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Theorising theorising: Critical Realism and the quest for certainty

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 January 2012

BENJAMIN HERBORTH
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Extract

Discussing matters of philosophy of science within the boundaries of an academic field, which seems to have a fairly well-delineated subject matter, a carefully circumscribed universe of cases to struggle with, is a distinct deviation from normal science. Yet, meta-theoretical quarrels have been lurking on the boundaries of International Relations (IR) ever since the field constituted itself as a relatively autonomous academic enterprise. Never at the centre of the discipline, philosophy of science debates have still been among the most tenacious ones, so there doesn't seem to be a need to justify or legitimate such intellectual pursuits. Suffice it to say that among the many niches of International Relations as a discipline there may also be one dealing with meta-theoretical inquiry.

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Review of International Studies , Volume 38 , Issue 1 , January 2012 , pp. 235 - 251
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Copyright © British International Studies Association 2012

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References

1 See esp. Morgenthau, Hans, Scientific Man Versus Power Politics (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 1946)Google Scholar.

2 It becomes apparent, then, that meta-theoretical debates are far less abstract and detached from ‘actual research’ than common cliché may have us believe.

3 Patomäki, Heikki, ‘How to Tell Better Stories about World Politics’, European Journal of International Relations, 2 (1996), pp. 105–33CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

4 Wendt, Alexander, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 99CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Milja Kurki's recent attempt to broaden our understanding of the concept of causality in IR: Causation in International Relations: Reclaiming Causal Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008)Google Scholar.

5 Interestingly, Patrick Jackson, an outspoken critic of Critical Realism arrives at the very same conclusion from a Weberian vantage point. See his plea for a ‘Pluralist Science of IR’, in Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus (ed.), The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of science and its implications for the study of world politics (London: Routledge, 2010), pp. 188–212Google Scholar.

6 Patomäki, Heikki, After International Relations: Critical Realism and the (Re-)Construction of World Politics (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 19–95, 143–63Google Scholar; Wight, Colin, Agents, Structures, and International Relations: Politics as Ontology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 8, 181CrossRefGoogle Scholar; see also Patomäki, Heikki and Wight, Colin‘After Postpositivism? The Promises of Critical Realism’, International Studies Quarterly, 44 (2000), pp. 213–37, at p. 235CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

7 Kratochwil, Friedrich, ‘Of false promises and good bets: a plea for a pragmatic approach to theory building (the Tartu lecture)’, Journal of International Relations and Development, 10 (2007), pp. 1–15, at p. 3CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Pragmatism at basement prices is typically reduced to a woolly commitment to things that work – something that, in fairness, the American pragmatists cannot be blamed for.

8 Kratochwil, Of false promises; Wight, Colin, ‘Inside the epistemological cave all bets are off’, Journal of International Relations and Development, 10 (2007), pp. 40–56CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kratochwil, Friedrich, ‘Of communities, gangs, historicity and the problem of Santa Claus: replies to my critics’, Journal of International Relations and Development, 10 (2007), pp. 57–78CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

9 Brown, Chris, ‘Situating Critical Realism’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 35 (2007), pp. 409–16CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

10 At least, one may hope that in the process Marx's second thesis on Feuerbach is uncovered: ‘The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question. Man must prove the truth, i.e., the reality and power, the this-sidedness [Diesseitigkeit] of his thinking, in practice. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking which is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question.’

11 There certainly are voices present in the debate, which could broadly considered to be positivist. As distinctive voices in IR's meta-theoretical debate their positions must not be confused with the neo-positivist consensus of which they, too, are critical. See, for instance, Dessler, David, ‘Constructivism within a positivist social science’, Review of International Studies, 25 (1999), pp. 123–37CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Chernoff, Fred, ‘Conventionalism as an Adequate Basis for Policy-Relevant IR Theory’, European Journal of International Relations, 15 (2009), pp. 157–94CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

12 Kratochwil, Friedrich and Ruggie, John, ‘International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State’, International Organization, 40 (1986), pp. 753–75, at p. 764CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

