Hostname: page-component-77c89778f8-rkxrd Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-23T19:55:55.618Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Mackie's Singular Causality and Linked Overdetermination

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2022

Robert H. Ennis
Robert H. Ennis*
Affiliation:
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

In The Cement of the Universe J. L. Mackie offered—with supplementation—a necessary-condition analysis of singular causal claims: “It seems that if any X is both necessary in the circumstances for and causally prior to Y, we shall say that X caused Y; also, wherever we are prepared to say that X caused Y we are prepared to say that X was necessary in the circumstances for and causally prior to Y” (p. 51). As Mackie interprets ‘necessary’, this is a counter-factual analysis.

Although there are difficulties with treating necessity (supplemented with the indicated qualifications) as sufficient for our being justified in saying that X caused Y (argued by Berofsky 1977 and Earman 1976, among others), I want to challenge the second half of the analysis, because refuting it seems to shake more deeply my sympathies for necessary-condition analyses.

Type
Part II. Causation
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1982 , Issue 1: Volume One: Contributed Papers 1982 , 1982 , pp. 55 - 64
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1982

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

1

For suggestions and comments I am indebted to David Bantz, John Barker, John Canfield, Nancy Cartwright, Jaegwon Kim, Adele Laslie, John Mackie, Robert Monk, Stephen Norris, Shirley Pendlebury, Denis Phillips, Shekhar Pradhan, and Stephen Wagner. I regret that Mr. Mackie did not have the opportunity to see this version.

References

Berofsky, B. (1977). “J.L. Mackie: The Cement of the Universe.” The Journal of Philosophy 74: 103–118.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Beauchamp, T.L. and Rosenberg, A. (1977). “J.L. Mackie, The Cement of the Universe.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7: 371—404.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brand, M. (1977). “Identity Conditions for Events.” American Philosophical Quarterly 14: 329–337.Google Scholar
Bunzl, M. (1980). “Causal Preemption and Counterfactuals.” Philosophical Studies 37: 115–124.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Davidson, D. (1967). “Causal Relations.” The Journal of Philosophy 64: 691–703.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Davidson, D. (1969). “The Individuation of Events.” In Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel. Edited by Rescher, N., et al. Dordrecht: Reidel. Pages 216–234.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Davis, W. (1980). “Swain's Counterfactual Analysis of Causation.” Philosophical Studies 38: 169–176.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Earman, J. (1976). “J.L. Mackie, The Cement of the Universe.” The Philosophical Review 85: 390–394.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hart, H.L.A. and Honoré, A.M. (1959). Causation in the Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Lewis, D. (1973). “Causation.” The Journal of Philosophy 70: 556–567.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lewis, D. (1979). “Counterfactual Dependence and Time's Arrow.” Noûs 13: 455–476.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mackie, J.L. (1974). The Cement of the Universe. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Scriven, M. (1964). “Critical Study: The Structure of Science.” The Review of Metaphysics 17: 403–424.Google Scholar
Scriven, M. (1966). “Causes, Connections and Conditions in History.” In Philosophical Analysis and History. Edited by Dray, W.H.. New York: Harper & Row. Pages 238–264.Google Scholar