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Scientific Explanation: From Covering Law to Covering Theory

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2022

Fritz Rohrlich
Fritz Rohrlich*
Affiliation:
Syracuse University
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Extract

The premise of the present paper is the primacy of understanding over explanation. The question “is the act of explaining a goal in itself, or is it a means to an end?” is here answered by “explaining is a pragmatic concept and serves the purpose of responding credibly to a request for understanding.” Explaining is secondary, understanding is primary.

Given this view of scientific explanation, one is faced with the received view and the recent literature based on it. Models of explanation cast into the covering law format do not necessarily ensure understanding, nor do they necessarily provide sufficient information for credibility.

After explicating this dissatisfaction (Section 2) I shall first clarify what I mean by scientific theory, law, and model (Section 3) since these concepts are crucial for the covering theory model proposed in Section 4.

Type
Part II. Explanation, Induction, and Linguistic Representation
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1994 , Issue 1: Volume One: Contributed Papers 1994 , 1994 , pp. 69 - 77
Copyright
Copyright © 1994 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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