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On Defending the Covering-Law “Model”

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2022

Laird Addis
Laird Addis*
Affiliation:
University of Iowa
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Extract

Hempel in Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays tells us that “all scientific explanation involves, explicitly or by implication, a subsumption of its subject matter under general regularities; that it seeks to provide a systematic understanding of empirical phenomena by showing that they fit into a nomic nexus.” This I take to be an informal statement of his covering-law, “model” of scientific explanation. In defense of his “model” against apparent examples of scientific explanations which do not fit it, Hempel's almost instinctive reaction has been to patch them up in some way so that they do conform. This, I believe, is the wrong way to defend the covering-law “model”. In the three parts of this brief essay I shall do the following: (1) show that Hempel's attempt to patch up a certain version of so-called “rational” explanation does not succeed of its purpose, (2) generalize that result with respect to all dispositional explanations, and (3) reflect momentarily on philosophic method and another way to defend the covering-law “model”.

Type
Contributed Papers: Session III
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1974 , 1974 , pp. 361 - 368
Copyright
Copyright © 1976 by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Holland

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References

Notes

1 Hempel, Carl G., Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays, The Free Press, New York, 1965, p. 488.Google Scholar

2 Dray, William, Laws and Explanation in History, Oxford University Press, London, 1957, p. 118.Google Scholar

3 Hempel, Ibid., p. 470. This is not a precise quote insofar as Hempel does not write the conclusion immediately following the premises.

4 Ibid., p. 471.

5 Ibid., p. 471, my emphases.

6 Ibid., pp. 457-463. The essential premise of Hempel's argument is that “multi-track” dispositions such as being magnetic cannot be analyzed wholly into conjunctions of “single-track” dispositions. If that is so then it is an empirical and not a definitional matter what the possessor of a given multi-track disposition would do in any given situation. Rationality, of course, is a multi-track disposition. I believe the essential premise to be false.

7 Ibid., pp. 488-489, Hempel's emphasis.

8 Ibid., p. 489.

9 Ibid., pp. 424-425.

10 Ibid., p. 425.