¹ Claude, Inis L. Jr, ‘The Heritage of Quincy Wright’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 14 (Dec. 1970), p. 461CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Whiting, Allen S., ‘In Memoriam: Quincy Wright, 1890-1970-A Symposium’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 14 (Dec. 1970), p. 443CrossRefGoogle Scholar. According to Professor Lepawsky, ‘Wright was the principal architect of the applied and scientific interdiscipline of “international relations”’. Lepawsky, Albert, ‘Concerning Quincy Wright’, in Lepawsky, Albert, Buehrig, Edward H., and Lasswell, Harold D. (eds.), The Search for World Order Studies by Students and Colleagues of Quincy Wright (New York, 1971), p. xviGoogle Scholar.

² Claude, ‘The Heritage of Quincy Wright’, p. 461. See also Whiting, ‘In Memoriam’, p. 444; Ballis, William B., ‘Quincy Wright: An Appreciation’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 14 (Dec. 1970), p. 455CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Abbass, Abdul Majid, ‘The Personal Impact of a Great Teacher’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 14 (Dec. 1970), pp. 467–71CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³ Thompson, Kenneth W., ‘Policy and Theory in Quincy Wright's International Relations’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 14 (Dec. 1970), p. 482CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Claude calls Quincy Wright a ‘dedicated and indefatigable … research scholar’. Claude, ‘Heritage’, p. 461.

⁴ Claude, ‘Heritage’, p. 464.

⁵ James P. Piscatori, ‘Quincy Wright: Law and Peace’, Masters thesis, University of Virginia, 1973, p. 1; Whiting, ‘In Memoriam’, p. 443; Ballis, ‘An Appreciation’, p. 453; Deutsch, Karl W., ‘Quincy Wright's Contribution to the Study of War’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 14 (Dec. 1970), pp. 475–7CrossRefGoogle Scholar. In the letter of nomination for the Nobel Peace Prize, Wright was called ‘the founder of systematic research for peace’. Cited in Whiting, ‘In Memoriam’, p. 445.

⁶ Lepawsky, ‘Concerning Quincy Wright’, p. xii. Cf. Thompson, Kenneth W., Masters of International Thought (Baton Rouge, LA, 1980), p. 201Google Scholar.

⁷ Thompson, ‘Policy and Theory’, p. 482.

⁸ Ibid., p. 479.

⁹ Claude, ‘Heritage’, p. 461.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 462.

¹¹ Karl Deutsch and Carl J. Friedrich formally organized a nominating committee in 1970, including Kenneth Boulding, Ernst B. Haas, Walter Isard, Majid Khadduri, Daniel Katz, Robert E. Lane, Harold D. Lasswell, Albert Lepawski, Anatol Rapoport, Bert E. A. Roling, J. David Singer, Kenneth W. Thompson, and Oscar Schachter. Though the nomination proved unsuccessful, at least one committee member advocated a posthumous award. Whiting, ‘In Memoriam’, p. 446.

¹² Thompson, Masters of International Thought, p. 183. See also Lepawsky, ‘Concerning Quincy Wright’, p. xviii, and Whiting, ‘In Memoriam’, p. 445.

¹³ One bit of anecdotal evidence will perhaps suffice: In a recent ‘job talk’ attended by the author, the presenter (from a very prominent US graduate programme in international relations) conceded that he had not examined any of Quincy Wright's works, even though the presenter's research focused squarely on the causes of wars.

¹⁴ Dougherty, James E. and Pfaltzgraff, Robert L. Jr, Contending Theories of International Relations, 3rd edn (New York, 1990), p. 3Google Scholar. See also Thompson, Kenneth W., ‘The Study of International Politics: A Survey of Trends and Developments’, Review of Politics, 14 (Oct. 1952), pp. 433–43CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Palmer, Norman D., ‘The Study of International Relations in the United States: Perspectives of Half a Century’, International Studies Quarterly, 24 (Sept. 1980), pp. 347CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 353.

¹⁵ See, e.g., Boyle, Francis, World Politics and International Law (Durham, NC, 1985), p. 15Google Scholar; Haggard, Stephan and Simmons, Beth A., ‘Theories of International Regimes’, International Organization, 41 (Summer 1987), p. 3CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Krasner, Stephen, ‘Preface’, in Krasner, Stephen (ed.), International Regimes (Ithaca, NY, 1983), p. viiGoogle Scholar.

¹⁶ For a discussion of Quincy Wright as ‘legalist’, see Thompson, Masters of International Thought, pp. 197-200; and Thompson, ‘Policy and Theory’, pp. 481-3.

