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Implications of the Cognitive Sciences for the Philosophy of Science

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 January 2023

Ronald N. Giere
Ronald N. Giere*
Affiliation:
University of Minnesota
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Extract

Does recent work in the cognitive sciences have any implications for theories or methods employed within the philosophy of science itself? The answer to this question depends first on one’s conception of the philosophy of science and then on the nature of work being done in the various different fields comprising the cognitive sciences. For example, one might think of the philosophy of science as being an autonomous discipline that is both logically and epistemologically prior to any empirical inquiry. If the cognitive sciences are empirical sciences, then research in the cognitive sciences could not have any significant implications for the philosophy of science. And that would be the end of the matter. Logical Empiricism is now typically understood as having exemplified this point of view.

More specifically, Logical Empiricism took it for granted (i) that scientific knowledge should be understood as ideally having the structure of a formal logical calculus, and (ii) that the empirical warrant for scientific claims is given by directly observed data together with formal rules which determine the weight of the evidence for or against the particular claims in question.

Type
Part XI. Implications of the Cognitive Sciences for Philosophy of Science
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1990 , Issue 2: Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers 1990 , 1990 , pp. 418 - 430
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1991

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Footnotes

1

The author gratefully acknowledges the support of the National Science Foundation and the hospitality of the Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin.

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