13 Ibid.

14 Kratochwil and Ruggie, ‘A State of the Art on an Art of the State’, p. 763.

15 Patomäki and Wight, ‘After Postpositivism’, p. 215.

16 Patomäki and Wight, ‘After Postpositivism’, p. 217, referring to Bhaskar.

17 Patomäki and Wight, ‘After Postpositivism’, p. 215.

18 The somewhat exuberant list is meant to indicate my scepticism vis-à-vis such classifications.

19 Wight, Colin, ‘A Manifesto for Scientific Realism in IR: Assuming the Can-Opener Won't Work!’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 35 (2007), pp. 379–98, at. p. 381CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

20 Dux, Günter, Historisch-Genentische Theorie der Kultur. Instabile Welten. Zur prozessualen Logik im kulturellen Wandel (Weilerswist: Velbrück Wissenschaft, 2000), here esp. pp. 405–24Google Scholar; along very similar lines also Luhmann, Niklas, Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft II (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1997), pp. 893–911Google Scholar.

21 Patomäki, After international relations, p. 153.

22 Patomäki, After international relations, p. 157.

23 Patomäki, After international relations, p. 156f.

24 Jürgen Habermas, ‘Kommunikative Rationalität und grenzüberschreitende Politik. Eine Replik’, in Niesen, Peter and Herborth, Benjamin (eds), Anarchie der kommunikativen Freiheit. Jürgen Habermas und die Theorie der internationalen Politik (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2007), pp. 406–59, at p. 417Google Scholar.

25 Habermas, Jürgen, Wahrheit und Rechtfertigung. Philosophische Aufsätze (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp), p. 352Google Scholar.

26 Ibid.

27 One should note, however, that the metaphor of the ivory tower entailed much more positive connotations when it originated in the literary context of French symbolism. The autonomy of fields of cultural production is not inherently a bad thing. See Bourdieu, Pierre, The Rules of Art: Genesis and Structure of the Literary Field (Stanford: Stanford University Press 1992)Google Scholar.

28 Pinch, Trevor, ‘Conflicts of Science Cultures: How to Avoid the Wrong Sort of Conflict over Science’, in Halfmann, Jost and Rohbeck, Johannes (eds), Zwei Kulturen der Wissenschaft revisited (Weilerswist: Velbrück Wissenschaft 2007), pp. 193–212, at p. 210Google Scholar.

29 Kratochwil, ‘Of false promises’.

30 Wight, ‘Inside the epistemological cave’, p. 50.

31 See Kratochwil, Friedrich, ‘Constructing a New Orthodoxy? Wendt's “Social Theory of International Politics” and the Constructivist Challenge’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 29:1 (2000), pp. 73–101CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

32 Tilly, Charles, Durable Inequality (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), p. 3fGoogle Scholar.

33 Teubner, Gunther, Recht als autopoietisches System (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 1989), p. 7Google Scholar.

34 Wendt, Social Theory, p. 91; see also Wendt, Alexander, ‘Causation and Constitution in International Relations’, Review of International Studies, 24 (1998), pp. 101–17, at p. 116CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

35 Obviously, the oddly scholastic question of whether or not there is a world was of no particular concern to any of the patron saints of ‘post-positivism’. It does tend to figure more prominently, however, in feature pages of the quality press and BA-level textbooks. It seems helpful to distinguish sharply between the various theoretical innovations, which have responded to the problem of conceptualising subjectivity in classical structuralism, which defy simplistic paradigmatic classifications, and a vaguely postmodern attitude, which paradoxically objectifies the abolition of objectivity in order to present itself as the (objective?) vanguard position.

36 See Dewey and Bentley, Knowing and the Known.

37 Dewey, John, ‘A Short Catechism Concerning Truth’, The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy and Other Essays (New York: Henry Hold and Company, 1910), pp. 154–68, at p. 158Google Scholar.

38 Dewey, ‘A Short Catechism’, p. 167f.

39 The linkages between pragmatism and modern systems theory remain largely unexplored, even though Luhmann builds on pragmatist idea, and Ch. S. Peirce in particular, throughout his methodological remarks.

40 See esp. Luhmann, Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft, 2nd vol., pp. 893–912.

41 Adorno, Theodor W., Ontologie und Dialektik (1960/61) (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2008), p. 340Google Scholar.