¹⁷ Barnett, Michael, ‘The New United Nations Politics of Peace: From Juridical Sovereignty to Empirical Sovereignty’, Global Governance, 1 (1995), p. 79Google Scholar. The realists, of course, were neither uniformly nor categorically dismissive of international law. Hans Morgenthau, for example, believed that international law was important, if of limited influence when political disputes arose. Prominent realist scholarship includes: Carr, E. H., The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939, 2nd edn (New York, 1946), pp. 170–223CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hoffman, Stanley, ‘International Law and the Control of Force’, in Deutsch, Karl and Hoffman, Stanley (eds.), The Relevance of International Law (Cambridge, MA, 1968), p. 21–46Google Scholar; Kennan, George, ‘Diplomacy in the Modern World’, in American Diplomacy, 1900-1950 (Chicago, 1984), pp. 91–103Google Scholar; Morgenthau, Hans J., ‘The Main Problems of International Law’, in Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 6th edn (New York, 1985), pp. 293–327Google Scholar; Morgenthau, , ‘International Law’, in The Decline of Democratic Politics (Chicago, 1962), pp. 282–307Google Scholar; Remarks by the Honorable Acheson, Dean, American Society of International Law Proceedings, 57 (1963), pp. 13–18Google Scholar.

¹⁸ Prominent neorealist critiques of institutionalism include Waltz, Kenneth N., Theory of International Politics (New York, 1979), pp. 115–16Google Scholar; Grieco, Joseph M., ‘Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism’, International Organization, 42 (Summer 1988), pp. 485–507CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Mearsheimer, John, ‘The False Promise of International Institutions’, International Security, 19 (Winter 1994/1995), pp. 1–49CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁹ On ‘sociological institutionalist’ (i.e. ‘reflectivist’) approaches, see Keohane, Robert O., ‘International Institutions: Two Approaches’, International Studies Quarterly, 32 (1988), pp. 379–96CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Hurrell, Andrew, ‘International Society and the Study of Regimes: A Reflective Approach’, in Rittberger, Volker (ed.), Regime Theory and International Relations (Oxford, 1993), pp. 49–72Google Scholar.

²⁰ See, e.g., John King Gamble, ‘The Decade's Emphasis of Public Education in International Law’, 34th ISA Convention, 25 March 1993, p. 21.

²¹ Among those international legal scholars who have secured publication in ‘IR’ journals: Burley, Anne-Marie and Mattli, Walter, ‘Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration’, International Organization, 47 (Winter 1993), pp. 41–76CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Chayes, Abram and Chayes, Antonia H., ‘On Compliance’, International Organization, 47 (Spring 1993), pp. 175–205CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Chayes, Abram and Chayes, Antonia H., ‘From Law Enforcement to Dispute Settlement: A New Approach to Arms Control Verification and Compliance’, International Security, 14 (Spring 1990), pp. 147–64CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²² For a discussion of Wright as ‘institutionalist’, see Kenneth W. Thompson, ‘International Policy in War and Peace: Wright's Contribution’, in Lepawsky et al. (eds.), Search for World Order, p. 439; Thompson, Masters of International Thought, pp. 188-9; and Thompson, ‘Policy and Theory’, pp. 484-5.

²³ See Rochester, J. Martin, ‘The Rise and Fall of International Organization as a Field of Study’, International Organization, 40 (Autumn 1986), pp. 777–813CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Haggard and Simmons, ‘Theories of International Regimes’, pp. 491-517; Kratochwil, Friedrich and Ruggie, John Gerard, ‘A State of the Art on the Art of the State’, International Organization, 40 (Autumn 1986), pp. 753–75CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Keohane, ‘International Institutions’.

²⁴ See Milner, Helen, ‘International Theories of Cooperation among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses’, World Politics, 44 (April 1992), pp. 466–96CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁵ The author is indebted to Inis Claude for this insight.

²⁶ Even in 1970, Kenneth Thompson observed: ‘Wright's theories and his approach have about them an all-inclusive, eclectic quality that significantly distinguishes them from the "hard" theorists. One looks in vain for single-factor analysis in Wright’. Thompson, ‘Policy and Theory’, p. 482.

²⁷ Deutsch, ‘Quincy Wright's Contribution’, p. 476.

²⁸ On IR's tendency toward faddishness, see Strange, Susan, ‘Cave! Hie Dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis’, International Organization, 36 (Spring 1982), p. 481CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁹ See Ferguson, Yale H. and Mansbach, Richard W., The Elusive Quest: Theory and International Politics (Columbia, SC, 1988), p. 194Google Scholar.

