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Convergent Realism and Approximate Truth

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2022

David B. Resnik
David B. Resnik*
Affiliation:
University of Wyoming
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Extract

Convergent realists typically maintain the following theses:

  1. Tl: Some scientific theories, literally interpreted, are at least approximately true.

  2. T2: Some scientific theories, literally interpreted, genuinely refer.

  3. T3: The history of mature sciences is a progressive approximation to the truth.

  4. T4: The world (reality) described by scientific theories is independent of our thoughts or theoretical commitments.

Convergent realists usually offer the infamous “success of science” argument as the strongest defense of their view. Scientific realism, according to convergent realists, is the only view that does not portray the success of science as miraculous (i.e., unexplainable). Various versions of convergent realism have been defended by writers such as Richard Boyd (1973,1980,1984), W.H. Newton-Smith (1978), Hilary Putnam (1975,1978), JJ.C. Smart (1963,1985,1989), and Russell Hardin and Jay Rosenberg (1982). Critics of convergent realism include Larry Laudan (1981), Arthur Fine (1984), and Bas van Fraassen (1980).

Type
Part XI. Realism, Methodology and Underdetermination
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1992 , Issue 1: Volume One: Contributed Papers 1992 , 1992 , pp. 421 - 434
Copyright
Copyright © 1992 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

1

I am grateful to James Forrester, Allan Franklin, James Martin, and Michael Resnik for helpful comments and criticism.

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