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Dutch Strategies for Diachronic Rules: When Believers See the Sure Loss Coming

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2022

Brad Armendt
Brad Armendt*
Affiliation:
Arizona State University
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Extract

Diachronic Dutch book arguments, or Dutch strategy arguments, have been used to recommend the rule of conditionalization (C) Jeffrey’s rule for fallible learning (J), and the principle of reflection (R). The arguments have been criticized in a variety of ways—more ways than can be discussed in this paper. Here we will look at two of the criticisms. As we proceed, it will become apparent how some criticisms not explicitly raised can be met; others will go unexamined. The criticisms are these: First, Dutch strategy arguments are said to fail as defenses of rules J and C, and principle R, because rational agents may violate each of those constraints, yet avoid vulnerability to a Dutch strategy; their knowledge of Dutch strategy arguments enables them to do this. Second, it is said to be no wonder that the arguments fail, because there are counter-examples to each of these purportedly general constraints on rational belief.

Type
Part VI. Decision Theory
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1992 , Issue 1: Volume One: Contributed Papers 1992 , 1992 , pp. 217 - 229
Copyright
Copyright © 1992 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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