Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-pftt2 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-05-08T22:20:06.124Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Efficient Structure of Provision for Emergency Public Services

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 August 2016

Elena Inarra ,
Ana Mauleon  and
Vincent Vannetelbosch
Elena Inarra
Affiliation:
Department of Economic Analysis, Basque Country University
Ana Mauleon
Affiliation:
Department of Economic Analysis, Basque Country University
Vincent Vannetelbosch
Affiliation:
Institute of Public Economics, Basque Country University
Get access

Summary

We consider an economy in which a central government has to decide on the provision and location of an emergency public service the quality of which diminishes with distance. The emergency service has to attend a group of municipalities geographically located in a star-tree-graph. We derive the optimal location and provision, as well as the Lindahl prices for the emergency service. Also, we determine the minimum quality of service that makes efficient the existence of a unique provider for the whole economy. Conversely, given any level of quality of service we identify the stable and efficient structure of provision.

Nous considérons une économie au sein de laquelle un gouvernement central décide l’approvisionnement et la location d’un service public de secours (pompiers, ambulance... ) dont la qualité du service diminue avec la distance. Le service de secours dessert un ensemble de municipalités géographiquement localisées dans un graphe en forme d’étoile. Nous dérivons l’approvisionnement et la location optimal, ainsi que les prix de Lindahl pour le service en question. Ensuite, nous déterminons la qualité minimale du service qui garantit l’efficacité d’un unique centre de secours desservant l’économie entière. Réciproquement, pour chaque niveau de qualité du service, nous identifions la structure d’approvisionnement stable et efficace.

Keywords

C71H41R1C71H41R1
Type
Research Article
Information
Recherches Économiques de Louvain/ Louvain Economic Review , Volume 65 , Issue 1 , 1999 , pp. 47 - 62
Copyright
Copyright © Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de recherches économiques et sociales 1999 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

(*)

We wish to thank two anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions. This paper has been presented at the University of Istambul, University Autonoma de Barcelona, XI Jornadas de Economía Industrial (Madrid). This research has been supported by: UPV 035.321-HB146/96, DGICYT PB94-1372. The research of Vincent Vannetelbosch has been made possible by a fellowship of the Basque Country government.

References

Ahlbrandt, R.S. [1973], Efficiency in the provision of fire services, Public Choice, 16, pp. 1–15.Google Scholar
Aumann, R.J. and Drèze, J.H. [1974], Cooperative games with coalition structures, International Journal of Game Theory 3, pp. 217–237.Google Scholar
Brueckner, J.K. [1981], Congested public goods: The case of fire protection, Journal of Public Economics, 15, pp. 45–58.Google Scholar
Demange, G. [1994], Intermediate preferences and stable coalition structures, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 23 pp. 45–58.Google Scholar
Duncombe, W.D. [1992], Costs and factors substitution in the provision of local fire services, Review of Economics and Statistics, 74, pp. 180–184.Google Scholar
Duncombe, W.D. and Yinger, J. [1993], An analysis of returns to scale in public production with an application to fire protection, Journal of Public Economics, 52, pp. 49–72.Google Scholar
Gallastegui, M.C., Grafe, F. and Inarra, E. [1997], Congestion effects in a public good economy, Journal of Economics, 66, pp. 189–204.Google Scholar
Granot, D. [1987], The role of cost allocation in locational models, Operations Research 35, pp. 234–248.Google Scholar
Grafe, F., Inarra, E. and MAuleon, A. [1998], An algorithm for computing the stable coalition structures in tree-graph communications games, Discussion Paper 98.05, Department of Economic Analysis, Basque Country University.Google Scholar
Lea, A.C. [1983], Theory of public and impure goods, in Thisse, J.F. and Zoller, H.G. (eds.), Locational analysis of public facilities, North-Holland (Amsterdam), pp. 263–300.Google Scholar
Myerson, R. [1977], Graphs and cooperation in games, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2, pp. 225–229.Google Scholar
Nystuen, J. and Dacey, M. [1961], A graph theory interpretation of nodal regions, in Berry, B.J.L. and Marble, D.F. (eds.), Spatial analysis: a reader in statistical geography, pp. 407–418.Google Scholar
Owen, G. [1995], Game theory, Academic Press, New York (Third edition).Google Scholar
Shapley, L.S. [1971], Cores and convex games, International Journal of Game Theory, 1, pp. 11–26.Google Scholar