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What the argument from evil should, but cannot, be

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 September 2018

JAMES HENRY COLLIN Open the ORCID record for JAMES HENRY COLLIN [Opens in a new window]
JAMES HENRY COLLIN*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Edinburgh, Dugald Stewart Building, 3 Charles Street, Edinburgh, EH8 9AD, UK
*
e-mail: james.collin@ed.ac.uk
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Abstract

Michael Tooley has developed a sophisticated evidential version of the argument from evil that aims to circumvent sceptical theist responses. Evidential arguments from evil depend on the plausibility of inductive inferences from premises about our inability to see morally sufficient reasons for God to permit evils to conclusions about there being no morally sufficient reasons for God to permit evils. Tooley's defence of this inductive step depends on the idea that the existence of unknown rightmaking properties is no more likely, a priori, than the existence of unknown wrongmaking properties. I argue that Tooley's argument begs the question against the theist, and, in doing so, commits an analogue of the base rate fallacy. I conclude with some reflections on what a successful argument from evil would have to establish.

Type
Original Article
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 56 , Issue 3 , September 2020 , pp. 333 - 348
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018

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