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Quel est le niveau optimal des allocations de chômage dans les modèles de négociations salariales?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 August 2016

Etienne Lehmann
Etienne Lehmann*
Affiliation:
MAD, Université de Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne
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Résumé

Cet article propose un processus de détermination explicite des allocations de chômage dans un modèle dynamique de négociations salariales. Nous supposons que celles-ci sont déterminées au niveau centralisé en prenant en compte leur impact sur les salaires et sur le taux de chômage.

Nous comparons alors le niveau optimal des allocations de chômage du point de vue des salariés, des chômeurs, du point de vue utilitariste et du point de vue des entrepreneurs. Nous montrons que le niveau optimal des allocations de chômage est plus élevé pour les chômeurs que pour les salariés. Enfin, les entrepreneurs ont intérêt à ce qu'il n'y ait pas de système d'indemnisation du chômage.

Summary

Summary

This article deals with the determination of unemployment benefits in a dynamic wage bargaining model. We assume unemployment benefits are set at the central level, taken into account their influence on wages and on the unemployment rate.

We then compare the levels of unemployment benefits which maximize the welfare of a currently employed workers, of a currently unemployed workers, of the utilitarian sum of welfare of every workers, and of entrepreneurs. We show that unemployed workers want higher unemployment benefits than employed workers, who want a higher replacement ratio than the utilitarian one. At last, we show that entrepreneurs are better of without an unemployment benefits system.

Keywords

J50J51J65J50J51J65
Type
Research Article
Information
Recherches Économiques de Louvain/ Louvain Economic Review , Volume 63 , Issue 4 , 1997 , pp. 389 - 419
Copyright
Copyright © Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de recherches économiques et sociales 1997 

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Footnotes

(*)

Sans engager leur responsabilité, je tiens à remercier, Pierre Cahuc, Manon Domingues Dos Santos, Emmanuelle Taugourdeau, Quentin Wibaut et André Zylberberg ainsi que deux rapporteurs anonymes de la revue pour leurs relectures attentives.

References

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