¹ For a discussion of the new trend, see Purcel, Susan Kaufman, “Authoritarianism,” Comparative Politics (01, 1973), pp. 301–312.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

² Linz, Juan, “An Authoritarian Regime: Spain” in Allardt, Erik and Rokkan, Stein, eds., Mass Politics (New York, 1970), p. 255.Google Scholar

³ See, for example, Wiarda, Howard J., “Toward a Framework for the Study of Political Change in the Iberic-Latin Tradition: The Corporative Model,” World Politics, XXV (01, 1973), 206–236.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴ Newton, Ronald C., “On Functional Groups, Fragmentation, and Pluralism in Spanish American Political Society,” The Hispanic American Historical Review, L (02, 1970), 1–29.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁵ Coder, Julio, “Bases Del Corporativismo en el Perú,” Sociedad y Política, I (10, 1972), 3–12.Google Scholar

⁶ For a review of the corporatist thinking, see Bowen, Ralph H., German Theories of the Corporate State (New York, 1947)Google Scholar; Elbow, Matthew H., French Corporative Theory, 1789–1948 (New York, 1966)Google Scholar; Camp, Richard L., The Papal Ideology of Social Reform (Leiden, 1969).Google Scholar

⁷ Weber, Max, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York, 1964), p. 145.Google Scholar

⁸ Schmitter, Philippe C., Interest Conflict and Political Change in Brazil (Stanford, 1971), p. 112.Google Scholar

⁹ For an overview of the American pluralist perspective, see Kariel, Henry S., ed., Frontiers of Democratic Theory (New York, 1970), part two.Google Scholar

¹⁰ This position is argued in Kornhauser, W., The Politics of Mass Society (London, 1960).Google Scholar

¹¹ For example, see Levy, Marion J. Jr., Modernization and the Structure of Societies (Princeton, 1969).Google Scholar

¹² See Rogowski, Ronald and Wasserspring, Lois, “Does Political Development Exist? Corporatism in Old and New Societies,” Sage Comparative Politics Series, 01–024, II (1971)Google Scholar and Portes, Alejandro, “Modernity and Development: A Critique,” Studies in Comparative International DevelopmentGoogle Scholar, in press. For a critique of the model as applied to the United States, see Lowi, Theodore J., The End of Liberalism (New York, 1969).Google Scholar

¹³ Durkheim, Emil, The Division of Labor in Society, preface to the second edition (Toronto, 1966), p. 3.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Linz, , p. 255.Google Scholar

¹⁵ An excellent compendium of speeches is Velasco la VOZ de la Revolución (Lima, 1971).Google Scholar

* The “social interest” sector as conceived by the Peruvian military regime bears considerable similarity to the “communitarian society” (sociedad comunitaria) that various Chilean Christian Democratic ideologists hoped to bring into being. The “communitarian society,” within which the distinction between capital and labor would be eliminated as the two functions came to be embodied in the same men through profit-sharing programs that would eventually bring ownership over the means of production into the hands of workers' associations, was in turn highly derivative. It revealed a striking parallel to the “national syndicalism” of the early revolutionary Spanish Falange, the Falange before it was tamed and transformed into a component of a nonrevolutionary system by Francisco Franco.—Ed.

¹⁶ ¿ A Donde Vamos? a publication of SINAMOS (Lima, 1972), p. 7.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 9.

¹⁸ This analysis is based on a lecture given by Delgado at the Superior School of Public Administration (Lima, July 21, 1972) and on Delgado, Carlos, “Significado político y social del proceso revolucionario peruano,” Libre, No. 3 (1972), pp. 35–43.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Paquette, Jane S., “Revolution by Fiat: The Context of Policy Making in Peru,” The Western Political Quarterly, XXV (12, 1972), 648–667.Google Scholar

²⁰ This position has been argued by many. One of the basic statements is that of Villanueva, Víctor, El CAEM y la revolución de la Fuerta Armada (Lima, 1972).Google Scholar

²¹ The most dramatic manifestation of this took place in 1969 with the emergence in many parts of Peru of numerous local “Committees for the Defense of the Revolution.” Some were organized spontaneously while others were organized by political groups such as the communists. At first the government sought to control these groups but then, obviously fearful of them, the government forced them to disband. For a discussion of the CDR's, see Palmer, David Scott, “Revolution from Above: Military Government and Popular Participation in Peru,” (Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1973), ch. 2.Google Scholar

²² SINAMOS ¿ de Qjuién y Para Que? publication of SINAMOS (Lima, 1972), p. 3.Google Scholar

²³ Ibid., p. 7.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 8.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 11.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid., pp. 13–14.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 22.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 25.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 26.

³¹ Ibid., p. 36.

³² The issue of the government versus the preexistent unions came to the fore in late 1972 when SINAMOS launched its own “Confederation of Revolutionary Workers.” This action sparked considerable bitterness on all sides but especially from the communist-led General Confederation of Workers which saw many important unions bolt its ranks for the government confederation.

³³ Huntington, Samuel P., Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, 1969), p. 243.Google Scholar

³⁴ Linz, p. 259.Google Scholar

³⁵ Ibid., p. 260.

³⁶ This argument is elaborated on in my Bolivia: The Uncompleted Revolution (Pittsburgh, 1972).Google Scholar

* Strikingly similar approaches seem to have been embodied into the justicialista program of Argentine dictator Perón, Juan Domingo (1946–1955). —Ed.Google Scholar

³⁷ Apter, David, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago, 1966).Google Scholar

* The lessons of peronismo in Argentina and perhaps also, although much less clearly, of the Getulio Vargas dictatorship in Brazil (1930–1945) seem to confirm the author's interpretation.—Ed.

³⁸ The percentage growth of GNP in 1972 was approximately 7 percent with government investment running about 41 percent of total investment. The consumer price index was rising at the rate of 6.8 percent, the money supply increased by 25 percent and expenditures for personal consumption rose 9.0 percent. The budget deficit for 1972 was about 12 percent of expenditures. The balance of trade has dropped from a +425.6 million dollars in 1970 to a projected +47 million in 1972. Data drawn from: Economic Indicators, U.S. Embassy (Lima, 1972)Google Scholar; Anexo Estadístico, Institute Nacional de Planificación (06, 1972)Google Scholar; Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas, Exposición 21 XXII CDN del CAEM, (05 15, 1972)Google Scholar; “The Economic Situation of Peru: Fourth Quarter, 1972,” Peruvian Times (02 8, 1973), pp. 7–9.Google Scholar For an overall projection of Peru's potential economic problems, see Klitgaard, Robert E., “Observations on the Peruvian National Plan for Development 1971–1975,” Inter-American Economic Affairs, XXIII (Winter, 1971), 3–32.Google Scholar

³⁹ For an elaboration of this analysis of Cuba, see my “Generation of Political Support and Allocation of Costs” in Mesa-Lago, Carmelo, ed., Revolutionary Change in Cuba (Pittsburgh, 1971).Google Scholar

⁴⁰ For an analysis of Bolivia in terms of this model, see Burke, Melvin and Malloy, James, “Del Populismo Nacional al Corporativismo Nacional: El Caso de Bolivia 1952–1970,” Aportes (10, 1972), pp. 66–97.Google Scholar

⁴¹ Either development scenario, by emphasizing industrialization, would entail a heavy allocation of costs on the peasant mass. For a theoretical justification of this prediction, see Owen, W. F., “The Double Developmental Squeeze on Agriculture,” American Economic Review, LVI (03, 1966), 43–70.Google Scholar