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On the Reality of Chance

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 January 2023

John M. Vickers
John M. Vickers*
Affiliation:
Claremont Graduate School
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Extract

In this paper I consider the question of the reality of chance. This is not what divides contemporary probabilists into the objective and subjective schools. That division is accomplished by the question whether there are objective grounds for the correctness of probability judgments. The subjectivists say that there need not be such grounds, and that probability judgments thus need not be empirically meaningful in the verificationist sense, or perhaps that they are not judgments at all, but rather expressions of attitude. (See [11], pp. 156-198). The objectivists say that the truth conditions for probability judgments are such as the frequencies of traits in populations or the existence of propensities. Objectivists and subjectivists are, however, agreed that there are no objective chances. (See [2], pp. 141, 142; and [12], §16).

There is a Humean argument against the reality of chance which depends mainly upon the premise that we have no experience of it.

Type
Part XIII. Conditionals
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1978 , Issue 2: Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers 1978 , 1978 , pp. 563 - 578
Copyright
Copyright © 1981 Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

1

It is a pleasure to acknowledge the careful and helpful advice and criticism of Gordon Brittan.

References

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