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Realism and the Anthropocentrics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2022

James Robert Brown
James Robert Brown*
Affiliation:
University of Toronto
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Extract

It always seems to me extreme rashness on the part of some when they want to make human abilities the measure of what nature can do. On the contrary, there is not a single effect in nature, even the least that exists, such that the most ingenious theorist can arrive at a complete understanding of it. —Galileo

Most anthropocentrics are realists. By this I simply mean that most who are anthropocentrics do not realise it, and that when they are convinced of the fact they will abandon their anthropocentric beliefs and adopt some other view. So, for instance, when we are convinced that God did not make us in his image but rather, the contrary, we become outright atheists or at least radically change our theology. The would be realist William Newton-Smith, as we shall see, is such an anthropocentric, and merely pointing this out should be adequate for undermining his view.

Type
Part VII. Realism and Empiricism
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1984 , Issue 1: Volume One: Contributed Papers 1984 , 1984 , pp. 202 - 210
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1984

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References

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