³⁰ Thompson, ‘Policy and Theory’, p. 485. Cf. Thompson, Masters of International Thought, p. 189

³¹ Thompson, Masters of International Thought, p. 184; Lepawsky, ‘Concerning Quincy Wright’, p. xiv. Wright's full bibliography exceeds fifty single-spaced typewritten pages. Whiting, ‘In Memoriam’, p. 444.

³² Lepawsky, ‘Concerning Quincy Wright’, p. xv.

³³ Ibid., p. xiv.

³⁴ Thompson, Masters of International Thought, p. 180.

³⁵ Corbett, Percy E., ‘Quincy Wright's Contributio n to International Law’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 14 (Dec. 1970), p. 465CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Ballis, ‘An Appreciation’, p. 454; North, Robert C., ‘Wright on War’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 14 (Dec. 1970), p. 487CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³⁶ Thompson, Masters of International Thought, p. 186.

³⁷ Claude, ‘Heritage’, p. 461.

³⁸ Lepawsky, ‘Concerning Quincy Wright’, p. xv.

³⁹ Fox, William T. R., ‘“The Truth Shall Make You Free”: One Student's Appreciation of Quincy Wright’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 14 (Dec. 1970), p. 451CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴⁰ A second, abbreviated edition was published in 1965.

⁴¹ At various points in his discussion, Wrigh t refers to ‘a program … to eliminate war’, a ‘social plan’, a ‘program of international reform’, and a ‘structure of peace’. Wright, Quincy, A Study of War, vol. II (Chicago, 1942), pp. 1309Google Scholar, 1302, 1304, 1332.

⁴² An Agenda for Peace, 17 June 1992. UNGA 47th sess., Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization. A/47/277, S/241II.

⁴³ The Security Council meeting, the first at the level of Heads of State and Government, concluded on 31 January 1992. See S/23500, statement by the President of the Council, section entitled ‘Peacemaking and peace-keeping’.

⁴⁴ The phrase is Wright's. Study of War, vol. II, p. 1300.

⁴⁵ Ibid., pp. 1299-1352.

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 1299. See also vol. I, ch. ii, sec. 4.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 1304.

⁴⁸ Ibid., pp. 1299-1300. Wright observed that planning for ‘social construction’ was distinct from planning in the engineering, agricultural or medical realms.

⁴⁹ Ibid., pp. 1300-4.

⁵⁰ Ibid., pp. 1304-7.

⁵¹ Ibid., pp. 1307-9.

⁵² Ibid., p. 1304. See also pp. 1333-4.

⁵³ Wright expressed the truisms as follows: ‘(a) We must start from where we are; (b) We must choose the direction in which we want to go; (c) Cost must be counted; and (d) The time element must be appreciated’. Ibid., pp. 1304-6.

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 1307. See also pp. 1333-4.

⁵⁵ The brief definition of ‘point of view’ offered here is mine, not explicitly Professor Wright's. Professor Wright devotes all of his chapter 34 to a discussion of the ‘influence of point of view’. See ibid., pp. 1227-39.

⁵⁶ The military point of view, for example, held as ‘constants’ human attitudes, national policies, and international law. It focused instead on the ‘variable’ of the ‘balance of power’, a state relationship that would typically be stabilized ‘by maintaining the freedom of states to make temporary alliances, to increase armaments, and to threaten intervention as the changing equilibrium require[d]’. The military perspective, therefore, rejected as unacceptable any policies that might interfere with state prerogatives or rapid political manoeuvring. It could not support, for example, ‘permanent alliances and unions, conceptions of aggression, disarmament obligations, systems of collective security’, or ‘economic interdependencies’. Ibid., pp. 1307-8.

⁵⁷ Ibid., pp. 1310-25. Much of Wright's chapter was derived from his earlier article, ‘The Causation and Control of War’, American Sociological Review, III (Aug. 1938), pp. 461ff.

⁵⁸ Ibid., pp. 1311-16.

⁵⁹ Ibid., pp. 1316-18.

⁶⁰ Ibid., pp. 1318-23.

⁶¹ Ibid., pp. 1323-5.

⁶² Wright used the term here in its sociological not its legal sense. Ibid., p. 1311.

⁶³ See, e.g., ibid., pp. 1312, 1314.

⁶⁴ ‘[Walter Lippmann ha s argued] that “a directed society mus t be bellicose and poor … A prosperous and peaceable society must be free”. This does not say that democracies are always prosperous and peaceful. Furthermore, no actual governments are either pure despotisms or pure democracies. Some central direction is essential for all government. If properly qualified, however, there is much truth in the proposition.’ Ibid., pp. 1312-13.

⁶⁵ Given the significant obstacles confronted by efforts to target specific ‘governments’, one must question the feasibility of this recommendation.

