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A Bayesian Argument in Favor of Randomization

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2022

Zeno G. Swijtink
Zeno G. Swijtink*
Affiliation:
Stanford University
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Extract

The theory of personal probability must be explored with circumspection and imagination. For example, applying the theory naively one quickly comes to the conclusion that randomization is without value to statistics. This conclusion does not sound right; and it is not right.

L. J. Savage (1961, p. 585).

Randomization is a generally accepted principle of sound experimental design and common practice among working scientists. But many philosophers and some theoretical statisticians have rejected it. Bayesians have most often stated their opposition to randomization in terms of a decision theoretic argument. Not all Bayesians, however, could go along with that argument, as the above quotation by Leonard Savage testifies.

In this paper I will examine the Bayesian decision theoretic argument against randomization and show why it fails. By means of an example I will then give a partial justification of randomization in Bayesian terms.

Type
Part IV. Probability and Statistical Inference
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1982 , Issue 1: Volume One: Contributed Papers 1982 , 1982 , pp. 159 - 168
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1982

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