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A defence of the no-minimum response to the problem of evil

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 July 2010

ANDREW CULLISON
ANDREW CULLISON*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, State University of New York Fredonia, Fredonia, NY 14063
*
e-mail: cullison@fredonia.edu
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Abstract

I defend Peter van Inwagen's no-minimum response to the problem of evil from a recent objection raised by Jeff Jordan.

Type
Articles
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 47 , Issue 1 , March 2011 , pp. 121 - 123
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

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References

Notes

1. Assumptions like the standard claim are used to motivate evidential versions of the problem of evil. The most well-known example comes from Rowe, William ‘The problem of evil and some varieties of atheism’, American Philosophical Quarterly, 16 (1979), 335–341Google Scholar.

2. van Inwagen, Peter ‘The problem of evil, the problem of air, and the problem of silence’, Philosophical Perspectives, 5 (1991), 135–165CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also idem ‘The magnitude, duration, and distribution of evil: a theodicy’, Philosophical Topics, 16 (1988), 161–167CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

3. Jordan, Jeff ‘Evil and van Inwagen’, Faith and Philosophy, 20 (2003), 236–239CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

4. Ibid., 237.

5. Ibid., 238.

6. Ibid.