⁶⁶ In some respects, Wright's discussion of international feuds is reminiscent of Samuel P. Huntington's ‘Clash of Civilizations’ discussion. See Huntington, , ‘Clash of Civilizations?’, Foreign Affairs, 72 (Summer 1993), pp. 22–49CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶⁷ Emphasis added.

⁶⁸ Wright does not elaborate here on the nature of this threat; however, he cautions in chapter 36: ‘fTJhe diminution of the number of independent political organizations in a political system, resulting in concentrations of political power, may tend toward accentuating political oscillations’. Later, on the same page, he qualifies this warning: ‘On the other hand, a more far-reaching centralization of authority as in an effective federation might, by conscious adjustments, maintain political stability*. Wright, Study of War, p. 1275.

⁶⁹ Wright elaborated: ‘[P]eaceful change in the interest of the dissatisfied great powers and consonant with accepted standards of justice might have proceeded sufficiently rapidly to alleviate aggressive tendencies before they had come to dominate in the policy of those states’. Ibid., p. 1325.

⁷⁰ Using numerous historical illustrations, Wright argued that governments tended ‘naturally’ toward such policies. ‘Statesmen have, when confronted by crises, usually turned the rudder the wrong way if their object was to bring the world to a harbor of political stability. In this sense peace may be considered artificial and war natural’. Ibid., p. 1332.

⁷¹ Ibid., pp. 1326-31.

⁷² Ibid., pp. 1332-44.

⁷³ Ibid., pp. 1334-6.

⁷⁴ Wright stated that ‘the opportunity to make scientific investigations of attitude and opinion should be a first requirement of an effective international organization’. Ibid., p. 1334.

⁷⁵ What Wright meant by ‘solidarity of technology* is not altogether clear. He seems to suggest a future circumstance in which technology is not concentrated in certain geographic areas, but rather is globally distributed.

⁷⁶ Wright, Study of War, pp. 1336-8.

⁷⁷ Ibid., pp. 1338-42.

⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 1342.

⁷⁹ Under a ‘reliable’ system, ‘only claims [for territorial change] which are based on justice as interpreted by international bodies can ever be successfully promoted’. Ibid., p. 1339.

⁸⁰ Wright defined ‘aggression’ here as the ‘resort to armed force by a state when such resort has been duly determined, by a means which that state is bound to accept, to constitute a violation of an obligation’. He cited Harvard Research in International Law, ‘Draft Code on Aggression’, American Journal of International Law, 33 (suppl., 1939), p. 847Google Scholar. See also Wright, Study of War, pp. 891-4. For more on Quincy Wright's views of ‘aggression’, see Falk, Richard A., ‘Quincy Wright: On Legal Tests of Aggressive War’, American Journal of International Law, 66 (July 1972), pp. 560–70CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁸¹ ‘Provisional’ in the sense that no final determination of culpability would be presupposed, not that states would have wide discretion in their response.

⁸² Wright, Study of War, pp. 1340-1. Enumeration added. Wright thought the ‘world-police’ might be granted a monopoly on the control of ‘bombing planes’, weapons whose devastating effects were evident even before Japan's Pearl Harbor attack.

⁸³ Claude, Inis L. Jr, Swords Into Plowshares, 4th edn (New York, 1984), pp. 119Google Scholar, 125.

⁸⁴ Wright, Study of War, pp. 1342-3.

⁸⁵ Other possible sovereign divisions of the world listed by Wright included ‘continental regions’, a ‘union of democracies’, a ‘union of Soviet republics’, and a ‘union of Fascist states’. Ibid., p. 1343.

⁸⁶ Wright cites here Thomas, William I., ‘The Persistence of Primary Group Norms in Present Day Society’, in Park, R. E. and Burgess, E. W. (eds.), Introduction to the Science of Sociology, 2nd edn (Chicago, 1924), p. 489Google Scholar. These ‘wishes’, Wright argued, could be related, respectively, to the aggressive (dominance and independence), affection (sex and society), and adventurous (activity and food) drives. See Wright, Study of War, p. 1344n. and Appendix 39, pp. 1456-65. Wright's discussion here is reminiscent of the Lasswell-McDougal approach to law. On that approach, see Tipson, Frederick S., ‘The Lasswell-McDougal Enterprise: Toward a World Public Order of Human Dignity’, Virginia Journal of International Law, 14 (Spring 1974), pp. 535–85Google Scholar; and Young, Oran R., ‘International Law and Social Science: The Contributions of Myres S. McDougal’, American Journal of International Law, 66 (Jan. 1972), pp. 60–76CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁸⁷ Wright, Study of War, pp. 1344-52.

