.

45 SCMP, No. 1524, pp. 13, 14, and 16.

46 United Press, London, July 13, 1957; cf. Mah, “The First Five Year Plan …,” p. 80, n. 136.

47 SCMP, No. 1626, p. n.

48 Commune Resolution o£ Aug. 29, 1958; cf. SCMP, No. 1853, pp. 2 and 4.

49 “Resolutions on Some Questions Concerning the People's Communes,” Sixth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (Peking, 1958), p. 28. Cf. Ho Chin, “A Great Improvement in the Tilling System of China,” New China News Service, Jan. 12, 1959; cf. SCMP, No. 1957, p. 30.

50 For Khrushchev's remarks on the Chinese communes, see Life, XLVI, No. 2 (Jan. 12, 1959), 86.

51 For a résumé; of Mikoyan's remarks, see New York Times, Jan. 13, 1959.

52 (Moscow and Leningrad, 1950), XXVII, 131, 226, 231-32; XXIX, 155; XXX, 173 ff.

53 (Moscow, 1959), p. 423.

54 (Moscow, 1949), XII, 197.

55 ibid., pp. 194, 195.

56 ibid., p. 197.

57 Ibid., p. 198.

58 ibid.

59 ibid., p. 192.

60 Ibid., p. 211.

61 Ibid., p. 192.

62 Ibid., pp. 192, 198.

63 Ibid., p. 198.

64 Ibid.

65 ibid., p. 192.

66 ibid., p. 215.

67 ibid., p. 211.

68 Ibid., p. 198; italics in original

69 Ibid., pp. 199, 212.

70 Ibid., p. 212.

71 Ibid., PP- 197-98; cf. p. 193.

72 Ibid., P- 193.

73 ibid., P- 198.

74 ibid.

75 ibid., p. 212.

76 Ibid. In January, 1934, when the attitude toward the collectives had been standardized, Stalin, in his Report to the 17th Congress of the CPSU, commented once more on the premature organization of the communes in his discussion of “Questions of Ideological and Political Leadership.” According to him, the commune is a unit that socializes both production and the “everyday life of every member of the commune” and does not permit its members to own individually “poultry, small livestock, a cow, grain or household land.“ He saw “petty-bourgeois” equalization as “the weakest side of the commune.” He condemned this policy as “a reactionary, petty-bourgeois absurdity,” contrary to the ideas of Marxism-Leninism and, as in 1930, he again called the too rapid transition to the commune “criminal” (, XIII, 351 ff.). Stalin's 1934 postscript, which is significant for his remarks on the dangers of equalitarianism, failed to repeat most of his earlier key arguments on the premature organization of agricultural communes. The new party history, which refers briefly to Stalin's 1934 Report and his discussion of the “ideological and political” issues, does not mention his supplementary criticism of the communes at all.

77 , p. 423

78 “Resolutions on Some Questions Concerning the People's Communes,” p. 28.

79 ibid., p. 36.

80 ibid., p. 25.

81 Ibid., pp. 23, 32.

82 ibid., p. 36.

83 ibid., p. 34.

84 ibid., p. 42.

85 Charles, “The Dismissal of Marshall P'eng Teh-huai,” pp. 67 ff.

86 Despite serious difficulties, industry in the USSR continued to grow impressively after 1930. See Jasny, Naum, Soviet Industrialization 1928-1952 (Chicago, 1961), pp. 77–79, 133, and 138Google Scholar; cf. Alfred Zauberman, s.v. “Industry,” Encyclopedia of Russia and the Soviet Union, ed. Michael T. Florinsky (New York, Toronto, London, 1961).

87 The meteorological data given in Chinese Communist publications indicate that in the year 1960, which was afterwards called a year of particularly devastating natural calamities, the weather was probably somewhat poorer but by no means catastrophically bad.

88 Joseph Alsop, New York Herald Tribune, Apr. 13, 1962.

89 ibid., Apr. 4, 1962.

90 Ibid., Apr. 16, 1962.

91 Hudson, G. F., Lowenthal, Richard, and MacFarquhar, Roderick, The Si?io-Soviet Dispute (New York, 1961), p. 42.Google Scholar

92 Ibid., p. 120.

93 ibid., p. 119.

94 Began on August 23, 1958.

95 The “first period,” Communist style, began with the Russian revolution of 1917 and ended in 1923 with the failure of the German revolution. The “second period,” the time of the “relative stabilization of capitalism” lasted from 1924 to 1928. The idea of the “third period” originated at the Sixth World Congress of the Comintern. It was aggressively used by Stalin and Molotov in 1929 and 1930. (See , XII, 20-21 and 34-35; International Press Correspondence, 1930, pp. 550-51 and 592-93.)

96 Jen-min jih-pao, May 10, 1960.

97 Tang, op. cit., p. 595.

98 Ibid., pp. 589-90.

99 Hudson et al., Sino-Soviet Dispute, pp. 194 a n d 196.

100 ibid., p. 174.

101 Bauer, Raymond A., Inkeles, Alex, and Kluckhohn, Clyde, How the Soviet System Works (Cambridge, Mass., 1956), p. 184.CrossRefGoogle Scholar