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A Reply to “Myths About the Physical Sciences and Their Implications for Teaching Political Science”

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 April 2005

Mariusz Ozminkowski
Mariusz Ozminkowski
Affiliation:
California State Polytechnic University, Pomona
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Extract

Well, let us admit, we all suffer from at least a mild case of “social sciences inferiority complex.” So it seems does Kim Quaile Hill in his spirited defense of the “less exact” part of academe. He finds his students' skepticism about (maybe even disdain for) political science troubling and frustrating. He is unhappy with students questioning the validity and certainty of social sciences. He fights back. However, his solution to the problem is not only ill-conceived, but it has the potential of harming his (our?) own cause. Instead of dealing with students' skepticism of the scientific character of social sciences, he blames that skepticism on students' misperceptions and misconceptions about physical sciences. Still, initially his argument sounds convincing when the misconceptions are framed in terms of scientific illiteracy, pseudo-science, and superstition. The first impression is—of course, how one can appreciate social sciences without a good understanding of science in the more traditional hard-sciences sense. Yet, we quickly discover that is not the author's point. It is the opposite. It is not so much about distrusting physical sciences, but rather about trusting it too much. With so much faith in physical sciences, social sciences are perceived as soft, inaccurate, and uncertain.

Type
Departments
Information
PS: Political Science & Politics , Volume 38 , Issue 1 , January 2005 , pp. 3 - 5
Copyright
© 2005 by the American Political Science Association

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