⁸⁸ Ibid., pp. 1344-5.

⁸⁹ Ibid., pp. 1345-7.

⁹⁰ See Wright, Quincy, ‘Repeal of the Neutrality Act’, American Journal of International Law, 36 (Jan. 1942), p. 22CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Wright refused to define specific behaviours worthy of proscription; nevertheless, he listed some international acts that were potentially as ‘destructive of world order’ as was ‘military aggression’: the arbitrary raising of commercial barriers, the augmentation of military forces, and the dissemination of ideas immediately inciting to disturbances of world peace. Wright cited here Van Dyke, Vernon, ‘The Responsibility of States for International Propaganda’, American Journal of International Law, 34 (Jan. 1940), pp. 58ffCrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Quincy Wright, ‘International Law and Commercial Relations’, Proceedings of the American Society of International Law, 1940, pp. 30ff.

⁹¹ Wright, Study of War, pp. 1347-50.

⁹² Professor Wright submitted: ‘This discussion rests upon the assumption that peace cannot be approached directly but is a by-product of a satisfactory organization of the world’. Ibid., p. 1350.

⁹³ Ibid., pp. 1350-2.

⁹⁴ Wright sounded a second cautionary note in conclusion: whatever structure of peace were eventually to be constructed had to ‘accept the philosophy that institutions [were] to be judged by the degree in which they advance[d] human freedom and welfare’, not ‘the special aims of nation, state, government or race’. Global organization did not have to express a ‘preference for uniformity over variety’. It must, however, ‘assert that whatever group distinctiveness [was] to be prized and augmented’ had to be ‘justified because of its contribution to the progress of humanity as a whole’. Ibid., p. 1352. Emphasis added.

⁹⁵ See Arend, Anthony Clark, ‘The United Nations and the New World Order’, Georgetown Law Journal, 81 (March 1993), pp. 491–533Google Scholar. In 1992, various efforts by the UN to foster peace across the globe appeared destined for success.

⁹⁶ Boutros-Ghali, Agenda for Peace, p. 2.

⁹⁷ The Security Council meeting, the first at the level of Heads of State and Government, concluded on 31 January 1992. See S/23500, statement by the President of the Council, section entitled ‘Peacemaking and peace-keeping’.

⁹⁸ To suggest that the written words of Boutros-Ghali and Quincy Wright bear striking similarities, of course, is not to argue that their personal qualities do so. Indeed, in temperament and approach, the two differ significantly. Professor Kenneth Thompson, ‘Comments: Legacy of Quincy Wright Seminar’, 5 November 1993.

⁹⁹ Agenda for Peace, p. 2. Boutros-Ghali noted, however, that since 1945, 100 major conflicts around the work [had] left some 20 million dead’. Ibid., p. 4.

¹⁰⁰ Hammarskjöld's major exposition of his ‘preventive diplomacy’ concept was made in his 1960 Annual Report to the General Assembly. Claude, Swords Into Plowshares, p. 313. Boutros-Ghali defined ‘preventive diplomacy’ quite differently, however, as ‘action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur’. Agenda for Peace, p. 5. The Secretary-General suggested five dimensions of preventive diplomacy: measures to build confidence; fact-finding; early warning; preventive deployment; and demilitarized zones. Ibid., pp. 7-10.

¹⁰¹ See Arend, Anthony Clark and Beck, Robert J., International Law and the Use of Force: Beyond the UN. Charter Paradigm (London, 1993), pp. 65–7Google Scholar. Boutros-Ghali offered this definition of ‘peace-keeping’: ‘the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or policy personnel and frequently civilians as well’. Agenda for Peace, p. 6.

¹⁰² Agenda for Peace, pp. 6, 16-17.

¹⁰³ Ibid., p. 23. ‘Respect for democratic principles at ail levels of social existence is crucial: in communities, within States and within the community of States’. Ibid., p. 5. See also Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, ‘Democracy: A Newly Recognized Imperative’, Global Governance, 1 (1995), pp. 3–11Google Scholar.

¹⁰⁴ Agenda for Peace, p. 17.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., pp. 22-3.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 2.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 23.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 9.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 18. Boutros-Ghali asserted: ‘Today a new sense exists that they [regional arrangements] have contributions to make’.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., p. 17.

¹¹¹ Ibid., p. 23.

¹² Ibid., p. 23.

¹¹³ Ibid., p. 11.

¹¹⁴ UN Charter, Art. 96.

¹¹⁵ UN Charter, Arts. 36, 37.

¹¹⁶ Agenda for Peace, p. II. Emphasis added.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., p. 10.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., p. 12.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., p. 12.

