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What Should We Expect of a Theory of Explanation?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2022

Barbara V. E. Klein
Barbara V. E. Klein*
Affiliation:
Yale University
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Extract

Few topics in the philosophy of science have received as much discussion as the topic of explanation. Yet as Hanna's (1979, pp. 291-316) survey of recent research on scientific explanation makes abundantly clear, the field is riddled with competing “paradigms”, “models”, and “formulas” with little sign of any consensus.

It is useful in this sort of situation to engage in metatheoretic ascent. What do we or ought we to expect of a theory of explanation? Unless some measure of agreement can be reached about that question, how can we expect agreement (or even rationally adjudicable disagreement) on the adequacy of particular candidate theories? The purpose of this paper is to sketch a meta-theoretic characterization of what: a theory of explanation ought to be like. The view I will put forth is surely not the only one, but it is a view which I believe to be implicit in the work of a number of influential writers on the subject, including Hempel (1965).

Type
Part XI. Explanation
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1980 , Issue 1: Volume One: Contributed Papers 1980 , 1980 , pp. 318 - 328
Copyright
Copyright © 1980 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

1

I am grateful to Scott Soames and Jeffrey Poland for comments on an earlier version of this paper.

References

Bromberger, S. (1962). “An Approach to Explanation.” In Analytical Philosophy. Edited by Butler, R. J.. Oxford, England: Basil Blackwell. Pages 72–105.Google Scholar
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Hanna, Joseph F. (1979). “An Interpretive Survey of Recent Research on Scientific Explanation.” In Current Research in Philosophy of Science. Edited by Asquith, P. D. and Kyburg, H. E. Jr., East Lansing, Michigan: Philosophy of Science Association. Pages 291–316.Google Scholar
Hempel, C. G. (1965). Aspects of Scientific Explanation. New York: The Free Press.Google Scholar
Hempel, C. G. and Oppenheim, P. (1948). “Studies in the Logic of Explanation.” Philosophy of Science 15: 135–75. (As Reprinted in Hempel (1965), pp. 245-295.).CrossRefGoogle Scholar