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Forms of belief-less religion: why non-doxasticism makes fictionalism redundant for the pro-religious agnostic

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 March 2019

CARL-JOHAN PALMQVIST
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Lund, Box 192, 221 00, Lund, Sweden
Corresponding

Abstract

Which form of belief-less religion should the agnostic prefer: non-doxasticism which substitutes belief with some weaker cognitive attitude, or fictionalism which standardly treats religious life as a game of make-believe? I argue for non-doxasticism due to its ability to handle the problems associated with fictionalism. However, in an argument for exclusive availability I go further, denying even that the agnostic has a choice: if she has a religious pro-attitude only non-doxasticism is rationally available to her. I also address and reject a recent argument by Finlay Malcolm to the effect that non-doxasticism cannot be properly distinguished from fictionalism.

Type
Original Article
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019

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