Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-8kt4b Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-06-17T13:38:57.377Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Background Knowledge in Science: A Naturalistic Critique

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2022

Ronald N Giere
Ronald N Giere*
Affiliation:
Indiana University
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

There is a common theme in the papers by Levi (1985) and Shapere (1985). Both are much concerned with the nature and role of background knowledge in science. Yet the approaches to this common problem represented in these two papers are so different as to be almost incommensurable. This divergence, I think, is not solely the fault of the authors, both of whom are distinguished and experienced philosophers of science. It reflects widespread features of the philosophy of science as it is now practiced. I will begin by saying what I think these features are and by suggesting an alternative conception of our enterprise as philosophers of science. Then I will comment on some specific points in each of these papers from the standpoint of this alternative conception. Finally, I will give my own account of the role of background knowledge in a specific scientific case.

Type
Part XVI. Reason and Scientific Change
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1984 , Issue 2: Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers 1984 , 1984 , pp. 664 - 671
Copyright
Copyright © 1985 by the Philosophy of Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Giere, Ronald N (1983). “Testing Theoretical Hypotheses.” In Testing Scientific Theories. (Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Volume X.) Edited by John Earman. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Pages 269-298.Google Scholar
Giere, Ronald N (1985). “Philosophy of Science Naturalized.” Philosophy of Science 52: 331-356.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kahneman, D; SLovic, P and Tversky, A (eds.). (1982). Judgment Dnder Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Levi, Isaac (1985). “Messianic vs Myopic Realism.” In PSA 1984, Volume 2. Edited by Asquith, P.D and Kitcher, P. East Lansing: Philosophy of Science Association. Pages 617-636.Google Scholar
Quine, W.V.O (1969). “Epistemology Naturalized.” In Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. New York: Columbia University Press. Pages 69-90.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shapere, D (1982). “The Concept of Observation in Science and Philosophy.” Philosophy of Science 49: 485-525.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shapere, D (1985). “Objectivity, Rationality; and Scientific Change.” In PSA 1984. Volume 2. Edited by Asquith, P.D and Kitcher, P East Lansing: Philosophy of Science Assocation. Pages 637-663.Google Scholar