Introduction

Japan's social policy has been categorized as a “residual” system, not only because of its low public expenditure (Hill 1996, 21) but also because of the weakness of its institutional form, which relies on private measures (Bryson 1992, 106–10). According to Esping-Anderson's three welfare-state regimes—social democratic, liberal, and conservative, classified by the criteria of decommodification and cross-class solidarity (1990, 21–29)—the Japanese welfare system “combines—in fairly equal measure—key elements of both the liberal-residual and the conservative-corporatist” models (1997, 187).However, Esping-Andersen avoids specifically classifying Japan as one of these three regimes because its welfare system “is still in the process of evolution” (1990, 187). Japan, at the same time, had followed the pattern of “a paternalist welfare state, in which male bureaucrats would administer regulations and social insurance ‘for the good’ of breadwinning industrial workers and their dependants” (Skocpol 1995, 12). Indeed, the Japanese social insurance system is bound by Bismarck's legacy (which basically qualified male employees as eligible for insurance coverage), and its policymaking has been dominated by males: ruling-party politicians, top bureaucrats, and representatives of pressure groups (See Nakano 1997, 13–63, 81–85, 89–94).