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Topological twists in the Syrian conflict: Re-thinking space through bread

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 October 2019

José Ciro Martínez Open the ORCID record for José Ciro Martínez [Opens in a new window]
José Ciro Martínez*
Affiliation:
Trinity College, University of Cambridge
*
*Corresponding author. Email: jcm88@cam.ac.uk
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Abstract

This article seeks to question the epistemological monopoly of territory and scale in analyses of the Syrian conflict. It does so to both challenge static conceptualisations of space in the study of politics and analyse how seemingly remote actors influence wartime outcomes. Since 2011, NGOs, government bodies, and merchants have worked to connect Damascus to Tehran, Idlib to Istanbul, London to Dara‘a. These connections have proven crucial to the reliable supply of food, funds, and firepower. Yet rather than reveal the importance of foreign patrons or proxies on the ground, such dynamics speak to a world in which relationships matter more than distance, practices more than geopolitical position or a priori forms of alliance. Drawing on the work of John Allen, I suggest why thinking topologically about these dynamics better equips us to understand the political outcomes they help engender. To demonstrate the promise of this approach, I hone in on the partnerships, intermediaries, and connections that shape performances of political authority in Syria by examining one object crucial to its enactment: bread.

Keywords

SpaceTopologiesSyriaCivil WarFood Politics
Type
Research Article
Information
Review of International Studies , Volume 46 , Issue 1 , January 2020 , pp. 121 - 136
Copyright
Copyright © British International Studies Association 2019 

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References

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77 Denying populations consistent access to food has been one of the primary means through which the Assad regime has sought to delegitimise opposition authorities. For more on myriad ways the Assad regime has helped manufacture the very vulnerabilities it then seeks to ameliorate, see Wedeen, Lisa, ‘Ideology and humor in dark times: Notes from Syria’, Critical Inquiry, 39:4 (2013), pp. 841–73CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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87 The vast majority of wheat grown in Dara‘a province is of the ‘hard’ variety, most of which was previously exported. When mixed with soft wheat, grown in cursory mounts in the province, it produces lower quality bread.

88 Martínez and Eng, ‘Stifling stateness’, pp. 235–53.

89 Aside from structural damage and destruction, reports have consistently found that one the main reasons for bakeries to stop functioning was a shortage of raw materials. ACU, ‘Bakeries in Syria’; RFSAN, ‘Wheat-to-Bread Infrastructure in Southern Syria’.

90 For more on the centrality of aid to the stability of prices, see RFSAN, ‘Wheat-to-Bread Infrastructure in Southern Syria’. A similar dependency on external flour from aid groups and Syrian traders based in Turkey exists in rebel-held Idlib.

91 Skype interview, Anonymous 7, 29 January 2018.

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