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Scientific Problems: Three Empiricist Models

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2022

Thomas Nickles
Thomas Nickles*
Affiliation:
University of Nevada, Reno
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Extract

One component of a viable account of scientific inquiry is a defensible conception of scientific problems, i.e., a conception which meets logical demands and which also fits or explains basic “data” arising from the history of that inquiry, including an account of how problems arise. In this paper I shall argue that three standard empiricist models of problems—essentially the logical positivist and Popperian views—satisfy neither the historical requirements nor even the logical conditions (except, weakly, in the case of Popper). These failures are instructive, however. They represent steps toward the solution of the “problem” problem—the problem of developing a model of problems rich enough to account for the data. In the weakest sense (which is all I need), ‘accounting for’ a datum means explaining how that aspect of scientific inquiry is possible. I shall not have space here to consider promising recent work on problems by Laudan (1977) and others.

Type
Part I. Scientific Problems and Research Traditions
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1980 , Issue 1: Volume One: Contributed Papers 1980 , 1980 , pp. 2 - 19
Copyright
Copyright © 1980 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

1

I am indebted to the National Science Foundation (Grant SOC-79O7078) for research support. A longer version of this paper was read at University of Nevada, Las Vegas.

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