Hostname: page-component-77c89778f8-vsgnj Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-23T02:33:41.742Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Observationality: Quine and the Epistemological Nihilists

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2022

P. William Bechtel  and
Eric Stiffler
P. William Bechtel
Affiliation:
Northern Kentucky University
Eric Stiffler
Affiliation:
Western Illinois University
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

For several years now Quine has been proclaiming a solution to problems concerning observation sentences and evidence: “The dislodging of epistemology from its old status of first philosophy has loosed a wave … of epistemological nihilism. This mood is reflected somewhat in the recent tendency of Polanyi, Kuhn, and the late Russell Hanson to belittle the role of evidence and to accentuate cultural relativism …. It is ironical that philosophers, finding “the old epistemology untenable as a whole, should react by repudiating a part which has only now [with Quine's account of observation sentences] moved into clear focus.” (pp. 87-88). Attacks on the notion of observationality by the critics of positivism have been : viewed by many (for example Scheffler, Chapter 1) as seriously undermining the objectivity of science. Quine's claim to have solved the problems, therefore, deserves careful consideration and evaluation.

Type
Part III. Observation and Theory
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1978 , Issue 1: Volume One: Contributed Papers 1978 , 1978 , pp. 93 - 108
Copyright
Copyright © 1978 by the Philosophy of Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

1

We dedicate this paper to the late Donald J. Lipkind, our close friend and fellow graduate student at the University of Chicago.

References

Achinstein, Peter. Concepts of Science: A Philosophical Analysis. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1958.Google Scholar
Carnap, R. “The Methodological Character of Theoretical Concepts.” In The Foundations of Science and The Concepts of Psychology and Psychoanalysis. (Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science Vol. 1.) Edited by Feigl, H. and Scriven, M. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1956. Pages 33–76.Google Scholar
Carnap, R. Philosophical Foundations of Physics. New York: Basic Books, 1966.Google Scholar
Carnap, R. “Testability and Meaning.” Philosophy of Science 3 (1936): 420–468 and 4 (1937): 1-40, (As reprinted in Feigl, H. and May Brodbeck (eds.). Readings in the Philosophy of Science. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1953. Pages 47-92).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Feyerabend, P. “Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge.” An Analysis of Theories and Methods of Physics and Psychology (Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume IV). Edited by Radner, Michael and Winokur, Stephen. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1970. Pages 17–130.Google Scholar
Feyerabend, P. “Problems of Empiricism.” In Beyond the Edge of Certainty (University of Pittsburgh Series in the Philosophy of Science, Volume 2). Edited by Colodny, Robert G.. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1965. Pages 145–260.Google Scholar
Hanson, N.R. Patterns of Discovery. New York and London: Cambridge University Press, 1958.Google Scholar
Hanson, N.R. Perception and Discovery. (ed.) Humphreys, Willard C.. San Francisco: Freeman, Cooper, and Company, 1969.Google Scholar
Hesse, M. “Is There an Independent Observation Language.” In The Nature and Function of Scientific Theories. (University of Pittsburgh Series in the Philosophy of Science, Volume 4). Edited by Colodny, R. Pittsburgh: The University of Pittsburgh Press, 1970. Pages 35–105.Google Scholar
Kuhn, T. “Second Thoughts on Paradigms.” In The Structure of Scientific Theories. Edited by Suppe, Frederick. Urbana: The University of Illinois Press, 1974. Pages 459–482.Google Scholar
Kuhn, T. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 2nd ed. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970.Google Scholar
Ostien, Philip A. “Observationality and the Comparability of Theories.” In PSA 1974. (Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science Vol. XXXII.) Edited by Cohen, Robert S., Hooker, C.A., Michalos, A.C., and Van Evra, J.W.. Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1976. Pages 271–289.Google Scholar
Quine, W.V. “Comment on Davidson.” Synthese 27 (1964): 325-329.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Quine, W.V. “On Empirically Equivalent Systems of the World.” Erkenntnis 9 (1975): 313-328.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Quine, W.V. “Epistemology Naturalized.” In Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. New York: Columbia University Press, 1969. Pages 69–90CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Quine, W.V. “Grades of Theoreticity.” In Experience and Theory. Edited by Foster, L. and Swanson, J.W.. Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1970. Pages 1–17.Google Scholar
Quine, W.V. “Reply to Hintikka.” In Words and Objections: Essays on the Work of W.V. Quine. Edited by Davidson, D. and Hintikka, J. Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1969. Pages 312–315.Google Scholar
Quine, W.V. The Roots of Reference. LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court Publishing Co., 1974.Google Scholar
Quine, W.V. “Two Dogmas of Empiricism.” In From a Logical Point of View: Nine Logico-Philosophical Essays. 2nd ed. rev. New York and Evanston: Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc., 1963. Pages 20–46.Google Scholar
Quine, W.V. Word and Object. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1960.Google Scholar
Scheffler, Israel. Science and Subjectivity. New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1967.Google Scholar
Siegel, Judith. “Logic Without Mentalism: A Study of Quine's Views.” Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation: The University of Chicago, 1970. Xerox University Microfilm Number unavailable.Google Scholar
Suppe, Frederick. “The Search for Philosophical Understanding of Scientific Theories.” In The Structure of Scientific Theories. Edited by Suppe, Frederick. Urbana: The University of Illinois Press, 1974. Pages 3–241.Google Scholar
Wimsatt, William C. “Reductionism, Levels of Organization, and the Mind-Body Problem.” In Consciousness and the Brain: A Scientific and Philosophical Inquiry. Edited by Globus, Gordon, Maxwell, Grover, and Savodnik, Irwin. New York: Plenum Press, 1976, Pages 205–267.CrossRefGoogle Scholar