1 The fundamental ideas expressed in this article were the subject of a contribution to the Semaines Sociales of Canada, Session of St. Jean, Quebec, 1942.

2 Duez, Paul, “L'évolution du pouvoir,” Encyclopédic française, 10:62, 7. 1935Google Scholar.

3 This change has manifested itself outwardly by a curious reversal. The democratic principle has been, up to the present crisis, a revolutionary and innovating principle. Some ten years ago it was noted that in the present crisis the Democracies were in the position of “conservative systems.” Revolutionary in the eighteenth century in a Europe ruled by absolute monarchs and “enlightened despots” of the age of Enlightenment, the democratic idea remained revolutionary in the nineteenth century. As it gained ground throughout the world it broke down the established regimes, transformed the political life of peoples, progressively affected the social life and everywhere produced new institutions. And because curious historical circumstances generalized the use of jargon, the revolution was everywhere in the nineteenth century considered “Leftist”; the extension of democratic principles came from the “Left.” What was “Leftist” seemed close to the people and contrary to the kings. In the same jargon, every conception of authority which, in the State, the factory or the workshop was not conferred or controlled by the governed was considered “Rightist” doctrine; what was “Rightist” was considered conservative, anti-revolutionary and protective of the established order. It is an irony which would make a Candide or an Ingenue rejoice; a number of our contemporaries have not yet noticed the change. They willingly consider as “Rightist” and as conservative of the existing order, movements like Italian Fascism, the Spanish Falange, pre-war National-Socialism, at the very time when these movements proclaim themselves innovators or supporters of definitive and exhaustive social and political revolution even more profound than the democratic revolution pretended to be.

4 Siegfried, André, “La Civilisation occidentale' in Revue des Deux Mondes, 09 15, 1941, pp. 130, sqqGoogle Scholar.

5 Dawson, Christopher, The Modern Dilemma, Sheed and Ward, New York, 1938. p. 53Google Scholar.

6 Candau, S. describes in an excellent article in the new review Economic et humanisme, 04–05, 1942Google Scholar, a significant incident which created quite a stir at the time it took place. Japan was one of the signatories of the Kellogg Peace Pact renouncing war to which almost all the states of the world adhered. The text said “The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the name of their respective peoples…” The formula was readily subscribed to by the kings of countries with democratic regimes. It produced an uproar in Japan. Was it not incompatible with the concept of imperial authority, even blasphemous, since the Emperor was of divine origin?

7 Modern Democracy, writes Mr. Duez, “is presented as a rational system which acts with the character of an idea-force in the minds of men thirsting for liberty ” “Reason itself,” writes Emile Faguet, “requires that a being obey only its own law, for if it obeys a law foreign to itself, it transforms itself into a thing and does not have its own activity.” “Conserve the virtue of individual activity in the social framework,” adds Mr. Duez, so that each one in receiving an order remains free and responsible—this is the essence of the democratic aspiration of the last century. Cf. Duez, , op. cit., 10:62, 6Google Scholar.

8 Adler, Mortimer J. and Walter Farrell, O. P. published in The Thomist, 07 1941 and 1942, an important study entitled “The Theory of Democracy.”Google Scholar They envisage democracy from an angle very different from that expressed in this article; they seek to establish a theory of Democracy. They interpret, therefore, the forms of government “in terms of human happiness” or greater virtue. Their conclusion is that Democracy, compared to what they call government, “that is the Royal State, the Republican State,” is the form of government and of State which adds to the principles of justice of the others a third: “a just distribution of full political status, i.e., citizenship and equality… all men are justly accorded political equality through the grant of citizenship.” Op. cit., 04, 1942, IV, 353Google Scholar.

It is easy to recognize the agreement of their point of view with ours. It is also in terms of right that we are led to interpret the democratic fact. The rights of citizens based on the rights of men and on nature belong equally to all like nature itself. We will show later the meaning that equality has in a democratic regime: equality in rights, equality before the law, equality in an upward direction, with equality is rooted in the spiritual nature of man.

9 Maritain, Jacques, Les Droits de l'homme el la Loi nalurelle. New York, 1942, p. 103Google Scholar.

10 Duez, Paul, op. cit., 10, 62, 6Google Scholar.

11 “Law is the wisdom of the great Jupiter” says Cicero. This means that law is a derivation of eternal wisdom; but also that the “great Jupiter” is subject to the law and that is why he is not a despot but a sage.

12 Bergson in the address given on the occasion cf his reception into the French Academy sees in true Democracy: “a purely rational principle of unification. ’ This is a profound expression which accords with our conception of law and its role in a democratic regime; it is a determination of the reascn and it is this which assures the unity of the body politic.

13 Maritain, Jacques. Les Droits de l'homme et al Loi naturelle, p. 110Google Scholar.

14 Maritain, , op. cit., p. 32Google Scholar.

15 Ibidem, pp. 47. 49.

16 Devant la crise mondiale, Manifeste des Catholiques européens sejournant en Amérique. Maison de France, New York, 1942, pp. 14–15.Google Scholar The English translation entitled “Manifesto on the War” was published in the Commonmeal, XXXVI, 18 (08 21, 1942), 415–421Google Scholar.