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How The Laws Of Physics Don't Even Fib
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 31 January 2023
Extract
The covering law model of explanation has a staying power not even to be outdone by Lazarus. For at least forty years, writer after writer has tried to put it in its grave for the last time. The most recent efforts come from Nancy Cartwright (1983). Her slant is at once modern and old fashioned. It is modern in that unlike the familiar charge that the covering law model lets in too much, her charge is that it does not let in enough. It is old fashioned in that the soft spot she presses is one recognized by Hempel and Oppenheim in their classical essay. (1948, p. 248).
Cartwright challenges the requirement that the sentences constituting the explanans (in particular the law or laws) must be true.
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- Part I. Physics
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- Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1986
References
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