¹²⁰ Ibid., p. 12. The ‘exhaustion of peaceful remedies’ requirement suggested here by Boutros-Ghali is far from universally accepted by legal scholars, however. Its tendency to undermine collective security will be discussed below.

¹²¹ UN Charter, Arts. 39-51.

¹²² Agenda for Peace, p. 12.

¹²³ Ibid., p. 12.

¹²⁴ Ibid., p. 13. Boutros-Ghali conceded, however, that ‘forces under Article 43 [might] perhaps never be sufficiently large or well enough equipped to deal with a threat from a major army equipped with sophisticated weapons’. Such forces would, however, prove ‘useful in meeting any threat posed by a military force of a lesser order’.

¹²⁵ Ibid., p. 23.

¹²⁶ Wright, Study of Wat, p. 1304.

¹²⁷ See discussion above.

¹²⁸ Agenda for Peace, p. 5.

¹²⁹ Wright, Study of War, p. 1329. Such a ‘policy of pacifist isolationism’, Wright contends, ‘was practiced by most of the states after the crisis of 1936, precipitated by Hitler's invasion of the Rhineland and the League's abandonment of sanctions in the Ethiopia case’.

¹³⁰ Ibid., p. 1331. See also p. 1324.

¹³¹ Agenda for Peace, p. 22.

¹³² Ibid., p. 22.

¹³³ Wright, Study of War, p. 1310.

¹³⁴ Agenda for Peace, p. 4.

¹³⁵ Ibid., p. 2.

¹³⁶ Wright, Study of War, p. 1307.

¹³⁷ Agenda for Peace, p. 2.

¹³⁸ Ibid., p. 22.

¹³⁹ Ibid., p. 24.

¹⁴⁰ Wright, Study of War, p. 1351.

¹⁴¹ Agenda for Peace, p. 10.

¹⁴² Ibid., p. 22.

¹⁴³ Prominent book-length scholarly analyses of the role played by institutions in facilitating international cooperation include Stephen D. Krasner (ed.), International Regimes; Rittberger, Volker (ed.), Regime Theory and International Relations (Oxford, 1993)Google Scholar; Keohane, Robert O., International Institutions and State Power (Boulder, CO, 1989)Google Scholar; Keohane, , After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, 1984)Google Scholar; Young, Oran R., International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources and the Environment (Ithaca, NY, 1989)Google Scholar; Haas, Peter M., Keohane, Robert O., and Levy, Marc C. (eds.), Institutions for the Environment: Sources of Effective International Environmental Protection (Cambridge, MA, 1993)Google Scholar. For a recent, prominent critique of institutionalism, see Mearsheimer, ‘The False Promise of International Institutions’.

¹⁴⁴ On the specific limitations of the UN Charter jus ad bellum, see Arend and Beck, International Law and the Use of Force. On the role of the UN in promoting international peace, see Barnett, Michael N., ‘The United Nations and Global Security: The Norm is Mightier than the Sword’, Ethics and International Affairs, 9 (1995), pp. 37–54CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁴⁵ Such a scholarly association is subject to dispute, however. See, e.g., Wright, Study of War, pp. 839-49; Waltz, Kenneth N., Man, The State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York, 1954), pp. 88–124Google Scholar; and Brown, Seyom, The Causes and Prevention of War, 2nd edn (New York, 1994), pp. 78–80CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁴⁶ For discussions of ‘liberal theory’, of democracy's relationship to international law, and of the emerging ‘Democratic Paradigm’, see Burley, Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda’, American Journal of International Law, 87 (Apr. 1993), pp. 205–39CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Burley, Anne-Marie, ‘Law Among Liberal States: Liberal Internationalism and the Act of State Doctrine’, Columbia Law Review, 92 (Dec. 1992), pp. 1907–96CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Fox, Gregory H., ‘The Right to Political Participation in International Law’, Yale Journal of International Law, 17 (1992), pp. 539–607Google Scholar; Franck, Thomas M., ‘The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance’, American Journal of International Law, 86 (Jan; 1992), pp. 46–91CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Meron, Theodor, ‘Democracy and the Rule of Law’, World Affairs, 153 (Summer 1990), pp. 23–27Google Scholar.

