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Temporality, Secondary Qualities, and the Location of Sensations

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2022

Paul Fitzgerald
Paul Fitzgerald*
Affiliation:
Baruch College/City University of New York
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Extract

Several philosophers in recent years, e.g., Baker (1974-5, 1979), Grünbaum (1971), Rescher (1973) and Salmon (1974) have argued that something they call “temporal becoming” is mind-dependent. They see the issue as analogous to the traditional one about the mind-dependence of secondary qualities. Do directly seen colors, felt coldness, and salty taste exist in the mind-independent world? Or only within experience? We know how the dialectic dances around that question….

“Roses are red, violets are blue, in the same way that some of our afterimages and sense-data are.”

“No, roses and violets don't really have colors. Roses only have the property of selectively reflecting light in the 7200 Å region. That makes them look red to us. But they aren't really red. Science shows that.“

Type
Part VII. Tachyons, Temporal Becoming, and Thermodynamics
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1982 , Issue 1: Volume One: Contributed Papers 1982 , 1982 , pp. 293 - 303
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1982

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