I would like to thank Lynne Arnault, John Norton, and Robert W. Langran for their comments on an earlier draft of this article that was presented at the Northeastern Political Science Association's 1991 annual meeting. I also wish to acknowledge the support of the Le Moyne College Faculty Senate Committee on Research and Development. My title is derived from Sara Ruddick's Maternal Thinking: Toward a Politics of Peace (New York: Ballantine Books, 1989).

1. Time, 20 July 1981.

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4. While faded, they're not entirely gone. There are some scholars who are attempting to measure the impact that O'Connor's presence has had on the Court. In particular, Karen O'Connor and Jeffrey A. Segal suggest that since O'Connor's appointment, Justices' support for sex discrimination claims has increased. See their "Justice Sandra Day O'Connor and the Supreme Court'reaction to Its First Female Member,” Women and Politics 10 (1990): 95–104.Google Scholar

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27. Ibid., pp. 613–15.

28. 1 focus on concurrences rather than majority opinions because the former are more illustrative of an individual justice's voice than are majority opinions which are necessarily written with an eye toward holding the votes of other justices. Concurrences, as opposed to dissents, are also instructive in uncovering a justice's jurisprudence since they usually address a finer point of law rather than a fundamental disagreement with the Court.

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35. Ruddick, Maternal Thinking.

36. Ibid., p. 23.

37. Ibid., p. 78.

38. Ibid., pp. 78–79.

39. Ibid., p. 95.

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid., pp. 95–96.

42. Sheny, , “Civic Virtue,” pp. 592–616.Google Scholar

43. The Federalist, No. 10 and No. 51.

44. Sherry, , “Civic Virtue,” p. 579.Google Scholar

45. Ibid., p. 581.

46. Ibid., p. 592.

47. I am not arguing that O'Connor is the only person on the court to ever use a feminine perspective. Since use of maternal legal thinking is not confined to women alone I would expect to see some of the other justices draw on it from time to time. However, as Sherry indicates, O'Connor's decisions suggest a consistent pattern of feminine jurisprudence. See Sherry, , “Civic Virtue,” p. 592Google Scholar at note 212.

48. Justices Scalia and Stevens have been the most frequent writers of individual opinions during the past few years. Scalia authored 23 concurrences and 9 dissents during the 1988 term, 18 concurrences and 12 dissents during the 1989 term, and 18 concurrences and 14 dissents during the 1990 term. Stevens wrote 14 concurrences and 22 dissents during the 1988 term, 17 concurrences and 29 dissents the 1989 term and 5 concurrences and 25 dissents during the 1990 term See “The Supreme Court, 1988 Term,” Harvard Law Review 103 (11 1989): 394Google Scholar; “The Supreme Court, 1989 Term,” Harvard Law Review 104 (11 1990): 359Google Scholar; “The Supreme Court, 1990 Term,” Harvard Law Review 105 (11 1991): 419.Google Scholar Compared with the other eight justices, O'Connor's number of opinions and dissents is below the Court's average. See “The Supreme Court in the Eighties: A Statistical Retrospective,” Harvard Law Review 104 (11 1990): 371.Google Scholar

49. Stewart, David O., “A Chorus of Voices,” ABA Journal 77 (04 1991): 50, 52, at 52.Google Scholar

50. Ibid.

51. 467 U.S. 649 (1984).

52. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U S. 436 (1966).

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56. Sherry, , “Civic Virtue,” p. 593.Google Scholar

57. The source of this label is Justice Lewis Powell and his swing vote in Bakke.

58. 487 U.S. 1012(1988).

59. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).

60. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).

61. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).

62. 497 US.——, 110 S.Ct. 2926,111 L. Ed. 2d 344 (1990).

63. 497 U.S. ——, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 111 L. Ed. 2d 224 (1990).

64. 497 U.S.——, 100 S. Ct. 3157, 111 L. Ed. 2d 666 (1990).

65. Ibid., at 682.

66. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).

67. Ibid., at 848.

68. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).

69. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).

70. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

71. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).

72. 439 U.S. 379 (1979).

73. 462 U.S. 416 (1983).

74. 106 L. Ed. 2d 410 (1989), see his footnote at 448.

75. Ill L. Ed. 2d 344 (1990), at 376–77

76. 497 U.S.——, 110 S.Ct, 2972, 111 L. Ed. 2d 405 (1990).

77. 111 L. Ed. 2d 224 (1990), at 248.

78. Ibid., at 250–51.

79. Ibid., at 251.

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100. See Bref for Respondents,Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, Nos. 91–744 and 91–902, October Term, 1991, which states “the text of the Constitution does not even mention abortion” at 108.

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106. Ibid.

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108. “The Supreme Court The 1990 Term,” p. 420.

109. Nos. 91–744 and 91–902, October Term, 1991.

110. See Brief for Respondents, pp. 34–54, which uses O'Connor's undue burden test to argue that the Court need not revisit Roe v. Wade in order to hold the Pennsylvania abortion regulations constitutional.