¹⁴⁷ Roth, Brad R., ‘Evaluating Democratic Progress: A Normative Theoretical Perspective’, Ethics and International Affairs, 9 (1995), pp. 55–77CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁴⁸ Because Professor Wright was far less keen than Boutros-Ghali about the idea, I will not address at length here the question of whether the democratization of domestic governments is desirable from the standpoint of fostering international peace. On the basis of substantial empirical evidence, Bruce Russett has argued that ‘with only marginal exceptions, democratic states have not fought each other in the modern era’. This, submits Russett, ‘is perhaps the strongest non-trivial or non-tautological statement that can be made about international relations’. Russett, Bruce, ‘Politics and Alternative Security: Toward a More Democratic, Therefore More Peaceful World’, in Weston, Burns H. (ed.), Alternative Security: Living Without Nuclear Deterrence (Boulder, CO, 1990), pp. 107Google Scholar, 111. Similarly, Anne-Marie Burley has recently contended that the democracy-peace correlation is ‘not spurious, that a causal link exists between reciprocal peaceful behaviour and the internal social, political and economic configuration of states’. Burley, ‘International Law’, p. 226. And even Quincy Wright conceded that ‘constitutional states with geographically and functionally federalized governments under democratic leadership are likely to be most peaceful’. Study of War, pp. 847-8.

¹⁴⁹ See, e.g., Haas, Peter M., ‘Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control’, International Organization, 43 (Summer 1989), pp. 377–403CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Haas, Peter M., ‘Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination’, International Organization, 46 (Winter 1992), pp. 1–35CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Haas, Peter M., ‘Banning Chlorofluorocarbons: Epistemic Community Efforts to Protect Stratospheric Ozone’, International Organization, 46 (Winter 1992), pp. 187–224CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Adler, Emanuel and Haas, Peter M., ‘Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World Order, and the Creation of a Reflective Research Program’, International Organization, 46 (Winter 1992), pp. 376–90CrossRefGoogle Scholar. It is unclear, however, whether an epistemic community for the international conflict management realm exists, or ever will exist.

¹⁵⁰ Claude, Swords Into Plowshares, p. 125.

¹⁵¹ See, e.g., Christoph Bertram, ‘Irreconcilable Partners: The U.N. and NATO at Cross Purposes in the Balkans’, Washington Post, 2 November 1994, p. A23.

¹⁵² Agenda for Peace, p. 17.

¹⁵³ See, e.g., Arend, ‘United Nations and New World Order’, pp. 515-20. Indeed, Boutros-Ghali acknowledged in 1994 the ‘complex’ and ‘politically sensitive’ nature of co-ordinating NATO activities with those of the United Nations. See Julia Preston, ‘U.N. Chief Recommends Pullout of Bosnia Peacekeeping Troops’, Washington Post, 26 July 1994, p. A12.

¹⁵⁴ On UN decision-making generally, see Riggs, Robert E. and Piano, Jack C., The United Nations: International Organization and World Politics, 2nd edn (Belmont, CA, 1994), pp. 54–9Google Scholar; and Baehr, Peter R. and Gordenker, Leon, The United Nations in the 1990s (New York: 1992), pp. 44–62CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁵⁵ Claude, Swords Into Plowshares, p. 126.

¹⁵⁶ Riggs and Piano, United Nations, 342-6; Baehr and Gordenker, United Nations in the 1990s, p. 47; ‘UN. Makes Room for Andorra’, New York Times, 29 July 1993, p. 15; and ‘Palau Becomes 185th U.N. Member’, Chicago Tribune, 15 December 1994, p. 1.

¹⁵⁷ See generally Franck, Thomas M., Nation Against Nation, (Oxford, 1985)Google Scholar.

¹⁵⁸ Claude, Swords Into Plowshares, p. 122.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 122; Riggs and Piano, United Nations, p. 299; Franck, Nation Against Nation, pp. 246-69. A recent example of the extent of American influence in the UN was the General Assembly's July 1994 agreement, ‘under prodding from the U.S. Congress’, to establish a high-level inspector's position to investigate its own bureaucracy's inefficiency and fraud. See Julia Preston, ‘U.N. to Establish Inspector's Post to Investigate Waste and Fraud’, Washington Post, 17 July 1994, p. A25. Preston notes that ‘the crisp work by the usually ponderous General Assembly shows that the United States-the largest contributor to U.N. budgets-still can effectively wield its financial clout’.

¹⁶⁰ On the problems and prospects of the contemporary state system's reform or replacement, see Bull, Hedley, The Anarchical Society (New York, 1977)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁶¹ One may, of course, disagree over any assessment of international institutional ‘success’. The Korean and Kuwaiti cases, for example, have been interpreted as merely examples of the United States exploiting the UN to serve American geopolitical and economic interests. For a quantitative assessment of the UNCrecord, see Haas, Ernst B., ‘The Collective Management of International Conflict, 1945-1984’, in The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security, United Nations Institute for Training and Research (Dordrecht, 1987)Google Scholar. See also idem, ‘Regime Decay: Conflict Management and International Organization’, International Organization, 37 (1983), pp. 189ffCrossRefGoogle Scholar. For a discussion of the difficulties of confirming the success of efforts to promote peace, see Aron, Raymond, Peace and War, tr., Howard, R. and Fox, A. B. (Garden City, NY, 1966), pp. 116Google Scholar,580.

