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Grene on Mechanism and Reductionism: More Than Just a Side Issue

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2022

Robert N Brandon
Robert N Brandon*
Affiliation:
Duke University
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Extract

Two summers ago Marjorie Grene described a mutual acquaintance as a young fogy. That immediately suggested a fourfold classification: Young fogies, old fogies, young turks and old turks. Marjorie's place in this classification is obvious; moreover, it is relevant to today's session. Were she just out of graduate school we would wait awhile to honor her. Here she a fogy we wouldn't bother.

One of the ways Grene has expressed her anti-fogyism has been her consistent attacks on reductionism, especially reductionism in the philosophy of biology. In this paper I want to discuss the common association between ontological reductionism and a methodological position I will call mechanism. I wish to make three major points: (1) Mechanism (as I characterize it) is not to be identified with reductionism in any of its forms; in fact, mechanism leads to a nonreductionist ontology.

Type
Part IX. Marjorie Grene's Contributions to Philosophy of Science
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1984 , Issue 2: Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers 1984 , 1984 , pp. 344 - 353
Copyright
Copyright © 1985 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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