¹⁶² See generally Riggs and Piano, United Nations, pp. 131-58, 295-6. On the UN's role in the Iran-Iraq War, see Arend, Anthony Clark, ‘The Role of the United Nations in the Iran-Iraq War’, in Joyner, Christopher C. (ed.), The Persian Gulf War (Westport, CT, 1990), pp. 191–208Google Scholar. On the Cambodia case, see, e.g.,’ “Big Five” Agree on U.N. Role in Cambodia’, UN. Chronicle, June 1990, p. 18.

¹⁶³ Agenda for Peace, p. 23.

¹⁶⁴ Though Wright and Boutros-Ghali proposed a wide variety of institutional prescriptions, I will focus here only on these two broad (and arguably the most significant) ones: collective security and peaceful settlement. On the broader problems posed by the UN Charter jus ad bellum, see Arend and Beck, International Law and the Use of Force, pp. 34-45. On the difficulties of achieving a competent, impartial and neutral Secretariat, see Franck, Nation Against Nation, pp. 94-116; and Riggs and Piano, United Nations, pp. 77-97. On the problems confronted by the ICJ, see Riggs and Piano, United Nations, pp. 138-142.

¹⁶⁵ Because each of the five permanent members of the Security Council possesses veto power, the UN system is one of ‘limited collective security’. Arend and Beck, International Law and the Use of Force, pp. 51-2.

¹⁶⁶ Recently, in Somalia, the UN has also responded to the forcible actions of a given armed political faction against already-deployed UN troops. This collective coercion action lies beyond the ambit of traditional notions of collective security.

¹⁶⁷ Arend, ‘The United Nations and the New World Order’, p. 504. On the tension in the UN structure between neutralism and partisanship, see Arend, ‘United Nations and New World Order’, pp. 503-7.

¹⁶⁸ Wright consistently supported the UN international peace and security mechanisms. Before their establishment in 1945, his A Study of War advocated the creation of international mechanisms essentially like those the UN would feature. In one of Wright's last articles, he concluded that ‘the foundations for a universal international system are to be found in … commitment of peoples and governments to the international system established by the Charter’. Cited in Ballis, ‘An Appreciation’, p. 454.

¹⁶⁹ On the question of the proper role for the Secretary-General in use-of-force matters, see Picco, Giandomenico, ‘The U.N. and the Use of Force: Leave the Secretary General Out of It’, Foreign Affairs, 73 (Sep./Oct. 1994), pp. 14–18CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁷⁰ Claude, ‘Moral Dilemmas in International Relations’, p. 6.

¹⁷¹ On this case, see Coll, Alberto R. and Arend, Anthony C., The Falklands War: Lessons for Strategy, Diplomacy and International Law (Boston, MA, 1985)Google Scholar.

¹⁷² The unsatisfactory situation in Iraq, moreover, suggests how broadly UN collective military action objectives may have to be drawn, if its ultimate political objectives are to be realized.

¹⁷³ Claude, ‘Moral Dilemmas’, p. 9.

¹⁷⁴ Claude, Swords Into Plowshares, pp. 164, 175-81; Thomas M. Franck, ‘The Security Council and “Threats to the Peace”: Some Remarks on Remarkable Recent Developments’, undated paper provided to author, pp. 32-8.

¹⁷⁵ See Gowlland-Debbas, Vera, ‘The Relationship between the International Court of Justice and the Security Council in Light of the Lockerbie Case’, American Journal of International Law, 88 (Oct. 1994), pp. 643–77CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kennedy, Robert F., ‘Libya v. United States: The International Court of Justice and the Power of Judicial Review’, Virginia Journal of International Law, 33 (Summer 1993), pp. 899–925Google Scholar; and Franck, ‘Security Council’, pp. 32-8.

¹⁷⁶ Perhaps one example shall suffice: an estimated 200,000 people perished in unfathomably brutal tribal warfare in Rwanda, and the UN took only the most modest steps to end the slaughter. If ever a situation demanded prompt international response, this would seem to have been it.

¹⁷⁷ Huntington, ‘Clash of Civilizations?’, and Bozeman, Adda B., The Future of Law in a Multicultural World (Princeton, 1971)Google Scholar.

¹⁷⁸ Claude, ‘Heritage’, p. 462.